Dedication must be to public.

- Dedication, strictly speaking, must be made to the public generally. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 227 F. 276 (S.D. Ga. 1915).

Establishment of public road.

- A public road may be established in two ways: (1) by the public authorities; and (2) by immemorial usage, or dedication. In the latter case two things must be proven: (1) the dedication, and (2) the acceptance of it by the public. Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107 S.E.2d 806 (1959).

Prescriptive title to highway possible.

- Possession, use, and upkeep of a road by the public as a highway for 20 years ripens into prescriptive title. Hyde v. Chappell, 194 Ga. 536, 22 S.E.2d 313 (1942).

If there is no intention to dedicate, but the public has taken possession of the property of an individual and used and maintained the property as a highway for a period of 20 years or more, a highway by prescription becomes complete. When there is an intention to dedicate, the maintenance of a way for less time will bring into existence a completed highway by dedication. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d 553 (1950), later appeal, 88 Ga. App. 674, 77 S.E.2d 565 (1953).

Property devoted to public uses of sidewalks and public parking.

- Trial court erred in finding that the area in which a lessee displayed merchandise came under the purview of City of Forest Park, Ga., Ordinance § 9-8-45 since it had been expressly dedicated to the public under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-230 because no deed or other public record was introduced that made an express dedication, and there was no evidence that the owner of the property on which the lessee's business sat specifically intended to make an express dedication of the property by installing parking areas and pathways; nonetheless, it was not necessary that there be an express dedication of property for that property to be brought into the ambit of § 9-8-45 because the trial court's order granting the city summary judgment also stated that a portion of the property had been devoted to the public uses of sidewalks and public parking, and it was clear from the evidence that such areas were created with the intention of pedestrian travel and vehicular parking. Braley v. City of Forest Park, 286 Ga. 760, 692 S.E.2d 595 (2010).

Nature of title obtained.

- Upon acceptance of dedication, the public stands in the position of a purchaser for value. Chapman v. Floyd, 68 Ga. 455 (1882).

Dedication may be estate in, or easement across, property.

- Dedication of property can consist of the dedication of either an estate in, or an easement across, the dedicated property, and a dedication of only an easement across the property does not deprive the holder of legal title of one's estate in the property. Rather, the holder retains one's estate for every purpose of user and profit not inconsistent with the easement. Wiggins v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 245 Ga. 526, 266 S.E.2d 148 (1980).

Dedication is jury question.

- Dedication is a conclusion of fact to be drawn by the jury from the circumstances of each particular case. The whole question, as against the owner of the property, is whether there is sufficient evidence of an intention on this part to dedicate the land to the public use as a highway. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d 553 (1950), later appeal, 88 Ga. App. 674, 77 S.E.2d 565 (1953).

Finding of dedication precludes taking of private property without just compensation.

- Determination by Supreme Court that there had been a dedication of private property to public use precludes there having been a taking of private property for public use without just and adequate compensation. Jergens v. Stanley, 247 Ga. 543, 277 S.E.2d 651 (1981).

Cited in East Atlanta Land Co. v. Mower, 138 Ga. 380, 75 S.E. 418 (1912); Gartrell v. McCravey, 144 Ga. 688, 87 S.E. 917 (1916); Smith v. Lemon, 166 Ga. 93, 142 S.E. 554 (1928); Rosser v. Styron, 171 Ga. 238, 155 S.E. 23 (1930); Morgan v. Shirley, 172 Ga. 727, 158 S.E. 581 (1931); Gordon v. Whittle, 206 Ga. 339, 57 S.E.2d 169 (1950); Norton v. City of Gainesville, 211 Ga. 387, 86 S.E.2d 234 (1955); City Council v. Newsome, 211 Ga. 899, 89 S.E.2d 485 (1955); East v. Mayor of Wrightsville, 217 Ga. 846, 126 S.E.2d 407 (1962); Pridgen v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 218 Ga. 326, 127 S.E.2d 808 (1962); Fountain v. Bryan, 229 Ga. 120, 189 S.E.2d 400 (1972); Jackson v. McIntosh County, 232 Ga. 712, 208 S.E.2d 813 (1974); Pair Dev. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 144 Ga. App. 239, 240 S.E.2d 897 (1977); Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 244 S.E.2d 559 (1978); Hughes v. Cobb County, 264 Ga. 128, 441 S.E.2d 406 (1994); Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 493 S.E.2d 148 (1997); Strozzo v. Coffee Bluff Marina Prop., 250 Ga. App. 212, 550 S.E.2d 122 (2001).

