Duty of probate court.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-13-101 does not require the probate judge to enter approval on the schedule of property filed by a debtor seeking its benefit. Carrie v. Carnes, 145 Ga. 184, 88 S.E. 949 (1916).

Federal bankruptcy debtors exempt from O.C.G.A. § 44-13-101. - The federal Bankruptcy Code, rules, and official forms, rather than Georgia law, apply and control in prescribing the procedure whereby exemptions are to be claimed in a bankruptcy case, and, as a result, debtors in bankruptcy are not required to comply with O.C.G.A. § 44-13-101. Caruthers v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 87 Bankr. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).

Where land lies in more than one county, the record must be made in each of the counties where the land set apart is situated. McLamb & Co. v. Lambertson, 4 Ga. App. 553, 62 S.E. 107 (1908).

Contents of schedule.

- The schedule filed by an insolvent debtor should contain a list of the property which the debtor owned at the time of filing the same. Johnson v. Martin, 25 Ga. 268 (1858).

Sufficiency of description.

- In a statutory homestead the description of the property should be sufficiently definite to impart notice of the property homesteaded. Arnold v. Faulk, 19 Ga. App. 797, 92 S.E. 294 (1917); Worley v. Arnold, 74 Ga. App. 772, 41 S.E.2d 568 (1947).

Owner of property must be disclosed.

- The schedule of exempt property must, on its face, disclose in express terms or by reasonable implication, whose property it is that the schedule is meant to comprehend and secure. Mapp v. Long, 62 Ga. 568 (1879).

Property within specified classes.

- A schedule of property returned to the ordinary (now probate judge) as required by O.C.G.A. § 44-13-101 must be of particular property falling within the classes specified in the statute. Kendall v. Parker, 146 Ga. 260, 91 S.E. 31 (1916).

Taking both homesteads prohibited.

- An applicant for a homestead is not authorized to take both the statutory and the constitutional homesteads. Worley v. Arnold, 74 Ga. App. 772, 41 S.E.2d 568 (1947).

Wife obtaining exemption.

- The wife may obtain an exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-101 where the husband refuses. Connally v. Hardwick, 61 Ga. 501 (1878).

Refusal of husband essential.

- It is essential to the validity of a schedule filed by the wife for the purpose of having the property of the husband set apart as exempt that it shall affirmatively appear in the schedule that the husband refused to file the same; and if this fact does not so appear, the schedule, though recorded, is void, and may be collaterally attacked in any court of competent jurisdiction in which the creditors of the husband are seeking to subject the property embraced in the schedule to the payment of the husband's debts. Mutual Benefit Bldg. Ass'n v. Tanner, 96 Ga. 338, 23 S.E. 403 (1895); Davis v. Lumpkin, 106 Ga. 582, 32 S.E. 626 (1899); Marcrum v. Washington, 109 Ga. 296, 34 S.E. 585 (1899); Hirsch Bros. & Co. v. Stinson, 112 Ga. 348, 37 S.E. 365 (1900). See also Sheppard v. Davis, 22 Ga. App. 733, 97 S.E. 262 (1918).

Resort to equity unnecessary.

- Where the widow of an insolvent intestate proceeds to obtain an exemption of personal property, there is no necessity to resort to equity to prevent the property from being seized and sold by a creditor of the intestate pending the filing and record of her schedule, or after such filing and record. Her remedy to recover the property from one having unlawful possession is by possessory warrant in a proper case, or by trover. Morgan v. Community Loan & Inv. Co., 195 Ga. 675, 25 S.E.2d 413 (1943).

Amendment of schedule.

- If the applicant fails to describe the property with sufficient certainty to identify it the applicant may amend the schedule by giving a sufficiently accurate and definite description. Redding v. Lennon, 112 Ga. 491, 37 S.E. 711 (1900).

A void schedule may be disregarded by an officer, and the property therein set forth be levied on. Kendall v. Parker, 146 Ga. 260, 91 S.E. 31 (1916).

Fullness of schedule question for jury.

- See Mims v. Lockett, 20 Ga. 474 (1856).

Description held sufficient.

- See McNair v. Fortner, 149 Ga. 654, 101 S.E. 772 (1920).

Description held insufficient.

- See Barfield v. Reynolds Banking Co., 40 Ga. App. 305, 149 S.E. 302 (1929).

Cited in Wardlaw v. Woodruff, 175 Ga. 515, 165 S.E. 557 (1932); Clark v. Kinney, 177 Ga. 864, 171 S.E. 763 (1933).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Exemptions, § 128 et seq. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homesteads, § 77 et seq.

ALR.

- Homestead right of cotenant as affecting partition, 140 A.L.R. 1170.