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Call Now: 904-383-7448The fact that a note or other evidence of debt is barred does not prevent a creditor from thereafter availing himself of the mortgage or other security unless the mortgage or other security itself is barred.
(Civil Code 1895, § 2735; Civil Code 1910, § 3268; Code 1933, § 67-116.)
- This section is derived from the decisions in Elkins v. Edwards, 8 Ga. 325 (1849) and Reid v. Flippen, 47 Ga. 273 (1872).
- The fact that notes given by a vendee to a vendor for the purchase-money of land have become barred does not extinguish the title of the vendor; and the latter can, although the purchase-money notes are barred, assert title by claim to the land until the purchase-money is paid in full. Myers v. Warrenfells, 153 Ga. 648, 113 S.E. 180 (1922).
- Where a policy of insurance was transferred as security for a debt, the fact that the remedy on the latter was barred did not destroy the debt itself, nor did it prevent the holder of the collateral from enforcing rights thereunder. Conway v. Caswell, 121 Ga. 254, 48 S.E. 956, 2 Ann. Cas. 269 (1904).
- Even though remedies upon an unsealed promissory note may have been barred, the debtor might still proceed under a mortgage or other security for the debt, executed under seal, until after the lapse of 20 years; and this is applicable to a foreclosure as an equitable mortgage of a deed to secure debt. Sammons v. Nabers, 186 Ga. 161, 197 S.E. 284 (1938).
- Provided the right to foreclose or otherwise recover land conveyed by a security deed is not barred by the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-43, even if the evidence at trial revealed that an action to collect the debt was barred by the statute of limitations, such would not prevent the grantee from exercising rights under the security deeds. Brinson v. McMillan, 263 Ga. 802, 440 S.E.2d 22 (1994).
- A security deed which does not refer in any way to the debt to secure which it was given, or furnish any evidence of its existence, cannot be foreclosed as an equitable mortgage, and a money judgment obtained thereon, if the obligation secured by the deed is barred by the statute of limitations. Duke v. Story, 116 Ga. 388, 42 S.E. 722 (1902).
Bar of action on account was applied though the account was for goods sold under sealed contract retaining title in seller until payment. Hinson v. Davis, 30 Ga. App. 356, 118 S.E. 481, cert. denied, 30 Ga. App. 801 (1923).
Enforcing equitable lien arising from absolute conveyance. See Story v. Doris, 110 Ga. 65, 35 S.E. 314 (1900).
Cited in Harris v. Black, 143 Ga. 497, 85 S.E. 742 (1915); Klosterman v. Tudor, 170 Ga. App. 4, 315 S.E.2d 920 (1984); Decatur Fed. Savs. & Loan v. Gibson, 268 Ga. 362, 489 S.E.2d 820 (1997).
- 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 687.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-09-15
Citation: 489 S.E.2d 820, 268 Ga. 362
Snippet: regardless of the note's enforceability. OCGA § 44-14-43. See Brinson v. McMillan, 263 Ga. 802, 803(2)
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1994-02-21
Citation: 440 S.E.2d 22, 263 Ga. 802, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 650, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 97
Snippet: Nabers, 186 Ga. 161 (197 SE 284) (1938); OCGA § 44-14-43. 3. Appellees also contend that summary judgment