There is no particular form of making a dedication.

- Dedication may be done in writing, or by parol; or the dedication may be inferred from the owner's acts, or implied, in certain cases, from long use. A grant is not necessary to create the dedication. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Moon v. City of Conyers, 222 Ga. 526, 150 S.E.2d 873 (1966).

Owner's intention and public acceptance required.

- Dedication to a public use is effected when one, being the owner of lands, consents, either expressly or by one's action, that it may be used by the public for a particular purpose. Mayor of Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239 (1852); Parsons v. Trustees of Atlanta Univ., 44 Ga. 529 (1871); Chapman v. Floyd, 68 Ga. 455 (1882); Southwestern R.R. v. Mitchell, 69 Ga. 114 (1882); City Council v. Burum & Co., 93 Ga. 68, 19 S.E. 820, 26 L.R.A. 340 (1893); Atlanta Ry. & Power Co. v. Atlanta Rapid Transit Co., 113 Ga. 481, 39 S.E. 12 (1901); Davis v. State, 9 Ga. App. 430, 71 S.E. 603 (1911); Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981); Department of Transp. v. Ladson Invs., 158 Ga. App. 687, 282 S.E.2d 171 (1981); Smith v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882, 286 S.E.2d 739 (1982).

Dedication is not complete until two things appear: the owner's intention to dedicate the owner's property to the public use and the acceptance thereof by the public. Healey v. City of Atlanta, 125 Ga. 736, 54 S.E. 749 (1906); Johnson v. State, 1 Ga. App. 195, 58 S.E. 265 (1907); City of La Fayette v. Walker County, 151 Ga. 786, 108 S.E. 218 (1921); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d 553 (1950), later appeal, 88 Ga. App. 674, 77 S.E.2d 565 (1953); Lowry v. Rosenfeld, 213 Ga. 60, 96 S.E.2d 581, later appeal, 213 Ga. 578, 100 S.E.2d 447 (1957); Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107 S.E.2d 806 (1959); Moon v. City of Conyers, 222 Ga. 526, 150 S.E.2d 873 (1966); Hasty v. Wilson, 223 Ga. 739, 158 S.E.2d 915 (1967); Waldrep v. Hall County, 227 Ga. 554, 181 S.E.2d 833 (1971); Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980); Jackson v. Stone, 210 Ga. App. 465, 436 S.E.2d 673 (1993).

Essentials of dedication to public use are an offer, either express or implied, by the owner and an acceptance, either express or implied, of the use of the land by the public or public authorities. Carroll v. De Kalb County, 216 Ga. 663, 119 S.E.2d 258 (1961).

Two basic requirements of dedication of property to public use are: (1) an intention by the owner to dedicate the land to public use; and (2) an acceptance thereof by the public. Such intention to dedicate need not be expressed, and neither must the acceptance by the public be expressed. Jergens v. Stanley, 247 Ga. 543, 277 S.E.2d 651 (1981).

Dedication complete if public or private rights materially affected by interruption of enjoyment.

- When public use has been made of the land for such a length of time that accommodation of public or private rights might be materially affected by the interruption of the enjoyment, the dedication is complete. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Mere use of property by public insufficient.

- Mere use of one's property by a small portion of the public, even for an extended period of time, is not sufficient to authorize an inference that the property has been dedicated to a public use, unless it clearly appears that there was an intention to dedicate, and that this dedication was accepted by the public authorities, either in express terms or by implication resulting from the maintenance of a way public in its nature. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d 553 (1950), later appeal, 88 Ga. App. 674, 77 S.E.2d 565 (1953); Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107 S.E.2d 806 (1959); Hasty v. Wilson, 223 Ga. 739, 158 S.E.2d 915 (1967); Waldrep v. Hall County, 227 Ga. 554, 181 S.E.2d 833 (1971); Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980).

