"Or otherwise disposes of".

- The words "or otherwise disposes of," must be construed to mean a disposition of the property in the nature of a sale and not in any other manner. Stenson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 582, 159 S.E. 777 (1931).

What constitutes loss generally.

- The loss mentioned in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-6 does not necessarily refer to a loss of the debt, or any part of it, nor will the solvency of the mortgaged property, of itself, prevent such a sale or disposition from being a violation of that section. Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 5 S.E. 204, 11 Am. St. R. 449 (1887).

Loss is shown by statement of value of property sold to accused.

- Where the prosecutor testifies about loss of a certain sum, the value of the property sold by the accused, this is a statement of fact and shows loss as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-6. Farmer v. State, 18 Ga. App. 307, 89 S.E. 382 (1916).

Loss is not shown by general statement of prosecutor about lost valuable time, and employment of a lawyer to foreclose mortgage. Denney v. State, 2 Ga. App. 146, 58 S.E. 318 (1907).

Section inapplicable where debtor has express permission to sell property.

- Where, by the terms of a bill of sale to secure debt it is provided that any property sold must be replaced in kind or the revenue from the sale thereof placed in position for payment on the note which the instrument secures, the fact that the defendant sold stock to another dealer, but failed to apply the proceeds from such sale toward the payment of the bill of sale to secure debt and such failure to apply the proceeds resulted in a loss to the holder of the bill of sale to secure debt, will not authorize the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-6 for the reason that the holder of the bill of sale to secure debt has expressly agreed and consented in the bill of sale itself that the defendant might sell the property on condition and while the evidence shows a failure to comply with the condition of the contract, such failure will not render criminal a sale of the property made under such permission. Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 417, 83 S.E.2d 246 (1954).

Implied permission.

- In a prosecution for the fraudulent sale of personal property on which there is a mortgage or bill of sale to secure a debt under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-6, where the evidence discloses that the holder of the bill of sale impliedly consented to the sale of the property by the defendant to the party to whom defendant did actually sell it, a conviction is not warranted. In such case, two elements of the offense are lacking: absence of consent, and an intent on the part of the defendant to defraud the holder of the bill of sale to secure a debt. Wallace v. State, 55 Ga. App. 872, 192 S.E. 81 (1937).

Where defendant had nothing to do with a sale of the property by the sheriff a conviction of the offense set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-6 is unauthorized. Tatom v. State, 27 Ga. App. 779, 109 S.E. 917 (1921).

One aiding in sale of the property is a principal. Wyatt v. State, 16 Ga. App. 817, 81 S.E. 802 (1914).

Disposal of property by killing and eating it, see Linder v. State, 17 Ga. App. 520, 87 S.E. 703 (1916); Stenson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 582, 159 S.E. 777 (1931).

What constitutes probable cause under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-6. - The mere act of a mortgagor in disposing of the mortgaged property, without the consent of the mortgagee and without applying the proceeds to the mortgage, constitutes probable cause for instituting a criminal prosecution against the mortgagor. Sirmans v. Peterson, 42 Ga. App. 707, 157 S.E. 341 (1931).

Sufficiency of description of property mortgaged and disposed of, and demurrer thereto, see Brown v. State, 60 Ga. App. 646, 4 S.E.2d 676 (1939).

Sufficiency of affidavit and warrant charging offense.

- Where an affidavit upon which a criminal warrant is founded states that the accused did commit the offense of a misdemeanor by disposing of property upon which another held mortgage, and the warrant states that the accused did commit the offense of misdemeanor, the affidavit and warrant are sufficient to charge a crime. Cain v. Kendrick, 199 Ga. 147, 33 S.E.2d 417, answer conformed to, 72 Ga. App. 392, 33 S.E.2d 883 (1945).

Elements of proof.

- To sustain a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-6, the evidence must show that the defendant sold or otherwise disposed of property after having made a mortgage deed thereto, or bill of sale to secure a debt, and that the sale was without the consent of the mortgagee or person holding the bill of sale to secure a debt, that it was with the intent to defraud the mortgagee or person holding the bill of sale to secure a debt, and that the mortgagee or holder of the bill of sale to secure a debt suffered loss thereby. Wallace v. State, 55 Ga. App. 872, 192 S.E. 81 (1937); Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 417, 83 S.E.2d 246 (1954).

Essential elements of offense, see Barclay v. State, 55 Ga. 179 (1875); Wright v. State, 9 Ga. App. 442, 71 S.E. 500 (1911); Farmer v. State, 18 Ga. App. 307, 89 S.E. 382 (1916).

Evidence must show the property sold was the mortgaged property. Gibson v. State, 16 Ga. App. 265, 85 S.E. 199 (1915).

Evidence of other transactions which tend to establish the existence of fraudulent intent which is the gist of the offense for which the accused is being tried is admissible in illustration of the accused's intent and motives in the transaction under investigation. Wyatt v. State, 16 Ga. App. 817, 81 S.E. 802 (1914).

Cited in Sims v. State, 43 Ga. App. 438, 158 S.E. 913 (1931); Smith v. State, 124 Ga. App. 581, 184 S.E.2d 681 (1971); Burke Loan Co. v. Kelly, 127 Ga. App. 36, 192 S.E.2d 413 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances, § 83.

C.J.S.

- 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 50.

ALR.

- Duty and liability of trustee under mortgage, deed of trust, or other trust instrument, to holders of bonds or other obligations secured thereby, 90 A.L.R.2d 501.