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Call Now: 904-383-7448Property set apart pursuant to Code Section 44-13-2 for a spouse, for a spouse and minor children, for minor children alone, or for dependents of a debtor (1) upon the death of the spouse or the spouse's remarriage, when set apart to the spouse alone, (2) upon the attaining of the age of 18 by the minor children or their emancipation during minority, when set apart for the minor children, (3) upon the death or remarriage of the spouse and the attaining of the age of 18 by the minor children or the emancipation of the minor children, when set apart to the spouse and minor children, and (4) upon a former dependent person's no longer being eligible to be claimed by the debtor as a dependent for income tax purposes pursuant to Code Section 48-7-26, shall revert to the estate from which it was set apart unless it was sold or reinvested pursuant to this article, in which case this Code section shall apply to and follow all the reinvestments unless the fee simple has been sold as provided in this article.
(Ga. L. 1868, p. 27, § 10; Ga. L. 1869, p. 25, § 1; Code 1873, § 2024; Ga. L. 1876, p. 48, § 6; Code 1882, § 2024; Civil Code 1895, § 2846; Civil Code 1910, § 3396; Code 1933, § 51-705; Code 1981, §44-13-21; Code 1981, §44-13-20, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1983, p. 1170, § 2; Ga. L. 2006, p. 141, § 8/HB 847.)
The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, near the middle of this Code section, substituted "18" for "majority" twice and substituted "emancipation" for "marriage" twice.
- Emancipation of minors, Art. 6, Ch. 11, T. 15.
- Ga. L. 1983, p. 1170, § 2, effective July 1, 1983, redesignated former Code Section 44-13-21 as this Code section. The 1983 Act also redesignated former Code Section 44-13-20, relating to costs of proceedings, as present Code Section 44-13-19.
- For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 79 (2006).
- Homestead property set apart to a wife, or wife and minor children, etc., upon the termination of the homestead estate reverts to the estate from which it was set apart unless it is sold or reinvested in pursuance of the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-20. Griffin v. Griffin, 153 Ga. 547, 113 S.E. 161 (1922).
Public policy favors support of minor children by the father's estate after his death. Russell v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 247 Ga. 556, 276 S.E.2d 641 (1981).
Homestead did not terminate so long as the daughters of the person who procured it and who were considered as beneficiaries of it, continued indigent and dependent, and remained with the homesteader, having no other home, and deriving support from the homesteader. Torrance v. Boyd, 63 Ga. 22 (1879).
- Where a man as the head of a family had set apart to himself as a homestead certain land, his family at that time consisting of a wife and several children, male and female, and where subsequently all of the children became of age, and all married except one daughter, who continued to live upon the land and to derive a support therefrom, upon the death of the man and his wife the homestead terminated, and the land was subject to be sold by his administrator for purposes of administration. Towns v. Mathews, 91 Ga. 546, 17 S.E. 955 (1893); Haynes v. Schaefer, 96 Ga. 743, 22 S.E. 327 (1895); Jones v. McCrary, 123 Ga. 282, 51 S.E. 349 (1912); Bell v. Carter, 138 Ga. 530, 75 S.E. 638 (1912); Vaughn v. Wheaton, 145 Ga. 311, 89 S.E. 210 (1916).
- The mere fact that a minor who is the sole beneficiary of a homestead estate does not live upon the property, and leaves the head of the family to use the proceeds of the same in such a way as the minor desires for a period of ten years, without calling the minor to account, does not cause the homestead estate to terminate and become subject to levy and sale as the property of the head of the family. Sigman v. Austin, 112 Ga. 570, 37 S.E. 894 (1901).
- The wife, after the death of the husband, having continued to enjoy the benefit of the homestead up to the time of her own death was neither entitled to dower nor to a child's part, and at her death the property reverted to the husband's estate. Love v. Anderson, 89 Ga. 612, 16 S.E. 68 (1892).
Cited in Hall v. Matthews, 68 Ga. 490 (1882); Gresham v. Johnson, 70 Ga. 631 (1883); Sutton v. Rosser, 109 Ga. 204, 34 S.E. 346, 77 Am. St. R. 367 (1899); Vaughn v. Wheaton, 145 Ga. 311, 89 S.E. 210 (1916); Dudley v. Griggs, 150 Ga. 153, 103 S.E. 89 (1920); Wardlaw v. Woodruff, 175 Ga. 515, 165 S.E. 557 (1932); Clavin v. Clavin, 238 Ga. 421, 233 S.E.2d 151 (1977).
- 40 C.J.S., Homesteads, §§ 105, 170 et seq.
No results found for Georgia Code 44-13-20.