Intention to dedicate and acceptance may be inferred.

- Neither the intention nor the acceptance need be express, but if not express they must be clearly inferred from the character of the use and the owner's acquiescence in such use. Healy v. City of Atlanta, 125 Ga. 736, 54 S.E. 749 (1906); Johnson v. State, 1 Ga. App. 195, 58 S.E. 265 (1907); City of La Fayette v. Walker County, 151 Ga. 786, 108 S.E. 218 (1921).

Intention to dedicate need not be shown by an express declaration, but may be inferred from acquiescence in the public use of the property. Acceptance likewise need not be express, but if the property be improved and maintained by the authorized public authorities and used by the public for such a length of time that the public accommodation and private rights might be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment, the dedication is complete. Lowry v. Rosenfeld, 213 Ga. 60, 96 S.E.2d 581, later appeal, 213 Ga. 578, 100 S.E.2d 447 (1957); Moon v. City of Conyers, 222 Ga. 526, 150 S.E.2d 873 (1966); Doby v. Brown, 232 Ga. 42, 205 S.E.2d 299 (1974).

Both dedication and acceptance may be express or implied as long as a clear intent is manifested. Ross v. Hall County Bd. of Comm'rs, 235 Ga. 309, 219 S.E.2d 380 (1975).

Burden of proof.

- Party relying upon an express or implied offer of dedication of land and the acceptance of any such offer has the burden of proving the dedication. Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980).

Right to use need not be vested in corporate body.

- It is not essential to constitute a valid dedication to the public that the right of use should be vested in a corporate body. If there be a dedication of land to public use prior to the existence of a municipal corporation, then, upon such corporation being organized, including such land within its limits, the use of the land in trust for the public at once vests in it. City of La Fayette v. Walker County, 151 Ga. 786, 108 S.E. 218 (1921); Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107 S.E.2d 806 (1959).

Intention to dedicate required.

- Whether express or implied, an intention on the part of the owner to dedicate one's property to the public use must be shown. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Hasty v. Wilson, 223 Ga. 739, 158 S.E.2d 915 (1967); Waldrep v. Hall County, 227 Ga. 554, 181 S.E.2d 833 (1971).

Intention may be shown by owner's acts.

- Intention to dedicate property to public use is essential to a dedication, but this may be proved by acts showing an assent that property should be so used and enjoyed. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944).

An intent on the part of the owner to dedicate must be manifested by the conduct of the owner from the facts and circumstances of the particular case, based upon the acts of the owner, and not upon what is secreted in one's heart. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944).

Acts relied on must clearly indicate owner's purpose.

- When an established dedication is claimed, the acts relied on to establish the dedication must be such as to clearly and satisfactorily indicate a purpose on the part of the owner to abandon the owner's personal dominion over the property and to devote the same to a definite public use. Swift v. Mayor of Lithonia, 101 Ga. 706, 29 S.E. 12 (1897); Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d 553 (1950), later appeal, 88 Ga. App. 674, 77 S.E.2d 565 (1953); Hasty v. Wilson, 223 Ga. 739, 158 S.E.2d 915 (1969); Waldrep v. Hall County, 227 Ga. 554, 181 S.E.2d 833 (1971); Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980).

Public use not inconsistent with retention of dominion by owner.

- Mere fact that the public uses the property of a private individual is not necessarily inconsistent with the retention of dominion by the owner. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980). See Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Greenfield, 160 Ga. 407, 128 S.E. 430 (1925).

Dedication with reservation by owner permissible.

- Land may be dedicated for a particular public use with a reservation by the owner of a right to use the land for a specified purpose not inconsistent with the legal character of the dedication. City of Abbeville v. Jay, 205 Ga. 743, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949).

When plat is made and recorded and lots are sold with reference thereto, the requisite intention is generally indisputable. Department of Transp. v. Ladson Invs., 158 Ga. App. 687, 282 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Recording subdivision plat showing areas for public use.

- Recording of a subdivision plat showing areas set apart for the use of the public acts not only as a grant of an easement to the purchasers of the property, but also raises a presumption of intent to dedicate to the public. Smith v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882, 286 S.E.2d 739 (1982).

