O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-12-75 (2019)

Exercise of discretion by factor; diligence

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Since peculiar confidence is reposed in a factor, he may, in the absence of instructions, exercise his discretion according to the general usages of the trade. In return, greater and more skillful diligence and the most active good faith are required of him.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 2090; Code 1868, § 2085; Code 1873, § 2111; Code 1882,

§ 2111; Civil Code 1895, § 2929; Civil Code 1910, § 3502; Code 1933, § 12-401.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Express contract binds factor. - If there is an express contract whereby goods will be held until a sale is autho-

rized, the factor is bound by the terms of the agreement as actually made, and is liable to the owner for any damages which

may be sustained by reason of an unauthorized sale. Wood & Bro. v. Jones & Son, 10 Ga. App. 735, 73 S.E. 1099, 1912 Ga. App. LEXIS 664 (1912); Campbell v. Redwine Bros., 22 Ga. App. 455, 96 S.E. 347, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 553 (1918). O.C.G.A. § 44-12-75 inapplicable to accounts receivable factor. - O.C.G.A. § 44-12-75 was originally intended to apply to a factor as bailee of merchantable goods, a practice rarely followed in modern day commerce, and thus it would be inappropriate to apply O.C.G.A. § 4412-75 to an accounts receivable factor.

Rather, the relationship between the parties to an accounts receivable factoring agreement must be governed by their contractual agreements and, to the extent applicable, the provisions of Title 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. CC Fin., Inc. v. Ross, 250 Ga. 832, 301 S.E.2d 262, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 634 (1983). Statutory duties of a factor do not apply to an accounts receivable factor. American Spacers, Ltd. v. Ross, 166 Ga. App. 829, 305 S.E.2d 659, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2342 (1983).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Account stated as between principal and factor, 3 A.L.R. 293. Right of a factor, commission merchant, or produce broker to sell property to protect advances, 40 A.L.R. 387. Relation between customer and broker receiving bonds or other securities for sale or exchange, 52 A.L.R. 501.

Purchaser’s right to protection under factor’s act where transaction involves exchange of goods, 132 A.L.R. 525. Stockyard operator’s liability for injury to or death of stock, 40 A.L.R.2d 988. Factor’s liability based on delay in marketing and selling principal’s goods, 3 A.L.R.3d 815.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 2 cases, 1983–1983 · leading case: C C Fin., Inc. v. Ross, 301 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. 1983).

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C C Fin., Inc. v. Ross, 301 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. 1983). · cites it 9× “We granted the petition of C C Financial for a writ of certiorari, to consider whether C C Financial is a factor within the meaning of OCGA § 44-12-75 (Code Ann. § 12-401); whether the dispute between these parties is governed by their factoring agreement; and the impact of…”

Am. Spacers, Ltd. v. Ross, 305 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that OCGA § 44-12-75 (Code Ann. § 12-401) which applies to the “[e]xercise of discretion by [a] factor; diligence,” does not apply to an accounts receivable factor.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.