O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-231 (2019)

Petition for writ of possession; affidavit

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Upon a statement of the facts under oath, any person holding a security interest on personal property and wishing to foreclose the security interest may petition, by affidavit, either in person or by his or her agent or attorney in fact or at law, for a writ of possession. Such affidavit shall be made pursuant to the requirements of Code Section 9-10-113 and forwarded with the petition to the appropriate judge, magistrate, or clerk in the county where the debtor may reside or where the secured property is located.

History

Code 1933, § 67-702, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 398, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1213, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1705, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 884, § 4-1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1023, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 630, § 3.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article on this part and personal property foreclosures, see 11 Ga. St. B. J. 230 (1975).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Venue. - An action under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-231 is not a “civil action” within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI, and thus venue is proper in a county other than that of the defendant’s residence. McClintock v. Wellington Trade, Inc., 252 Ga. 563, 315 S.E.2d 428, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 772 (1984). An action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-231 is not limited to proceeding only against a debtor who is in possession of the property, but contemplates that the defendant may be someone who is in possession of the property other than the debtor. Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. C.I.T. Corp., 143 Ga. App. 840, 240 S.E.2d 212, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2528 (1977); Sylvester Motor & Tractor Co. v. Farmers Bank, 153 Ga. App. 614, 266 S.E.2d 293, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1923 (1980). Rights determined. - Like writ of possession, writ of immediate possession, whether upheld or dissolved, determines only right to possession pending final decision on merits. Ward v. Charles D. Hardwick Co., 156 Ga. App. 96, 274 S.E.2d 20, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2893 (1980). Judicial immunity for magistrate judge. - Given that, in Georgia, issuance

of writs of possession is delegated to magistrates by Georgia law, the debtor’s complaint against the magistrate judge was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim because the magistrate judge was acting as an arm of the state and was therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; the judge was also acting within the judge’s judicial capacity and therefore entitled to judicial immunity. Singleton v. Yoder’s Storage Bldgs., LLC (In re Singleton), No. 16-60415-EJC, No. 16-06015-EJC, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3213 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2017). Oath administered by unauthorized person. - Where oath made before notary public and not by party authorized to issue summons, all subsequent proceedings were nugatory. Jordan v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141 Ga. App. 280, 233 S.E.2d 256, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1871 (1977). Amendable defect. - Where a party seeking to foreclose a security interest in personal property sues out a writ of possession based on a petition not under oath, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-231, the failure is an amendable defect under

O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 through 9-11-132 and does not render the proceedings void. C.E. Morgan Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Safe-Lite Mfg., Inc., 244 Ga. 475, 260 S.E.2d 870, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1296 (1979). Failure to raise timely objection. - Where the parties went to trial on the merits of the plaintiff’s petition for writ of possession seeking to foreclose security interest in personal property, without the defendant’s raising any objection concerning the plaintiff’s failure to verify the petition until appeal, the objection came too late. C.E. Morgan Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Safe-Lite Mfg., Inc., 244 Ga. 475, 260 S.E.2d 870, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1296 (1979). Court cannot command return of property, dispensing with levy on secured property. - O.C.G.A. § 44-14231 authorizes a court having jurisdiction to grant a writ of possession to secured property; it does not authorize a state court judge to command affirmatively that the defendant return the property and thus allow a plaintiff to dispense with a levy made on the secured property. Ponderosa Granite Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 173 Ga. App. 105, 325 S.E.2d 591, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2739 (1984). Default judgments. - O.C.G.A. § 4414-269 deals with petitions for immediate

writ of possession and is inapplicable to a proceeding dealing with a petition for a writ of possession under O.C.G.A. § 4414-231. Spencer v. Taylor, 144 Ga. App. 641, 242 S.E.2d 308, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1721 (1978). Res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply. - Trial court did not err in ruling for a creditor in the creditor’s action against a debtor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-231 to foreclose on personal property and to recover monies lent and unpaid because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply when the merits of the creditor’s claims for foreclosure and monies lent had not been previously adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction; the issue before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Office of State Administrative Hearings was limited to whether the Georgia Department of Revenue acted properly in cancelling the creditor’s certificate of title to a vehicle, and the issue of the debtor’s failure to pay the debtor’s debt to the creditor was not an issue litigated and decided in the administrative proceeding. Allen v. Santana, 303 Ga. App. 844, 695 S.E.2d 314, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (2010).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL A justice of the peace may only honor applications for writs of possession as provided by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-230 et seq.

when the amount in controversy does not exceed $200.00. 1974 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U74-104.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 69 Am. Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions, §§ 590-606. C.J.S. 14 C.J.S., Chattel Mortgages, §§ 272, 405-408. ALR. Relief to person who by mistake has foreclosed real estate mortgage in manner inimical to his own interests, 42 A.L.R. 1192. Chattel mortgagee’s failure to pursue proper course after taking possession as affecting personal liability of mortgagor, 47 A.L.R. 582.

Jurisdiction of court of state other than that in which property is located to redeem from or enforce a chattel mortgage debt secured thereby, 69 A.L.R. 622. Bankruptcy court’s injunction against mortgage or lien enforcement proceedings commenced, before bankruptcy, in another court, 40 A.L.R.2d 663. Maintenance of replevin or similar possessory remedy by cotenant, or security transaction creditor thereof, against other cotenants, 93 A.L.R.2d 358.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2025 · leading case: Allen v. Santana, 695 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
Allen v. Santana, 695 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 4× “Pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-231, 1 Keith Santana brought an action against Rowland Allen in the State Court of Clayton County to foreclose on personal property.”
Deere Park & Assocs. v. C H Furniture Source, LLC, 674 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “*385 Pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-233 (c), after the plaintiff has commenced an action for a writ of possession under OCGA § 44-14-231, “[t]he defendant shall be allowed to remain in possession of the secured property pending the final outcome of the litigation, provided that the…”
Bledsoe v. Cent. Georgia Prod. Credit Ass'n, 349 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “The record shows that appellee and the trial court followed the procedure set forth at OCGA §§ 44-14-231 and 44-14-232. Appellee attached to the affidavit seeking the writ copies of the notes in default and the pertinent security agreements to the affidavit, and also introduced…”
Barnett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 313 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 4× “In September 1981, acting pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-231 (Code Ann. § 67-702), appellee First Federal Savings & Loan Association of *397 Atlanta (“S & L”) sought a writ of possession on a mobile home purchased by appellant Barnett under a retail installment sales contract held by…”
Jack Grant, Jr., Evelyn H. Grant, & All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 764 F.2d 1404 (11th Cir. 1985). “The Grants' argument fails for the simple reason that the issue before us is not what Georgia law requires, but what the federal preemption scheme requires, as there appears to be no question of fact as to whether the parties intended to enter a federal preemption contract.”
McClintock v. Wellington Trade, Inc., 315 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 10× “McClintock attacks the constitutionality of OCGA § 44-14-231 et seq. (Code Ann. § 67-702 et seq.”
Pmb Rentals, LLC v. Basmatie Jorree (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 4× “Significantly, the cases relied on by the superior court in reaching its conclusion concerned landlords who failed to follow the rules for the handling of a tenant’s personal property during the execution and levy for eviction from real property owned 17 See OCGA § 44-14-231…”
Banks v. Borg-warner Acceptance Corp., 308 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “Held: The petitioning creditor, Borg-Warner, proceeded against the debtor Banks precisely as directed by Georgia law, OCGA § 44-14-231 et seq. (Code Ann. §§ 67-702 — 67-717, 67-1001 — 67-1004, 67-1601— 67-1603).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.