Lack of public acceptance bars dedication.

- Dedication of land by the owner thereof for public use as a public road, and the use of such road by the public as a route of travel, without some recognition of such road on the part of the county authorities, would not make such road a public road. Penick v. County of Morgan, 131 Ga. 385, 62 S.E. 300 (1908); Hillside Cotton Mills v. Ellis, 23 Ga. App. 45, 97 S.E. 459 (1918).

When dedication of land by a donor to a city for the purpose of a public street is in issue, the evidence must show not only that the owner gave the land, but that the public accepted the land before there can be a dedication. Hutchinson v. Clark, 169 Ga. 511, 150 S.E. 905 (1929).

Before a municipality can acquire by dedication an easement over land, for use by the public as a street, there must be an acceptance of the dedication by the municipality. Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107 S.E.2d 806 (1959).

When there has been an express offer on the part of the owner to dedicate land to the public, there must still be shown an acceptance, express or implied, of the use of the land by the public authorities. Jackson v. Chatham County, 225 Ga. 641, 170 S.E.2d 418 (1969).

Private landowner may dedicate land by setting the land apart for public use, but the land must be accepted by the county before the land becomes a county road. Ross v. Hall County Bd. of Comm'rs, 235 Ga. 309, 219 S.E.2d 380 (1975).

Repair or paving of road shows acceptance by public.

- Frequent way of showing acceptance by the public in the case of a road or street is to prove that the proper authorities assumed control over such road or street as by having the road worked, graded, or paved. Moon v. City of Conyers, 222 Ga. 526, 150 S.E.2d 873 (1966).

An implied acceptance by the public authority may be shown by proof that such authority maintained, improved, or repaired the strip as a public road. Jackson v. Chatham County, 225 Ga. 641, 170 S.E.2d 418 (1969).

Proof that a public authority has impliedly accepted an offer of dedication may be made by showing that the authority has exercised control over the property, made improvements, or maintained the property's upkeep. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Entire street dedicated need not be improved to complete the acceptance.

- When the extent of the grant is defined by the landowner personally in the landowner's statement making an express dedication to a municipality, it is not necessary that the public authorities should work the entire street within the confines of the grant to make effectual the act of acceptance; any improvements or repairs done on the street by the public authorities in recognition of the dedication of a defined strip of land for a street may be regarded as an acceptance of the dedication. Department of Transp. v. Ladson Invs., 158 Ga. App. 687, 282 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Occasional road-working is insufficient acceptance.

- An occasional road-working of property by public authorities, there being no other evidence of maintenance, is not of itself sufficient to create the presumption of an intention to dedicate. The use and maintenance must be of the character, and for the length of time, sufficient to create a presumptive right of the public therein. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107 S.E.2d 806 (1959).

Mere approval of plats insufficient to constitute acceptance.

- County did not accept offers of dedication of land for public use contained in subdivision plats merely by approving plats containing offers of dedication. Smith v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882, 286 S.E.2d 739 (1982).

Minutes of city officers sufficient to show acceptance.

- Minutes of the mayor and council of a city are sufficient to prove ratification of a previous parol agreement dedicating certain lands owned by the city to a particular public use. Tillman v. Mayor of Athens, 206 Ga. 289, 56 S.E.2d 624 (1949).

Right to accept continues until the wants and convenience of the public require the use, or until the offer has been withdrawn or revoked. Department of Transp. v. Ladson Invs., 158 Ga. App. 687, 282 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Public use need not be immediate or of entire property dedicated.

- Acceptance by the public need not be immediate, but may be made when public necessity or convenience arises. As a corollary to this proposition, it follows that it is not necessary that the public use the entire property dedicated; any public use of a part of the property indicating a purpose to accept the gift fixes the public right to the whole. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Right of acceptance not forfeited by delay.

