List of property.

- Whether all or only a part of the estate is to be exempt, the schedule must contain a list of all the property owned by the decedent. Blackstone v. Kritzer, 120 Ga. 78, 47 S.E. 585 (1904).

No schedule.

- Where there is no schedule of property, the homestead is void. Peterson v. Calhoun, 135 Ga. 103, 68 S.E. 1022 (1910).

Schedule amendable.

- The schedule is a part of the pleadings, and is amendable at any time prior to judgment. Davis v. James, 145 Ga. 325, 89 S.E. 203 (1916).

Property included by mistake.

- A petition for homestead may be amended by adding to the schedule something which has been omitted, but not by striking therefrom any article of property therein set forth. If the applicant has by mistake inserted property belonging not to the applicant but to another, the applicant should dismiss the application and file another one, omitting such articles of property not belonging to the applicant as were in the previous schedule. McWilliams v. Bones, 84 Ga. 199, 10 S.E. 723 (1890); Smith v. Exchange Bank, 25 Ga. App. 278, 103 S.E. 99 (1920).

Sale of article included in schedule.

- The sale by the applicant, after making an application, of an article which the applicant had placed on the schedule, was sufficient to have defeated the application, unless the applicant accounted for the money and delivered up the same for the benefit of creditors. McWilliams v. Bones, 84 Ga. 199, 10 S.E. 723 (1890).

Statutory exemptions inapplicable in federal bankruptcy cases.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 44-13-4(b) and44-13-7 deal with constitutional exemptions from the levy and sale of property, and these statutory provisions simply do not apply in the context of federal bankruptcy cases. Caruthers v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 87 Bankr. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).

Wife not head of family.

- A wife having children by a former as well as by a present husband cannot be said to be the head of a family, consisting of herself and her minor children by both husbands. Neal v. Sawyer, 62 Ga. 352 (1879).

Widow as head of family and guardian.

- A widow in the character both of the head of a family and the guardian of her minor children, applied for and obtained homestead in the real estate of her husband. The effect of so doing was to obtain a homestead as the head of a family in her own undivided share, and a homestead as the guardian of her minor children in their undivided shares. Fountain v. Hendley, 82 Ga. 616, 9 S.E. 666 (1889).

Wife failing to attach schedule as to personalty.

- Where a wife made an application to the ordinary (now probate judge)for an exemption of realty out of land belonging to the husband, but not praying therein for any exemption of personalty, the exemption of realty, after being duly set apart and approved by the ordinary (now probate judge), was not void because of the applicant's failure to attach to her application a schedule of personal property belonging to the husband. Atwater v. Respess, 97 Ga. 283, 22 S.E. 1000 (1895).

Dependent females.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-13-4 does not contemplate a homestead or exemption for the benefit of dependent females, except in the property of the person upon whom they were dependent. Sutton v. Rosser, 109 Ga. 204, 34 S.E. 346, 77 Am. St. R. 367 (1899).

Showing beneficiaries.

- A petition which stated that the applicant claimed a homestead as head of a family, and then stated of whom that family consisted, was sufficiently explicit in showing who were the beneficiaries for whom the homestead was asked. Roberts v. Cook, 68 Ga. 324 (1882).

A collateral attack on a judgment setting aside a constitutional homestead under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-4 is not allowable, though allowable as to a "short homestead." Gann v. McGee, 19 Ga. App. 13, 90 S.E. 976 (1916).

After-acquired realty.

- Where the head of a family asserts a homestead in personalty, not having any realty at that time, that person does not lose the right to a homestead in realty thereafter acquired. Dickinson v. Haralson, 61 Ga. 526 (1878).

The description of an automobile, in the application for homestead, as "one five-passenger Ford automobile," was sufficient to identify the property. Gann v. McGee, 19 Ga. App. 13, 90 S.E. 976 (1916).

Fixing valuation.

- It is not incumbent on the applicant for a homestead to fix the valuation of the real estate sought to be set apart; this duty devolves upon the surveyor, the surveyor's valuation being subject to review by appraisers. Wood & Bro. v. Collins, 111 Ga. 32, 36 S.E. 423 (1900).

Signature to and verification of petition.

- Where a petition for a homestead was signed by the attorney of the applicant, and verified by the affidavit of the latter, it was not void. Roberts v. Cook, 68 Ga. 324 (1882).

Alleging age of wife.

- Where a homestead was asked for the benefit of a wife and children, a failure to allege the age of the wife did not render the proceeding void. Roberts v. Cook, 68 Ga. 324 (1882).

Approval of the schedule does not operate to set aside, as exempt, property described therein but omitted from that part of the petition stating out of what property the exemption is claimed. Blackstone v. Kritzer, 120 Ga. 78, 47 S.E. 585 (1904).

Proceeding under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-16. - A bankrupt debtor in perfecting an exemption of money, set aside to the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, in a proceeding before the ordinary (now probate judge) of the county of residence under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-16 must comply with O.C.G.A. § 44-13-4 and §§ 44-13-7 through44-13-9, relating to the schedule to be attached to the application, the notice to be published by the ordinary (now probate judge), and the notice to be given creditors by the applicant or the applicant's agent. Lou Hill Co. v. Bjoralt, 103 Ga. App. 564, 120 S.E.2d 39 (1961).

Presumption that proper order given.

- As against a creditor who was duly served with notice of an application for a homestead, it will, though the homestead proceeding does not so disclose, be presumed that a proper order to the surveyor to lay off and plat the homestead was granted; nor as to such creditor will a homestead so approved be treated as invalid because the plats of two lots composing the same did not purport to be made by the county surveyor and were not sworn to, accompanied by an affidavit as the law requires. Dunagan v. Stadler, 101 Ga. 474, 29 S.E. 440 (1897).

Plats made by other than county surveyor.

- When it is shown that the plats were made by other than the county surveyor, the law will presume there was no county surveyor. Dunagan v. Stadler, 101 Ga. 474, 29 S.E. 440 (1897).

Question for jury.

- The sufficiency of identification of property in an application for homestead is a matter for the consideration of the jury. Gann v. McGee, 19 Ga. App. 13, 90 S.E. 976 (1916).

Appellate review.

- Power to act under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-4 is conferred upon the ordinary (now probate judge) of the county in which the applicant resided; and the ordinary's action must be reviewed by certiorari and not by appeal. Cunningham v. United States Sav. & Loan Co., 109 Ga. 616, 34 S.E. 1024 (1900).

Cited in Sanders v. GMAC, 43 Ga. App. 374, 158 S.E. 646 (1931); Kemp v. Swainsboro Ice & Fuel Co., 47 Ga. App. 99, 169 S.E. 700 (1933); Pass v. Pass, 195 Ga. 155, 23 S.E.2d 697 (1942).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Exceptions, §§ 16-18, 33, 36-119, 152, 159-161, 164, 177, 186. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homesteads, §§ 16, 18, 40 et seq., 78 et seq., 146, 162, 167 et seq.

ALR.

- Estate or interest in real property to which a homestead claim may attach, 74 A.L.R.2d 1355.