O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36 (2019)

Confidentiality of certain information related to inmates; certain information classified as state secrets; declassification; exception; records custodians; penalties for breach

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Officials and employees of the department shall respect the confidential nature of information supplied by inmates who cooperate in remedying abuses and wrongdoing in the penal system. Any official or employee who breaks such a confidence and thereby subjects a cooperating inmate to physical jeopardy or harassment shall be subject to suspension or discharge.

(b) Investigation reports and intelligence data prepared by the Internal Investigations Unit of the department shall be classified as confidential state secrets and privileged under law, unless declassified in writing by the commissioner.

(c)(1) As used in this subsection, the term:

(A) “Dangerous sexual offense” shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 42-1-12.

(B) “Serious offense” shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 42-9-42.

(C) “Serious violent felony” shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 17-10-6.1.

(2) All institutional inmate files and central office inmate files of the department shall be classified as confidential state secrets and privileged under law, unless declassified in writing by the commissioner; provided, however, that:

(A)(i) Except for medical records, this subsection shall not

STATE/COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INST.

apply to information requested by the district attorney of the circuit in which the inmate was sentenced for a serious violent felony or sentenced for a dangerous sexual offense against a person less than 18 years of age for purposes of such district attorney submitting information or filing a written objection under Code Section 42-9-43;

(ii) The commissioner shall furnish the records provided for under division (i) of this subparagraph that were created on and after January 31, 2010, upon receipt of the request for such records from the district attorney, and such request shall state that the records are sought for purposes of submitting information or filing a written objection under Code Section 42-9-43; and

(iii) Any record provided for under this subparagraph shall be held in confidence by the district attorney and shall not be subject to disclosure under Article 4 of Chapter 18 of Title 50 and shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (f) of this Code section.

(B) These records shall be subject to subpoena by a court of competent jurisdiction of this state; and

(C) The commissioner shall prepare a report of the conduct of record of any inmate serving a sentence for a serious violent felony. When the report includes conduct which would constitute a serious offense, reasonably related information connected to such offense shall be included in the report. Such report shall be subject to disclosure under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 42-9-43.

(d)(1) As used in this subsection, the term “identifying information” means any records or information that reveals a name, residential or business address, residential or business telephone number, day and month of birth, social security number, or professional qualifications.

(2) The identifying information of any person or entity who participates in or administers the execution of a death sentence and the identifying information of any person or entity that manufactures, supplies, compounds, or prescribes the drugs, medical supplies, or medical equipment utilized in the execution of a death sentence shall be confidential and shall not be subject to disclosure under Article 4 of Chapter 18 of Title 50 or under judicial process. Such information shall be classified as a confidential state secret.

(e) The commissioner shall designate members of the department to be the official custodians of the records of the department. The custodians may certify copies or compilations, including extracts thereof, of the records of the department. Subject to the provisions of this Code section, in response to a subpoena or upon the request of any appropriate government or judicial official, the department may provide a duly authenticated copy of any record or other document. This authenticated copy may consist of a photocopy or computer printout of the requested document certified by the commissioner or his or her duly authorized representative.

(f) No person shall divulge or cause to be divulged in any manner any confidential state secret. Any person violating this Code section or any person who causes or procures a violation of this Code section or conspires to violate this Code section shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History

Ga. L. 1968, p. 1399, § 5; Ga. L. 1983, p. 680, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 42; Ga. L. 1984, p. 1361, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 42; Ga. L. 1985, p. 283, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 851, § 1; Ga. L. 2013, p. 1056, § 1A/HB 122; Ga. L. 2017, p. 585, § 2-4/SB 174; Ga. L. 2021, p. 91, § 1/HB 168. The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection (c), added subparagraph (c)(1)(A), redesignated former subparagraphs (c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B) as present subparagraphs (c)(1)(B) and (c)(1)(C), respectively, substituted the present provisions of paragraph (c)(2) for the former provisions, which read: “All institutional inmate files and central office inmate files of the department shall be classified as confidential state secrets and privileged under law, unless declassified in writing by the commissioner; provided, however, that these records shall be subject to subpoena by a court of competent jurisdiction of this state and provided, further, that the commissioner shall prepare a report of the conduct of record of any inmate serving a sentence for a serious violent felony. When the report includes conduct which

would constitute a serious offense, reasonably related information connected to such offense shall be included in the report. Such report shall be subject to disclosure under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 42-9-43.”; and added subsection (f).