- Department of Transportation did not forfeit its right of acceptance merely by waiting three years from the most recent expression of an intention to dedicate the property before exercising that right. Department of Transp. v. Ladson Invs., 158 Ga. App. 687, 282 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Acceptance by the public for public use is sufficient to complete the dedication without acceptance by the appropriate public authorities. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Length of time of public use is not as significant as the character of the use in determining whether the public has accepted the offer of dedication. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Acceptance of express offer to dedicate property may be shown by public use of the property for a period of time sufficient to indicate that the public is acting on the basis of a claimed right resulting from the dedicatory acts by the owner. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Public not required to use land for any specific period of time in order to accept impliedly the offer of dedication; rather, the public use must simply be over a period of time long enough to indicate an intent or purpose to accept the offer. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Seven-year period of use sufficient.

- Because a seven-year period is sufficient time to raise the presumption of gift, the courts have held that seven years is a sufficient period of public use to establish the length of time necessary for the public to use the property allegedly dedicated to public use before acceptance of such dedication by the public may be implied. Jergens v. Stanley, 247 Ga. 543, 277 S.E.2d 651 (1981).

When a county did not expressly accept a dedication of land for public use, no implication of acceptance may be inferred when the county has not improved or maintained any part of the area or when there is no evidence of any use of the area by the general public. Smith v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882, 286 S.E.2d 739 (1982).

Public uses insufficient to prove intent to dedicate may constitute implied acceptance of express offer.

- Public uses of a beach which are insufficient to prove that the owner of the property intended to dedicate the land to the public may be sufficient to constitute an implied acceptance of the property when an express offer of dedication has been made. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Deed recitals concerning a cemetery.

- Trial court did not err in finding an implied dedication of a cemetery for public use because, given the deeds among family members which excepted the cemetery, the neighboring residents and family members were estopped to deny by the deed recitals that there had been no dedication of the cemetery, and the cemetery had been in existence for more than 40 years before the family acquired the property which surrounded the cemetery. Thus, having been dedicated, any authority over the cemetery which the neighboring residents and family members might have had as owners was lost. Brannon v. Perryman Cemetery, Ltd., 308 Ga. App. 832, 709 S.E.2d 33 (2011).

Mere showing of public use insufficient.

- When theory that owner has impliedly dedicated property is relied on, party so contending must show more than simply that the public made uses of the property which were consistent with the uses made by the owner. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Acquiescence by owner in public's use of land.

- Intention to dedicate property to public use may be inferred from acquiescence by the owner in the use of the owner's land by the public, if the use be of such character as to clearly indicate that the public accepted the dedication to public use. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d 553 (1950), later appeal, 88 Ga. App. 674, 77 S.E.2d 565 (1953); Moon v. City of Conyers, 222 Ga. 526, 150 S.E.2d 873 (1966).

Exclusive public control of property for period of time.

- In every case of implied dedication, it must appear that the property has been in the exclusive control of the public for a period long enough to raise a presumption of a gift. Hutchinson v. Clark, 169 Ga. 511, 150 S.E. 905 (1929); Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980).

Length of time of public use critical when needed to prove implied dedication.

- Length of time of public use becomes critical only when its proof is necessary in order to establish the owner's dedicatory intent as in the case of proving an implied dedication. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Isolated instances of public travel over property insufficient.

- An acquiescence cannot be effective to deprive the owner of the owner's property when the claimed acquiescence amounts to no more than a failure to protect in isolated instances when some members of the public travel over one's land. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944); Waldrep v. Hall County, 227 Ga. 554, 181 S.E.2d 833 (1971).

Use by trespassers can give rise to no rights in the public under this statute. Central R.R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 207 (1883); City of Atlanta v. Georgia R.R., 148 Ga. 635, 98 S.E. 83 (1919) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-230).

Owner's acquiescence implies knowledge of public's claim on land.

- While an intention to dedicate need not be shown by an express declaration to that effect, but may be inferred under certain circumstances from an acquiescence by the owner in the use of the owner's property by the public, such acquiescence is in the nature of an estoppel in pais, and implies a knowledge on the part of the owner of the claim by the public to the right to appropriate the owner's property to the public use. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944).

Proof that whole area taken to exclusion of owner required.

- When an implied dedication is relied upon, it is necessary for the contending party to show that the whole area contended for was taken in possession by the public adversely to, and to the exclusion of, the contended dedicating owner. Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980).

