O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 (2019)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 1995, p. 1198, § 4(b), not codified by the General Assembly, provides that where the record of conveyance states or fixes the maturity of the debt or debts or the maturity of the last installment thereof and the parties by affirmative statement contained in the record of conveyance evidence their intention to establish a perpetual or indefinite security in-

terest, section 2 of the Act shall be applicable and effective with respect to all such conveyances even though they may be dated prior to July 1, 1995. Law reviews. For article surveying developments in Georgia real property law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1981). For note on the 1995 amendment of this section, see 12 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 313 (1995). For annual survey of real property law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 367 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Section constitutional as applied to deeds to secure debt executed after effective date. - O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80, as applied to deeds to secure debt executed after its effective date, does not offend constitutional provisions prohibit-

ing retrospective legislation. Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 226 Ga. 715, 177 S.E.2d 249, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 647 (1970). O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 is unconstitutional in instances where security

deed predates it because it would be retroactive and it would impair the obligation of a contract since the powers granted in a security deed could have been exercised so long as the debt secured remained unpaid, regardless of whether the evidence of the debt was barred by the statute of limitations. Drake v. Barrs, 225 Ga. 597, 170 S.E.2d 684, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 579 (1969). What constitutes “affirmative statement.” - Use of the words “forever, in fee simple” in a security deed were not an “affirmative statement” within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(2) such that title to the property did not revert to the grantor for 20 years, rather than seven years, because those words related to the estate granted rather than the duration of the security interest. Parol evidence was not admissible and § 44-14-80 controlled over O.C.G.A. § 44-6-21. Vineville Capital Group, LLC v. McCook, 329 Ga. App. 790, 766 S.E.2d 156, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 781 (2014). Deed more than 20 years past due cannot be foreclosed. - When the debt secured by an unforeclosed deed is more than 20 years past due, title conveyed by the deed shall revert to the grantor. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 further denies any right to foreclose, to sell under such deed, or to sue for the land therein. Williams v. O’Connor, 208 Ga. 39, 64 S.E.2d 890, 1951 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1951). Reversion period was 20 years. - Trial court erred in finding that title to the real property reverted to an ex-husband and by setting aside a security deed on that basis because the security deed contained a sufficient statement that the parties intended to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest in the real property such that the applicable reversion period was 20 years from the date of the conveyance as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1). Stearns Bank, N.A. v. Mullins, 333 Ga. App. 369, 776 S.E.2d 485, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 322 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1821, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 868 (Ga. Nov. 2, 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Hawkins v. Stearns Bank, N.A., No. S15C1827, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 855 (Ga. Nov. 2, 2015). Reversion period was seven years. - Given the fixed maturity date in the deed, with a loan for a sum certain rather

than a revolving line of credit, the deed lacked an affirmative statement of intent to create a perpetual and indefinite security interest in the property and, so, under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1), the seven-year reversionary period applied. Griggs v. Miller, 363 Ga. App. 82, 870 S.E.2d 578, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2022). Title under one security deed reverted after seven years. - Two security deeds did not create a perpetual or indefinite security interest in the property; therefore, as to a 2008 deed, title reverted to the grantor seven years after the maturity date under O.C.G.A. § 4414-80(a); however, title did not revert under a 2011 deed because the lender had initiated foreclosure proceedings. West Vill. Holdings, LLC v. ONH Holdings, LLC (In re West Vill. Holdings, LLC), No. 1905116-LRC, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 845 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2020). Extension of reversion of title period. - Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in the appellee’s favor on the appellant’s wrongful foreclosure claim because the record contained no evidence showing whether the written renewals of the loan from the bank were recorded; thus, the appellate court could not determine from the record before the court whether title reverted to the appellant as a matter of law on November 10, 2010, seven years after the security deed was first filed, or whether the recording of any of the subsequent loan renewals extended the reversion period. Matson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 890, 795 S.E.2d 195, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 691 (2016). Extension not triggered. - In an action to quiet title, because the extensions to the maturity date of the note were not recorded and consequently the nonjudicial foreclosure occurred more than seven years after the note’s maturity date, the automatic 20 year extension was not triggered. Bell v. Freeport Title & Guaranty, Inc., 355 Ga. App. 94, 842 S.E.2d 565, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 266 (2020). Promissory note secured under the dragnet clause of a previously executed security deed must be entered of record under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 in order to prevent title from reverting to the

