Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448In light of the entire instrument, the dependence or independence of covenants or conditions must be determined from the intention of the parties. If the conditions are dependent, the failure of the person first required to act shall be an excuse to the other party for failing to comply; if the conditions are independent, no such excuse shall avail. The law favors conditions to be independent.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2279; Code 1868, § 2272; Code 1873, § 2298; Code 1882, § 2298; Civil Code 1895, § 3140; Civil Code 1910, § 3720; Code 1933, § 85-905.)
- Promises which are mutual to the extent that each affords the sole consideration to the other will not be construed as independent, but will, in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, be taken as dependent one upon the other and, while ordinarily dependent covenants are such as mutually afford to the other the whole consideration, the stipulations and circumstances of the contract may be such as to render covenants mutual and dependent even though one of them affords to the other only a part of its consideration. In such a case, the question as to whether covenants shall be taken as mutually dependent is to be determined by reference to the rational meaning and intent of the parties as disclosed by the entire instrument, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the purposes for which the contract as a whole was made. Schmidt v. Mitchell, 117 Ga. 6, 43 S.E. 371 (1903); Brenard Mfg. Co. v. Kingston Supply Co., 22 Ga. App. 280, 95 S.E. 1028 (1918).
- Landlord leased certain stores to tenants at a stipulated price, payable monthly. The landlord agreed to keep the building in good repair and to pay the tenants any damage the tenants might sustain by the landlord's neglect to do so. The covenant to pay rent and that to repair were independent covenants, and a failure to repair did not work a forfeiture of the rent, but gave a right of action or of recoupment to the tenant. Lewis & Co. v. Chisolm, 68 Ga. 40 (1881).
Covenants in a contract whereby A agreed to convey to B all the timber on certain lands for turpentine purposes, and whereby B agreed to convey to A all the timber on certain other lands for sawmill purposes, were independent covenants. Howell & Rawls v. James Lumber Co., 102 Ga. 595, 27 S.E. 699 (1897).
Cited in McRae v. Sewell, 47 Ga. App. 290, 170 S.E. 315 (1933); Fulford v. Fulford, 225 Ga. 9, 165 S.E.2d 848 (1969).
- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, § 10 et seq. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates, § 144 et seq.
- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, §§ 273, 304 et seq., 315, 316, 319, 322, 326, 345 et seq. 31 C.J.S., Estates, § 21 et seq. 96 C.J.S., Wills, § 1408 et seq.
- Restraint upon voluntary alienation of legal life estate, 160 A.L.R. 639.
No results found for Georgia Code 44-6-106.