Unimproved property shows failure to dedicate.

- Although the offer to dedicate may be implied from conduct, when the property is not improved and the public use and enjoyment of private rights would not be materially injured by interruption no dedication is shown. Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980).

Mere ownership of a parcel of land by a cemetery corporation does not constitute a dedication of that parcel for cemetery purposes. Melwood, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 255 Ga. 247, 336 S.E.2d 571 (1985).

Absence of abandonment of personal dominion and public use.

- Because the facts relied upon by an adjacent landowner failed to clearly indicate a purpose to abandon both personal dominion over the property and devote the property to a definite public use, and the declaration involving the property at issue specifically provided that any easements created under the declaration were not to be construed as creating any rights by the general public, the appeals court declined to find that an implied dedication existed. Wilcox Holdings, Ltd. v. Hull, 290 Ga. App. 179, 659 S.E.2d 406 (2008).

Express dedication by recorded map.

- When the owner of a tract of land subdivides the land into lots and records a map or plat showing such lots, with designated streets, and sells lots with reference to such map or plat, the owner will be presumed to have expressly dedicated the streets designated on the map to the public. Ross v. Hall County Bd. of Comm'rs, 235 Ga. 309, 219 S.E.2d 380 (1975); Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 282 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

Express dedication may be found even though plat was unrecorded.

- Since an express dedication may be shown by parol evidence as well as by documentary evidence, it would be illogical to hold that evidence fails to establish an express dedication simply because a plat is unrecorded. Department of Transp. v. Ladson Invs., 158 Ga. App. 687, 282 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Acceptance by public without acceptance by authorities is sufficient.

- When the owner of lands expressly dedicates the land to public use as a public road, acceptance by public use is sufficient to complete the dedication without acceptance by the public authorities of the county; when the land is so used for such a length of time that the public accommodation and private rights will be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment, the owner and those holding under the owner may not afterwards appropriate the land to private purposes. Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107 S.E.2d 806 (1959).

Acceptance may be shown by use.

- When the dedication is express, acceptance may be shown by use in fact, even though the period of such use be less than seven years. Davis v. State, 9 Ga. App. 430, 71 S.E. 603 (1911); Hillside Cotton Mills v. Ellis, 23 Ga. App. 45, 97 S.E. 459 (1918).

Dedication found.

- Curb cut had been dedicated to public use by the trust that owned the land in question, and under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-230, the dedication could not be revoked; it was undisputed that in 1976, the trustees had given express oral permission for the curb cut to be created on their property and that they understood that it would be used by the public, and acceptance by the public was implied by the public's use of the curb cut for over 20 years. Postnieks v. Chick-fil-A, Inc., 285 Ga. App. 724, 647 S.E.2d 281 (2007).

In a quiet title action, the trial court properly determined that there was no issue of fact with regard to dedication of a road. A recorded plat survey created a presumption of express dedication, which was not contradicted by an unrecorded plat document, and a county had accepted the dedication by partially paving and maintaining the street. Harbuck v. Houston County, 284 Ga. 4, 662 S.E.2d 107 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 641, 172 L. Ed. 2d 613 (2008).

Title may be lost only by legal abandonment.

- Statute is silent as to what would be the effect of a failure to keep the way in repair after a prescriptive title has been acquired by seven years' use. The duty to repair, no doubt, continues, but on principle it would seem that when the title vested, it could not be divested by neglect, but only by abandonment. Kirkland v. Pitman, 122 Ga. 256, 50 S.E. 117 (1904) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-230).

Title or easement, once vested in the public, is not lost by neglect of the governing or controlling officials, but may be lost only by a legal abandonment under the statutes and general law, not by such officials alone, but also by the public which has used and may continue to use the land. Calfee v. Jones, 54 Ga. App. 481, 188 S.E. 307 (1936); Southern Ry. v. Wages, 203 Ga. 502, 47 S.E.2d 501 (1948).

Mere nonuse does not work a forfeiture of the right to the use of a public road. Doby v. Brown, 232 Ga. 42, 205 S.E.2d 299 (1974).