grantor at the expiration of 20 years from maturity of the original debt. Minor v. Neely, 247 Ga. 147, 273 S.E.2d 853, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 606 (1981). Notes and security deeds maturing before effective date of section not affected. - O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 is not applicable to a note and security deed given to secure the same where the note matured before that section, according to its provisions, became effective. Hames v. Hames, 220 Ga. 595, 140 S.E.2d 844, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 568 (1965). O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 will not be applied retroactively to loan deed made prior to 1941. McCreary v. Wright, 132 Ga. App. 500, 208 S.E.2d 373, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1729 (1974). For case where O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 not retroactive, see Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 550 (1959). Exclusion from evidence of deed to secure debt when more than 20 years past due. - Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80, a deed to secure debt upon which the plaintiffs rely in a common-law action in ejectment should be excluded from the evidence when objected to, when the debt secured is more than 20 years past due and that section also provides that in such a case title in the deed reverts to the grantor. Williams v. O’Connor, 208 Ga. 39, 64 S.E.2d 890, 1951 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1951). Notice requirements in security deed. - Issue of whether a grantee properly served notice to cure to a promisor 60 days prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings, as stipulated in the grantee’s security deed, was not waived because once the foreclosure sale the grantee conducted was completed, a bank properly amended the bank’s petition to include the issue of whether the foreclosure sale was validly conducted; the pre-trial order in the case specifically listed as substantive issues whether the foreclosure sale was validly conducted and, if not, whether title under the grantee’s security deed reverted to the promisor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1), and the 60-day notice issue directly related to whether the foreclosure sale was validly conducted because the grantee was legally required to

advertise and sell the property according to the terms of the security deed. MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 2 (2011). Special master, in accordance with the special master’s complete jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-66, was entitled to review the pleadings and evidence to determine the valid interests in real property because an amended pleading properly filed by a bank included claims that a grantee’s foreclosure sale was improper and that title under the grantee’s security deed reverted to a promisor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1). MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 2 (2011). No affirmative statement of perpetual or indefinite security interest. - Title to real property that the debtors conveyed by a deed to secure a debt reverted to the debtors seven years after the maturity date because the deed did not contain an affirmative statement of intent to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest. Lyons v. Taylor (In re Lyons), No. 17-51834-JPS, No. 17-05048, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 253 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 2018). Incorporation by reference. - Presence in a deed to secure debt of a date that was referenced in a note as the maturity date of the loan, and the incorporation by reference of the note into the deed sufficed to fulfill the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1) that the maturity date of a debt be stated in the record of the conveyance; there is no reason that the terms of a note cannot be incorporated by reference into a deed. United Bank v. West Cent. Ga. Bank, 275 Ga. App. 418, 620 S.E.2d 654, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 982 (2005). Estoppel. - Bank was not estopped from asserting that title to real property reverted to a promisor under a grantee’s security deed because an investment company had constructive and actual knowledge of the bank’s assertion of superior title and the possibility that title to the property pursuant to the grantee’s security deed had reverted, and there was no evidence that the company relied in any way upon the bank’s actions, silence, or

inactions; the bank filed suit claiming superior title to the property and recorded a notice of lis pendens well in advance of the foreclosure sale, the company, which purchased the property, admitted at the hearing before the special master that the company knew of the suit against the property but decided to purchase the property anyway, and the company also admitted at that hearing that since the grantee’s security deed was public record, the company had notice of both the maturity date on the security deed and the date on which automatic reversion could occur pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1). MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 2 (2011). Entitlement to excess funds after tax sale. - Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the property owner because the trial court erred by holding that the security deed holder lost the holder’s right to excess funds that arose from the tax sale as the relevant date under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 when considering who was entitled to the excess funds from the tax sale was the tax sale date,

not the fund distribution date. Worthwhile Investments, LLC v. Higgins, 337 Ga. App. 183, 787 S.E.2d 245, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 247 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1663, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 507 (Ga. June 5, 2017). No showing of reversion of title. - Trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion for summary judgment because, while the security deed was recorded, and seven years had passed from the maturity date of the note, the evidence showed without dispute that the note was renewed; and, in the absence of evidence that those renewals were not placed in the public record, the appellant did not yet make a prima facie showing of reversion of title. Matson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 890, 795 S.E.2d 195, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 691 (2016). Provision not applicable. - In a quiet title action, under the unique circumstances this case, the maturity date of the last installment was fixed in the security deed, and the reversion provision did not apply. Freeport Title & Guar. v. Tegeue, 360 Ga. App. 18, 858 S.E.2d 554, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 241 (2021).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 642 et seq. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, §§ 48, 157. C.J.S. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, § 192. ALR. Extension of existing real estate mortgage or deed of trust by subsequent agreement to cover additional indebtedness, 76 A.L.R. 574. Who may take advantage of failure to renew real estate mortgage as provided by statute, 97 A.L.R. 739.

Renewal by one spouse without the other’s participation, of lien on homestead, 143 A.L.R. 1369. Increase or renewal of mortgage debt without insurer’s consent as violation of policy provisions as to mortgages or encumbrances, 163 A.L.R. 1402. Validity, and applicability to causes of action not already barred, of a statute enlarging limitation period, 79 A.L.R.2d 1080.