O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100 (2019)

Tree growing and fruit producing as agricultural pursuits; gum producers as farmers

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The planting, growing, cultivating, harvesting, and marketing of trees and the fruits and products thereof shall be considered and treated under the laws of this state as an agricultural pursuit. (b) Every original producer or manufacturer of crude gum, oleoresin, from which is derived or may be derived gum spirits of turpentine and gum resin, and his or her employees are declared to be, for all intents and purposes, farmers insofar as any law of this state relates to farming and farmers.

History

Ga. L. 1933, p. 128, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, § 67-1107; Ga. L. 1939, p. 240, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1962, p. 156, § 1; Ga. L. 1963, p. 188, § 39; Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 35.

Annotations

Cross references. Forest resources and other plant life generally, § 12-6-1 et seq.

Law reviews. For article, “Things Attached to Realty,” see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 343 (1964).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Section strictly construed. - Since O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100 is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed, and the intention of the General Assembly carried out if that intention can be gotten from the section itself. Meadows v. Dixon, 61 Ga. App. 697, 7 S.E.2d 329, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 225 (1940). Treatment of crude gum before section enacted. - Prior to the passage of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100 at common law and by the law of this state, crude gum was a part of the realty, and only became personalty when it was taken from the tree. As a part of the realty, under the law as it then existed, it was not such a crop as could be mortgaged to secure advances, nor could a

bill of sale thereto be given to secure advances for the gathering of the crude gum. Meadows v. Dixon, 61 Ga. App. 697, 7 S.E.2d 329, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 225 (1940). Reason for classification of pine tree products as personalty. - It was the intention of the General Assembly in passing O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100 to classify the products of the pine tree as personalty solely for the purpose of enabling turpentine operators to obtain credit on their products by the giving of bills of sale or a mortgage, and for no other purpose. Meadows v. Dixon, 61 Ga. App. 697, 7 S.E.2d 329, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 225 (1940).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Commissioner of Agriculture may license warehouse storing pine cones

under O.C.G.A. § 10-4-2. 1958-59 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. 14.

Pine cones may come under O.C.G.A. § 10-4-2, being includable in “agricultural products” as used therein. 1958-59 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. 14. Lumber is not an agricultural product within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 10-4-2. 1958-59 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. 12.

Nursery products such as ornamental garden shrubs are not farm products as that term is used in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. 1, Para. IV (see, now, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. 2, Para. IV), and are subject to property taxation. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-407.

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Chattel mortgage on fruit crops growing or to be grown, 54 A.L.R. 1532.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases, 2004–2012 · leading case: In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).
In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 4× “Most of the cases cited by the Trustee focus on “Debtor’s right to receive” and “traceability” issues relevant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100 and do not address the threshold issue of whether the exemption is allowed by non-bankruptcy federal law.”
Taras v. Cadle Co. (In Re Taras), 304 B.R. 912 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004). · cites it 2× “” He claimed an exemption in his home of $507,000 on his original Schedule C, “Property Claimed As Exempt,” specifically pleading the exemption pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100(a)(l). 2 Debtor filed an amendment to his motion to avoid the judicial lien on October 10, 2003, in…”
— 44-14-100(a) — 1 case
In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012). “Most of the cases cited by the Trustee focus on “Debtor’s right to receive” and “traceability” issues relevant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100 and do not address the threshold issue of whether the exemption is allowed by non-bankruptcy federal law.”
— 44-14-100(a)(l) — 1 case
Taras v. Cadle Co. (In Re Taras), 304 B.R. 912 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004). “” He claimed an exemption in his home of $507,000 on his original Schedule C, “Property Claimed As Exempt,” specifically pleading the exemption pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-100(a)(l). 2 Debtor filed an amendment to his motion to avoid the judicial lien on October 10, 2003, in…”
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