Constitutionality.

- Provisions of this statute relating to the trial by jury, upon demand, of issues of fact arising upon exceptions to the examiner's report, which is to be taken as prima facie true, and restricting the hearing to the evidence reported by the examiner, except as otherwise provided in this statute, are not unconstitutional limitations of the right of trial by jury. Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S.E. 791, 19 A.L.R. 51 (1921) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-103).

This statute is not violative of the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions, upon the ground that the statute provides for the independent examination of the title by the examiner and for the submission by the examiner of a final report based upon such findings, which shall be taken as prima facie true, such report not being conclusive upon the parties nor binding upon the court until after trial by jury upon exceptions of fact filed thereto. Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S.E. 791, 19 A.L.R. 51 (1921) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-103).

Equity procedure applicable.

- While an action under The Land Registration Act is not a case in equity, but is a purely statutory proceeding, the statute expressly makes the procedure in equity applicable to exceptions to an examiner's report in such case. Bird v. South Ga. Indus. Co., 150 Ga. 420, 104 S.E. 232 (1920); Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939).

Procedure on the report of the examiner under the Georgia Land Registration Act is the same as that on the report of an auditor in an equity case. Bird v. South Ga. Indus. Co., 150 Ga. 420, 104 S.E. 232 (1920); McCaw v. Nelson, 168 Ga. 202, 147 S.E. 364 (1929).

Examiner's report binding on parties if not excepted to.

- An examiner's report, when not excepted to within 20 days as required by this statute, becomes binding upon all parties to that proceeding and the parties are not allowed to later challenge the report. Miller v. Turner, 209 Ga. 255, 71 S.E.2d 517 (1952) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-103).

Sole function of the jury, as expressed in The Land Registration Act, is to pass upon issues of fact raised by exceptions to the examiner's report. Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939).

Issues to be submitted to jury.

- Party is entitled to have submitted to a jury certain disputed issues of fact found by the examiner upon which the examiner concluded that the other party had acquired prescriptive title and was entitled to have the land registered in that party's name. Allen v. Johns, 235 Ga. 667, 219 S.E.2d 369 (1975).

Either party may request jury.

- Either the applicant or the defendant in a land registration proceeding may insist upon a jury trial upon any material issue of fact arising out of exceptions to the examiner's report. Gordon v. Georgia Kraft Co., 217 Ga. 500, 123 S.E.2d 540 (1962).

Provision for jury trial upon demand mandatory.

- See Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S.E. 791, 19 A.L.R. 51 (1921); Saunders v. Staten, 152 Ga. 142, 108 S.E. 797 (1921).

Jury empanelment not required if there are no material issues of fact.

- If an examination of the record reveals no material issues of fact and further reveals that the finding of the examiner was demanded by the evidence, then it is not error for the court, instead of empaneling a jury and directing a verdict, to render judgment in accordance with the findings of the examiner. Gordon v. Georgia Kraft Co., 217 Ga. 500, 123 S.E.2d 540 (1962).

Failure to request jury trial not waiver.

- Fact that neither party requests a trial by jury does not operate as a waiver of jury trial, except as to such issues of fact as might be raised by exceptions to the examiner's report. Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939).

When there has been no express waiver and the parties merely fail to demand a jury trial upon issues specifically designated by the statute, the waiver is therefore only that which may be implied from such inaction, and it should not be extended beyond the plain meaning of the statute. Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939).

Effect of waiver of jury trial.

- Waiver of jury trial authorizes the trial judge to act as jury only to the extent of passing upon the exceptions as a jury would otherwise have done and does not carry consent for the judge to act as trier for the purpose of making new findings of fact. Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939).

Exceptions of law and fact to be separated.

- Exceptions to an examiner's report must separately classify exceptions of law and exceptions of fact, making each exception clear and distinct, specifying the errors complained of. Bird v. South Ga. Indus. Co., 150 Ga. 420, 104 S.E. 232 (1920).

Failure to support exceptions is ground for dismissal.

- Neglect of a party excepting to an examiner's report on matters of fact, or on matters of law dependent for a decision upon the evidence, to set forth, in connection with each exception of law or fact, the evidence necessary to be considered in passing thereon, or to point out the same by appropriate reference, or to attach as exhibits to one's exceptions those portions of the evidence relied on to support the exceptions, is sufficient reason in a land registration proceeding for dismissing or disapproving the exceptions of fact and for overruling or dismissing the exceptions of law. Davis v. Varn Turpentine & Cattle Co., 167 Ga. 690, 146 S.E. 458 (1929); Morris v. James, 216 Ga. 272, 116 S.E.2d 286 (1960).

Remand to examiner lies within the discretion of trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed when appellees fail to show that the trial court has abused this discretion. Bruce v. Rowland Hills Corp., 243 Ga. 278, 253 S.E.2d 709 (1979).

When de novo investigation and report required.

- On sustaining the exceptions to an examiner's report, the case should be referred again to the same or a different examiner for a de novo investigation and report. Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939).

Adoption of report without transcript.

- Examiner's brief of the evidence in a title registration proceeding fully complied with O.C.G.A. § 44-2-103(b), and a trial court did not err in adopting the report without first reviewing a transcript; if a stenographic report did exist, the registrant never made timely request that the report be filed or direct the trial court's attention to evidence appearing in the report. A A OK, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 280 Ga. 764, 632 S.E.2d 633 (2006).

Right to new trial.

- See Rock Run Iron Co. v. Heath, 155 Ga. 95, 116 S.E. 590 (1923).

Cited in Smith v. Board of Educ., 166 Ga. 535, 143 S.E. 578 (1928); Reynolds v. Smith, 186 Ga. 838, 199 S.E. 137 (1938); Burgess v. Simmons, 208 Ga. 672, 68 S.E.2d 902 (1952); Simon Wolf Endowment Fund, Inc. v. West, 210 Ga. 172, 78 S.E.2d 420 (1953); City of Marietta v. Glover, 225 Ga. 265, 167 S.E.2d 649 (1969); Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 244 S.E.2d 559 (1978); Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Registration of Land Titles, §§ 2, 10.

C.J.S.

- 76 C.J.S., Registration of Land Titles, §§ 8, 14, 15.