Annotations

Cross references. Privileged communications generally, § 24-5-501 et seq. Inspection of public records generally, § 50-18-70 et seq. Administrative rules and regulations. Administration, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Board of Corrections, Chapter 125-1. Law reviews. For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 230 (1997). For article, “Death Penalty,” see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 51 (2014). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 115 (2017). For annual survey on local governments, see 74 Mercer L. Rev. 197 (2022).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - Georgia Supreme Court held that it is was not unconstitutional for the State of Georgia to maintain the confidentiality of the names and other identifying information of the persons and entities involved in executions, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d), including those who manufacture the drug or drugs to be used. Owens v. Hill,

295 Ga. 302, 758 S.E.2d 794, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 400, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 980, 135 S. Ct. 449, 190 L. Ed. 2d 340, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 7387 (2014). Prisoner’s challenge to Lethal Injection Secrecy Act. - Condemned prisoner’s challenge to the state’s method of execution based on Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36, was

STATE/COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INST.

not timely because the Act was not a change to the injection protocol itself. The Act merely altered how the state responded to requests for information about executions, which was different from how the state carried out the protocol. Gissendaner v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3134 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 925, 135 S. Ct. 1580, 191 L. Ed. 2d 661, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1849 (2015), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 925, 135 S. Ct. 1581, 191 L. Ed. 2d 661, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1857 (2015). Prisoner’s emergency motion to stay the prisoner’s execution was denied because the motion was made at the last moment and without adequate explanation, the prisoner did not show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and the equities counseled against imposing the stay since the prisoner did not identify a cognizable liberty interest infringed by the Georgia Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36, the prisoner did not appeal the dismissal of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner failed to state a claim that could be redressed, the prisoner’s conclusory allegation about an alternate drug source was implausible, Georgia’s current protocol had been used at least seven times in the last year without incident, and the prisoner was provided with Georgia’s analysis, drug logs, and testing results. Jones v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 811 F.3d 1288, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1697 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1125, 136 S. Ct. 998, 194 L. Ed. 2d 16, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 975 (2016). Change in law did not affect statute of limitations on method of execution claim. - Neither the Georgia Department of Corrections’ anticipated use of an adulterated pentobarbital nor the lethal injection secrecy act, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36,

established a significant alteration in Georgia’s method of execution sufficient to restart the statute of limitations on a death row inmate’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which had expired. Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11396 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 928, 134 S. Ct. 2838, 189 L. Ed. 2d 803, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4294 (2014). Changes made in 2013 were not substantial changes to Georgia’s execution protocol and the defendant’s method-ofexecution claim accrued in October 2001 and must have been filed by October 2003 to be timely; the defendant’s federal complaint challenging lethal injection, filed on May 12, 2017, was over ten years too late. Ledford v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8554 (11th Cir. 2017). Journalist’s entitlement to information about lethal injections. - When an investigative journalist sought records relating to the purchase, acquisition, transportation, and handling of the drugs that the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) used or planned to use for executions by lethal injection under the Georgia’s Open Records Act (ORA), O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., the trial court erred in dismissing the journalist’s ORA claim because, while there might be records in the possession of the GDOC that consisted solely of identifying information protected by the Secrecy Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36, the allegations of the amended complaint did not disclose with certainty that the journalist would not be entitled to relief under the ORA. Further, if protected information was properly redacted, there would be no violation of the Secrecy Act. Blau v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 364 Ga. App. 1, 873 S.E.2d 464, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 247 (2022).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Declassification by commissioner. - Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36 investigation reports and intelligence data prepared by the Internal Investigations Unit of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (Corrections) are classified as confidential state secrets and privileged under

law except as declassified in writing by the commissioner of offender rehabilitation (corrections). 1985 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 85-4. Fingerprinting required. - Misdemeanor offenses arising under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(f) are offenses for which those

