O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 43-21-3.1 (2019)

Notice of termination of occupancy by innkeeper

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Whenever the keeper of a hotel, apartment hotel, boarding house, inn, or other accommodations furnished on a day-to-day or weekly basis wishes to terminate the occupancy of a guest for reasons other than those described in subsection (b) of this Code section, the keeper shall give notice of such intention to the guest. The period of time to be specified in the notice as to when the occupancy will be declared terminated by the keeper shall be equal to the period of time for which occupancy is paid for by the guest and accepted by the keeper. (b) The notice requirement of subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply to a termination of occupancy for cause, such as failure to pay sums due, failure to abide by rules of occupancy, failure to have or maintain reservations, or other action by a guest.

History

Code 1981, § 43-21-3.1, enacted by Ga.

L. 1986, p. 1212, § 1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1032, § 13/HB 1168.

HOTEL, INN, & ROADHOUSE OPERATORS

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Proper termination of hotel room rental agreement. - Contraband found by police officers in the defendant’s hotel room was properly seized under the Fourth Amendment because the hotel manager had the authority to terminate the defendant’s rental agreement without prior notice on the ground the defendant was selling drugs from the room and creating a disturbance at the hotel, and did so before the officers went to the room; thus, the defendant no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. The officers had to determine if anyone was in the room before the clerk could lock the door and effectuate the eviction, and thus properly entered the room to search in places where someone could be hiding and properly seized marijuana found on a table in plain view as well as marijuana located under the bed. Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 288 (2009). As a hotel manager had grounds to conclude that a guest was causing a disturbance, the manager was authorized to evict the guest for cause without giving advance notice under O.C.G.A. § 43-213.1(a). Therefore, the guest’s arrest for criminal trespass was legal and the

guest’s false imprisonment claim against the hotel and manager was properly dismissed on summary judgment. Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 310 Ga. App. 58, 712 S.E.2d 91, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 488 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1649, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 854 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011). Persons not paying fee for room are not guests and are not entitled to notice of eviction. - Trial court erred by assuming that the defendants had a continuing expectation of privacy in a hotel room because a guest services agent had the authority to evict the defendants from the room once the agent learned that the defendants had checked into the hotel using a fraudulent credit card, and because the defendants had obtained the room through a fraudulent credit card that would not be honored by the credit card company, the defendants were not paying a fee for the room and were not guests within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 43-21-1(1); therefore, the defendants could be evicted from the room for cause, and if the defendants were being evicted from the hotel for cause, under O.C.G.A. § 43-21-3.1(b), the defendants were not entitled to notice of the eviction. State v. Delvechio, 301 Ga. App. 560, 687 S.E.2d 845, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1274 (2009).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1993–2023 · leading case: Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 712 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
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Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 712 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 6× “We find that Celestin, as the hotel manager, was accordingly authorized to evict Lewis for cause and was not required to give the advance notice contemplated by OCGA § 43-21-3.1 (a). 12 We also conclude that the officer’s instructions to Lewis consti *61 tuted a criminal…”
State v. Delvechio, 687 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “Further, they could be evicted from the room for cause, and if they were being evicted from the hotel for cause, under OCGA § 43-21-3.1 (b) 1 they would not be entitled to notice of the eviction.”
Johnson v. State, 679 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. 2009). · cites it 2× “1 (b), which provides that a hotel need not provide notice of a “termination of occupancy for cause, such as failure to pay sums due, failure to abide by rules of occupancy, failure to have or maintain reservations, or other action by a guest.”
In Re Tollman-Hundley Dalton, L.P., 162 B.R. 26 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993). · cites it 2× “An example of innkeeper’s special rights can be found in the termination provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 43-21-3.1(a), 43-21-3.1(b). An innkeeper’s liability is governed by O.”
Commonwealth v. Molina, 948 N.E.2d 402 (Mass. 2011). “ll, quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 43-21-3.1 (b) (LexisNexis 2008).”
Johnson v. State, 665 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 43-21-3.1 (b) (permitting innkeepers to terminate occupancy without notice).”
Darren Jordan v. Kimpton Hotel & Restaurant Grp., LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 20× “Given our conclusion that there is evidence that Jordan was entitled to occupy the room at the time of his eviction, we also reverse the grant of summary judgment on his claims for a violation of OCGA § 43-21-3.1; invasion of privacy; and false imprisonment.”
Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Amertrius Neason (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 43-21-3.1. Efficiency Lodge argues that, aside from the language of the contract, they are nevertheless considered an “apartment hotel” under this statute and are thus entitled to evict their residents without resorting to dispossessory proceedings.”
Phillip Ray Lindsey, Jr. v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “16 See OCGA § 43-21-3.1 (a) (“Whenever the keeper of a hotel, apartment hotel, boarding house, inn, or other accommodations furnished on a day-to-day or weekly basis wishes to terminate the occupancy of a guest for reasons other than those described in subsection (b) of this…”
— 43-21-3.1(a) — 1 case
In Re Tollman-Hundley Dalton, L.P., 162 B.R. 26 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993). “An example of innkeeper’s special rights can be found in the termination provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 43-21-3.1(a), 43-21-3.1(b). An innkeeper’s liability is governed by O.”
— 43-21-3.1(b) — 1 case
Johnson v. State, 665 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). “See OCGA § 43-21-3.1 (b) (permitting innkeepers to terminate occupancy without notice).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.