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(Code 1981, §44-3-231, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1879, § 1.)
- In a personal injury action filed by owners of a parcel of land in a community against the community owners' association, a restrictive covenant which shifted the duty to inspect the community's common areas from the association to owners of parcels in the community was not void as against public policy on the ground that O.C.G.A. § 44-3-231(g) of the Georgia Property Owners' Association Act (Act) pronounced a public policy against precluding owners from bringing tort actions against owners' associations; § 44-3-231(g) concededly did not apply to the action because the covenant was recorded before the Act became effective, the Act reflected a policy of deference toward parties' freedom to contract by making § 44-3-231(g) applicable only where a recorded declaration affirmatively stated such an intention, and the covenant at issue did not violate § 44-3-231(g), which simply identified the proper defendant in certain tort claims against owners' associations. Hayes v. Lakeside Vill. Owners Ass'n, 282 Ga. App. 866, 640 S.E.2d 373 (2006).
- Property owners' association ("POA") was a "party in interest" under 11 U.S.C. § 1109 and had standing to intervene in a contested matter that was brought by an LLC that purchased property from a developer's ("debtor's") Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate, to determine ownership of common areas in a subdivision the debtor developed, because a ruling in favor of a trustee who was appointed under the debtor's bankruptcy plan that title to the common areas did not pass to the POA could have affected the POA's right to exist; even in the absence of injury to the POA itself, the POA had organizational standing to intervene on behalf of the POA's members. Sea Island Acquisition, LLC v. Barnett (In re Sea Island Co.), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 30, 2014).
- In a suit challenging a homeowners association's declaration amendment allowing it to enter into an agreement with a nearby private swim and tennis club, the trial court erred by not granting the association's summary judgment because even without the amendment, the association was authorized, for the common benefit of all homeowners, to accept an easement granting the homeowners access to recreational facilities, and to assess them their pro rata share of the ongoing cost of the easement. Amberfield Homeowners Ass'n v. Young, 346 Ga. App. 29, 813 S.E.2d 618 (2018).
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-01-21
Citation: 294 Ga. 489, 754 S.E.2d 42
Snippet: Justices concur. 1 See OCGA § 44-3-231 (h) (association has power and standing to prosecute