charged are to be fingerprinted. 2021 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 21-1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 25 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1992–2023 · leading case: Owens Et Al. v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014).
Owens Et Al. v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014). · cites it 18× “” OCGA § 42-5-36 (d) (2).2 Hill filed 2 OCGA § 42-5-36 (d) (as amended effective July 1, 2013), referred to in the discussion below as the execution-participant confidentiality statute, provides as follows: (d) (1) As used in this subsection, the term “identifying information”…”
Jones v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 812 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2016). · cites it 13× “While Jones’s complaint in the district court alleged an Eighth Amendment challenge to Georgia’s method of execution as well as a separate due process challenge to Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36, he has not appealed from the district court’s dismissal…”
Richard Jordan v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2020). · cites it 4× “See O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d). Plaintiffs filed objections to the magistrate judge’s ruling, arguing that the information sought by the subpoena was not privileged.”
Jones v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 811 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). · cites it 5× “1 In his § 1983 complaint -- just filed on December 22, 2015, in the Northern District of Georgia -- Jones alleged that Georgia’s method of execution amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act,…”
Presnell v. State, 551 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. 2001). · cites it 8× “In addition, the record contains a sworn certificate authenticating the prison records, signed by the assistant director of legal services for the Department of Corrections and stating that OCGA § 42-5-36 had been complied with.”
Hardaway Co. v. Rives, 422 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. 1992). · cites it 10× “However, it is apparent that this definition cannot be the legislatively intended meaning in the Georgia Code, as a close variant of the term, "confidential state secrets," has been used in statutes that concern subjects at a lower level than national or state security, see OCGA…”
Marcus A. Wellons v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014). · cites it 3× “O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36; see Owens v. Hill, No.”
Kelley v. Johnson, 2016 Ark. 268 (Ark. 2016). · cites it 2× “§ 13-757 (C) (2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-36 (d)(2) (2014); Fla.”
Ledford v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2017). · cites it 2× “; O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d). This Court has squarely held that these changes made in 2013 are not substantial changes to Georgia’s execution protocol.”
Joseph Wood, III v. Charles Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). · cites it 2× “, Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-36 . But several flawed executions this year, including two in Oklahoma, and one in Ohio featuring the 7 Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, States Face Shortage of Key Lethal Injection Drug, N.”
Stephen Michael West v. Derrick D. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113 (Tenn. 2015). “Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-36 (d) (effective July 1, 2013).”
Gissendaner v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 803 F.3d 565 (11th Cir. 2015). “See Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-36 (d) (classifying as a “confidential state secret” any identifying information concerning any person or entity participating in an execution).”
— 42-5-36(c) — 1 case
Mountain v. Dozier (M.D. Ga. 2021).
— 42-5-36(d) — 11 cases
Jones v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 811 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). “1 In his § 1983 complaint -- just filed on December 22, 2015, in the Northern District of Georgia -- Jones alleged that Georgia’s method of execution amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act,…”
Jones v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 812 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2016). “While Jones’s complaint in the district court alleged an Eighth Amendment challenge to Georgia’s method of execution as well as a separate due process challenge to Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36, he has not appealed from the district court’s dismissal…”
Richard Jordan v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2020). “See O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d). Plaintiffs filed objections to the magistrate judge’s ruling, arguing that the information sought by the subpoena was not privileged.”
Ledford v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2017). “; O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d). This Court has squarely held that these changes made in 2013 are not substantial changes to Georgia’s execution protocol.”
Marcus A. Wellons v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014). “O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36; see Owens v. Hill, No.”
— 42-5-36(d)(2) — 5 cases
Richard Jordan v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2020). “See O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d). Plaintiffs filed objections to the magistrate judge’s ruling, arguing that the information sought by the subpoena was not privileged.”
Jones v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 812 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2016). “While Jones’s complaint in the district court alleged an Eighth Amendment challenge to Georgia’s method of execution as well as a separate due process challenge to Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36, he has not appealed from the district court’s dismissal…”
Jones v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 811 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). “1 In his § 1983 complaint -- just filed on December 22, 2015, in the Northern District of Georgia -- Jones alleged that Georgia’s method of execution amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act,…”
Richard Jordan v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 908 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2018).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.