O.C.G.A. § 44-11-2 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Heirs at law, donees by parol gift of land, partnerships, lessors of plaintiff, and administrators ejected by their successors may recover under O.C.G.A. § 4411-2. McKay v. Kendrick, 44 Ga. 607, 1872 Ga. LEXIS 378 (1872); Boynton v. Brown, 67 Ga. 396, 1881 Ga. LEXIS 192 (1881); Wolfe v. Baxter, 86 Ga. 705, 13 S.E. 18, 1891 Ga. LEXIS 48 (1891); McDonough & Co. v. Carter & Co., 98 Ga. 703, 25 S.E. 938, 1896 Ga. LEXIS 125 (1896); Ellis v. Dasher, 101 Ga. 5, 29 S.E. 268, 1897 Ga. LEXIS 146 (1897); Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 375, 45 S.E. 260, 1903 Ga. LEXIS 565 (1903); Whitehead v. Pitts, 127 Ga. 774, 56 S.E. 1004, 1907 Ga. LEXIS 477 (1907). A cestui of an executed trust may maintain an action of ejectment. Glover v. Stamps, 73 Ga. 209, 1884 Ga. LEXIS 102 (1884). Squatter may be ejected. Eaton v. Freeman, 63 Ga. 535, 1879 Ga. LEXIS 272 (1879). Section applies to equity bills. - O.C.G.A. § 44-11-2 applies where a bill in equity was filed as the equivalent of an action of ejectment. Nolan v. Pelham, 77 Ga. 262, 2 S.E. 639, 1887 Ga. LEXIS 101 (1887). With prior possession alone, section allows recovery from subsequent unlawful occupant. - While under O.C.G.A. § 44-11-1, a plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength of plaintiff’s own title, and not on the weakness of the defendant’s title, under O.C.G.A. § 44-11-2 plaintiff may recover upon prior possession alone, against one who subsequently acquires possession of the land by mere entry and without any lawful right whatever. Smith v. Bailey, 183 Ga. 869, 189 S.E. 905, 1937 Ga. LEXIS 418 (1937). Prior possession requires occupancy. - A mere entry upon premises, when unaccompanied by an actual occupancy, is not a prior possession. Flannery & Co. v. Hightower, 97 Ga. 592, 25 S.E. 371, 1895 Ga. LEXIS 534 (1895). Constructive possession under color of title. - Where reliance is had upon possession alone, and not upon possession under color of title, the possession

must be actual; but where the possession is accompanied by color of title, the possession relied upon may be either actual or constructive. Smith v. Bailey, 183 Ga. 869, 189 S.E. 905, 1937 Ga. LEXIS 418 (1937). Possession for less than prescriptive period supports recovery for damages. - Possession as referred to in O.C.G.A. § 44-11-2, for less than the prescriptive period, will support a recovery against one who after such possession commenced enters without a lawful right. Slaughter v. Land, 194 Ga. 156, 21 S.E.2d 72, 1942 Ga. LEXIS 544 (1942). Prior possession sufficient for recovery against trespasser. - Prior possession is some evidence of title, and is sufficient as a basis for recovery of possession as against a trespasser. Terrell v. Gould, 168 Ga. 607, 148 S.E. 515, 1929 Ga. LEXIS 196 (1929); Chandler v. Raney, 201 Ga. 544, 40 S.E.2d 661, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 283 (1946); Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 407 (1970). Where a plaintiff relies on prior possession, plaintiff need not aver that the defendant is a trespasser. Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72, 42 S.E. 786 (1903); Moss v. Chappell, 126 Ga. 196, 54 S.E. 968, 1906 Ga. LEXIS 361 (1906); Jackson v. Strickland, 127 Ga. 106, 56 S.E. 107, 1906 Ga. LEXIS 754 (1906). Entry under mere claim of right not sufficient to defeat prior possession, for a mere claim of right is not a “lawful right” of entry within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 44-11-2. Chandler v. Raney, 201 Ga. 644, 40 S.E.2d 661 (1946); Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 407 (1970). A defendant in an action of ejectment, where prior possession is shown in the plaintiff, cannot successfully defend by showing merely that the plaintiff did not in fact have title, or by setting up outstanding title in a third person, unless defendant connects personally with that title. Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 407 (1970); Fessenden v.