Mere nonuse of a dedicated street is insufficient to show abandonment. Garner v. Young, 214 Ga. 109, 103 S.E.2d 302 (1958).

Improved dedicated lands may not be revoked at will.

- If lands of a city are dedicated to a particular public use, and citizens contribute money for necessary improvements to effectuate such use, the city may not revoke at will the dedication or license. Tillman v. Mayor of Athens, 206 Ga. 289, 56 S.E.2d 624 (1949).

Title is in adjacent landowners upon vacation of street.

- Whenever a street is vacated, the presumption is that the fee is in the adjacent landowners, and that the right of each extends to the middle of the way. Calvary Independent Baptist Church v. City of Rome, 208 Ga. 312, 66 S.E.2d 726 (1951).

Owner may not revoke dedication by sale of land.

- Dedication of land to public use is in the nature of an estoppel in pais, and if an attempt is made by the original owner to revoke the dedication by a sale of the land, the owner may be enjoined by any person interested in the use. City of Abbeville v. Jay, 205 Ga. 743, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949).

When lands are dedicated, and are enjoyed as such, and rights are acquired by individuals in reference to such dedication, the law considers it in the nature of an estoppel in pais, which precludes the original owner from revoking it; the proprietor is still the owner of the fee and can alien that, or maintain an action for an injury done to the freehold, but the use in the public follows the fee wherever it may go. Tillman v. Mayor of Athens, 206 Ga. 289, 56 S.E.2d 624 (1949).

Standing to oppose reappropriation by owner.

- When a county adopts a zoning ordinance for the accommodation of the public, since the public accommodation will be materially affected by the reappropriation of the land impliedly dedicated for street purposes, the county has standing to enforce the county's implied dedication and prohibit the county's reappropriation by the former fee owner. Lee v. Warren, 230 Ga. 165, 195 S.E.2d 909 (1973); Kinney v. Brown, 234 Ga. 578, 216 S.E.2d 798 (1975).

Owner prohibited from appropriating land for private purposes.

- See Haslerig v. Watson, 205 Ga. 668, 54 S.E.2d 413 (1949).

No funeral home on property for cemetery use.

- Funeral home may not be established on real property dedicated to cemetery use. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-26.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession, §§ 71, 72, 268 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, § 13 et seq.

ALR.

- Necessity of acceptance of dedicated street to relieve it from taxation, 5 A.L.R. 1537.

Implied or constructive dedication of land between street line and building, 7 A.L.R. 727.

Validity and effect of condition of dedication that remaining property shall not be subject to assessments for improvements, 16 A.L.R. 499; 37 A.L.R. 1357.

Validity and effect of restrictions or reservations in dedication of property in respect of right to operate public utilities, 58 A.L.R. 854.

Attempted dedication as affecting right to assert after-acquired title, 62 A.L.R. 480.

Sufficiency as common-law dedication of incomplete statutory dedication, or ineffectual attempt to make statutory dedication, 63 A.L.R. 667.

Dedication: time for acceptance, 66 A.L.R. 321.

Validity and effect of conditions or covenants in deed of property for streets relating to the use of the property or the street, 69 A.L.R. 1047.

Use by public as affecting acquisition by individual of right of way by prescription, 111 A.L.R. 221.

Reservation of right of way for railroad or street railway in dedicating property for highway, 131 A.L.R. 1472.

Dedication: acceptance of some streets, alleys, and the like appearing on plat as acceptance of all, 32 A.L.R.2d 953.

Construction or maintenance of sewers, water pipes, or the like by public authorities in roadway, street, or alley as indicating dedication or acceptance thereof, 52 A.L.R.2d 263.

Right of owner of servient tenement subject to right of way to dedicate his land, 69 A.L.R.2d 1236.

Width and boundaries of public highway acquired by prescription or adverse user, 76 A.L.R.2d 535.

Revocation or withdrawal of dedication by grantees or successors in interest of dedicator, 86 A.L.R.2d 860.

Use of property by public as affecting acquisition of title by adverse possession, 56 A.L.R.3d 1182.

Implied acceptance, by public use, of dedication of beach or shoreline adjoining public waters, 24 A.L.R.4th 294.