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2018 Georgia Code 44-14-162.1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 44 PROPERTY

Section 14. Mortgages, Conveyances to Secure Debt, and Liens, 44-14-1 through 44-14-613.

ARTICLE 7 FORECLOSURE

44-14-162.1. Sales made on foreclosure under power of sale - Mailing of notice to debtor - "Debtor" defined.

As used in Code Sections 44-14-162.2 through 44-14-162.4, the term "debtor" means the grantor of the mortgage, security deed, or other lien contract. In the event the property encumbered by the mortgage, security deed, or lien contract has been transferred or conveyed by the original debtor, the term "debtor" shall mean the current owner of the property encumbered by the debt, if the identity of such owner has been made known to and acknowledged by the secured creditor prior to the time the secured creditor is required to give notice pursuant to Code Section 44-14-162.2.

(Ga. L. 1981, p. 834, § 2.)

Law reviews.

- For note, "Opportunity Costs: Nonjudicial Foreclosure and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in Georgia," see 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1205 (2009).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The definition of "debtor" in O.C.G.A. § 44-162.1 does not apply to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161. Hill v. Moye, 221 Ga. App. 411, 471 S.E.2d 910 (1996).

Right to notice other than by advertisement.

- Only the property owner was entitled to receive any notice of the initiation of foreclosure proceedings other than by advertisement. Breitzman v. Heritage Bank, 180 Ga. App. 171, 348 S.E.2d 713 (1986).

No confirmation where no indication of proper advertising or notification.

- Where no evidence appeared in the transcript of the hearing on the confirmation petition tending to indicate either that the sale was properly advertised or that the landowner was properly notified of the sale, the judgment of confirmation must be reversed. Martin v. Federal Land Bank, 173 Ga. App. 142, 325 S.E.2d 787 (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 610, 333 S.E.2d 370 (1985).

Notice of foreclosure held sufficient.

- Trial court did not err in granting a bank and a law firm summary judgment in a former husband's action alleging that they wrongfully foreclosed on property that the husband obtained from his former wife via a divorce decree because the bank and law firm provided the wife with notice of the impending foreclosure sale as required under the terms of the security deed and O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2; because the husband did not obtain any legal interest in the property until the quitclaim deed from his wife was filed, he was not the owner of the property at the time the bank and law firm were required to provide notice of the foreclosure sale. Farris v. First Fin. Bank, 313 Ga. App. 460, 722 S.E.2d 89 (2011).

Requirements for notice to debtor.

- Trial court did not err in finding the lending company failed to comply with the foreclosure notice provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 because the company's attorney failed to offer any reasonable explanation as to why, despite knowing that the debtor was the record owner of the properties, the company only sent the notices to the predecessor in interest, and its agent, and the lending company was not entitled to equitable estoppel despite actual notice to the debtor. DIP Lending I, LLC v. Cleveland Avenue Properties, LLC, 345 Ga. App. 155, 812 S.E.2d 532 (2018).

Damages for wrongful foreclosure without notice.

- In a suit brought by a purchaser seeking damages for wrongful foreclosure of certain real property after two foreclosure sales, the trial court erred in granting the second foreclosing bank attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, based on frivolous litigation, as that second bank had knowledge of the purchaser's acquisition of the property via the first foreclosure, therefore, the purchaser's suit did not lack substantial justification as to the second bank and the second bank's failure to provide proper notice of the sale to the purchaser. Roylston v. Bank of Am., N.A., 290 Ga. App. 556, 660 S.E.2d 412 (2008).

Trial court erred by failing to confirm sale.

- Trial court erred by denying a creditor's petition to confirm the foreclosure sale of six townhouses because the sale satisfied applicable notice and advertisement requirements and the uncontradicted evidence showed that the townhouses did sell for at least fair market value. RBC Real Estate Fin., Inc. v. Winmark Homes, Inc., 318 Ga. App. 507, 736 S.E.2d 117 (2012).

Cited in TKW Partners, LLC v. Archer Capital Fund, L.P., 302 Ga. App. 443, 691 S.E.2d 300 (2010).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.1

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 293 Ga. 67 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 72 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 20, 2013 | 743 S.E.2d 428, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1539

...tion to the deed. Moreover, the term “secured creditor,” which is used to signify the foreclosing party, is not defined in the statute, an omission particularly notable given the statute’s explicit definition of the term “debtor.” See OCGA § 44-14-162.1....
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PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Smith, 298 Ga. 818 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 4, 2016 | 785 S.E.2d 505

...owner of the property encumbered by the debt, if the identity of such owner has been made known to and acknowledged by the secured creditor prior to the time the secured creditor is required to give notice pursuant to Code Section 44-14-162.2. OCGA § 44-14-162.1. Ultimately, the codifiers made Sections 1 and 2 of the 1935 Act into OCGA §§ 44-14-161 and 44-14-162, and Sections 3 to 6 into OCGA §§ 44-14-162.1 to 44-14-162.4 — and in so doing, limited the “notice requirements of this Act” language of Section 5 (b) to say in OCGA § 44-14-162.3 “the notice requirement [singular] of Code Section 44-14-162.2.”
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Parks v. Bank of New York, 614 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 6, 2005 | 279 Ga. 418, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 1761

...the foreclosure sale. If no deficiency exists after the sale, judicial review is unnecessary. Id. There is no state action involved in OCGA § 44-14-162.2. The statute merely provides the mechanism for giving notice to the debtor, as defined in OCGA § 44-14-162.1, of the foreclosure under power of sale....
...o mortgagees in support of her proposition that the statute's notice provisions are constitutionally inadequate. Yet, Parks as the borrower and the grantor of the security deed is certainly not in the position of a "mortgagee" in this case. See OCGA § 44-14-162.1; Arp v....

Pnc Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Smith (Ga. 2016).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 22, 2016 | 279 Ga. 418, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 1761

...for a similar notice requirement – the 30-day notice of a non-judicial foreclosure sale that must be given to debtors (who are defined for purposes of this provision to include original mortgagors and current owners, but not guarantors, see OCGA § 44-14-162.1) under OCGA § 44-14-162.2....
...3 nonjudicial foreclosure sale . . . .” (emphasis added)). When the Code was reorganized into the Official Code of Georgia Annotated the next year, however, the sections added in the 1981 amendment were re-codified as separate Code sections 44-14-162.1 to 44-14-162.4, with the no-waiver provision reworded to expressly apply only to the notice requirement in § 44-14-162.2....