Parrigin, 228 Ga. 61, 183 S.E.2d 771, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 461 (1971). Defendant may set up a bona fide possession with title in a third person. Johnson v. Lancaster, 5 Ga. 39, 1848 Ga. LEXIS 70 (1848); Jones v. Scoggins, 11 Ga. 119, 1852 Ga. LEXIS 19 (1852). Where lessor of plaintiff was ejected, plaintiff cannot be said to have voluntarily abandoned, because plaintiff did not resume possession immediately upon the land becoming vacant again. McKay v. Kendrick, 44 Ga. 607, 1872 Ga. LEXIS 378 (1872); Lovett v. Taylor, 144 Ga. 210, 87 S.E. 7, 1915 Ga. LEXIS 134 (1915). Action proper against possessor where petition alleges possessor claims under will. - If the petition in ejectment alleges that the defendant as an individual is in possession of the property claiming the title thereto as a devisee under the will, there is no exemption from the action, and the action is properly brought against the party in possession. Sharp v. Autry, 183 Ga. 282, 188 S.E. 354, 1936 Ga. LEXIS 217 (1936). Possession at time of death supports administrator’s claim for land and mesne profit. - If a person dies while in possession of land under a bona fide claim of right thereto, such possession at the time of death is prima facie evidence of title in the deceased that will support an action of complaint for land and mesne profit instituted by the administrator of such deceased person against a third person, who after the death of the intestate entered possession adversely and not under a better title. Segars v. Crump, 177 Ga. 665, 170 S.E. 785, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 385 (1933). Bona fide entry may be made under void deed. Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 375, 45 S.E. 260, 1903 Ga. LEXIS 565 (1903); Wilcox v. Moore, 118 Ga. 351, 45 S.E. 400, 1903 Ga. LEXIS 558 (1903). Utility not ejectable if appropriated land becomes necessary for public service. - If a landowner permits, without legal objection, a public utility company to appropriate the owner’s land to its necessary corporate use until such becomes a necessary and constituent part of its service to the public, and the rights of

the public intervene to such extent that to oust the company would interrupt the service and deny it to the public, to protect the public rather than the company, the landowner is estopped from recovering the land in ejectment or from enjoining its use for the service, but may, if the owner moves in time, sue for damages. Wiggins v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 245 Ga. 526, 266 S.E.2d 148, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 845 (1980). Plaintiff in fi. Fa. Has burden if defendant not in possession. - Where property is levied on under execution and claimed by a third party, O.C.G.A. § 9-13102 imposes the burden of proof on the plaintiff in fi. fa. in all cases where the property levied on is, at the time of such levy, not in possession of the defendant in execution. One of the ways in which the onus may be carried is to show possession in the defendant in fi. fa. after the rendition of the judgment. Such proof will raise a presumption of title in the defendant and require a finding in favor of the plaintiff in fi. fa. in the absence of rebutting evidence. Roughton v. Roughton, 178 Ga. 367, 173 S.E. 673, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 56 (1934). Defendant has burden to show record title or adverse possession. - The burden is on the defendant to show that defendant has a title superior to the plaintiffs’ rights acquired by possession either by showing record title to the property, or title by adverse possession. Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 407 (1970). Evidence of prior possession shifts burden of proof. - Evidence of prior possession alone is sufficient to require the defendant to prove that defendant has a better title than that of the plaintiff. Terrell v. Gould, 158 Ga. 607, 148 S.E. 515 (1929); Crews v. Russell, 199 Ga. 732, 35 S.E.2d 444, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 373 (1945); Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 407 (1970). Nonsuit proper where right to possession not proven. Priester v. Melton, 123 Ga. 375, 51 S.E. 330, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 470 (1905); Delay v. Felton, 133 Ga. 15, 65 S.E. 122, 1909 Ga. LEXIS 132 (1909). Nonsuit proper where property given up with animo revertendi. - A

nonsuit is proper where premises are relinquished with an animo revertendi. Administrators of Jones v. Nunn, 12 Ga. 469, 1853 Ga. LEXIS 18 (1853); McKay v. Kendrick, 44 Ga. 607, 1872 Ga. LEXIS 378 (1872); King v. Sears, 91 Ga. 577, 18 S.E. 830, 1893 Ga. LEXIS 288 (1893); Jackson v. Strickland, 127 Ga. 106, 56 S.E. 107, 1906 Ga. LEXIS 754 (1906); Lovett v. Taylor, 144 Ga. 210, 87 S.E. 7, 1915 Ga. LEXIS 134 (1915); Walton v. Whitton, 158 Ga. 741, 124 S.E. 338, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 334 (1924).

Ejectment petition properly denied. - Where a successor received title to a disputed parcel of land by means of a quitclaim deed, an original property owner was not able in an ejectment petition to seek recovery based upon prior possession, which required that the defendant subsequently acquired possession by mere entry and without any lawful right whatsoever. Brooks v. Green, 277 Ga. 722, 594 S.E.2d 629, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 273 (2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Ejectment, § 19 et seq.

C.J.S. 28A C.J.S., Ejectment, §§ 16, 17.