CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 25, 2006 | 280 Ga. 556, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1331
...erty because the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction of Shields. The assertion of lack of personal jurisdiction is based on Shields's claim he was never personally served. However, under the statutes governing statutory partitioning, OCGA §
44-6-160 et seq., the notice of intention to seek partitioning is the only process necessary in order to bring a defendant into court to meet the application for partitioning ( Clay v....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1999 | 270 Ga. 849
...Lathem filed an amended petition on that date, and although the court's order is silent as to whether the amended petition was considered, the text of the order makes it clear that the court considered the amendment in addressing the motion to dismiss. [2] Lathem requested statutory partition under OCGA §
44-6-160, or "[a]lternatively in reliance on Weeks v....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2015 | 773 S.E.2d 274
...that the Property be partitioned or that she be awarded 50% of its value. In fact,
a consent order issued in which the parties agreed, inter alia, to add a count to
the divorce complaint to petition the superior court to partition the Property
pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160,5 to the extent that the Property or the equity
expressly refers to the takers as “joint tenants,” “joint tenants and not as tenants in common,”
or “joint tenants with survivorship” or as taking “jointly with s...
...which results in his lifetime transfer of all or a part of his interest; provided, however, that,
if all persons owning joint tenant interests in a property join in the same recorded lifetime
transfer, no severance shall occur.
5
OCGA §
44-6-160 provides:
3
therein was determined to be premarital property....
...the court’s equitable division of the parties’ marital assets in the divorce
proceeding. However, insofar as the superior court sought to statutorily
partition the Property in accord with the prior consent order, statutory
partitioning pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160 applies only to tenants in common,
not to joint tenants with a right of survivorship.8 Wallace v....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 31, 2011 | 289 Ga. 233, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1602
...See Hook v. Bergen,
286 Ga.App. 258(2),
649 S.E.2d 313 (2007). The Superior Court of Spalding County had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the partitioning judgment since the land sought to be partitioned was partially located in Spalding County and OCGA §
44-6-160, the statute under which the partitioning petition was filed, requires a partitioning petition to be filed in the superior court of the county in which the land is located....
...Cabrel's contention that the trial court erred when it declined to set aside the 2004 judgment of partition. [4] The probate court of the county in which the year's support award was made does not have jurisdiction to partition the property. See OCGA §
44-6-160, which requires a petition for statutory partitioning to be filed in superior court....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 17, 2010 | 287 Ga. 201, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 1615
...rtition action falls within our title to land jurisdiction. That transfer was correct, and we reiterate that this Court has jurisdiction over both statutory and equitable partition actions. See OCGA §
44-6-140 et seq. (equitable partitioning); OCGA §
44-6-160 et seq....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 24, 2014 | 755 S.E.2d 126, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 272
...statutory) partition, and we remand
for the court to conform its judgment to the requirements for a statutory
partition.
Georgia distinguishes between “equitable” partition, OCGA §
44-6-140
et seq., and “statutory” partition, OCGA §
44-6-160 et seq....
...2 (538 SE2d 814) (2000). This nomenclature, however, has led to some
confusion, insofar as equitable and statutory partitions alike must account for
certain equities. In a statutory partition,
a court is authorized to divide commonly owned land under OCGA
§
44-6-160, or if a party in interest convinces the court that the land
cannot be divided fairly, the land may be appraised and a party in
interest given the opportunity to purchase the petitioner’s share
before a public sale is ordered....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 27, 2004 | 603 S.E.2d 255, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3124
...., seeking a public sale and division of the proceeds in proportion to the respective interests of the parties. The Chaneys counterclaimed for statutory partition, seeking to have the property divided by metes and bounds under the provisions of OCGA §
44-6-160 et seq.
A survey of the property was prepared....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 17, 2003 | 589 S.E.2d 94, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 3382
...owners of non-lakefront lots who have a 20-foot-wide right of lake access that lies between two of the lakefront lots, and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which operates and exercises dominion over the lake; and (2) met the requirement in OCGA §
44-6-160 that the property sought to be partitioned be described....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 24, 2003 | 276 Ga. 404
...Additionally, Smith had record title to a 7/8 undivided interest in the remainder of the tract; Reece held the other 1/8 undivided interest. In 1999, Smith sought a statutory partition of that portion of the tract in which he and Reece both held interests. See OCGA §
44-6-160 et seq....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 12, 1997 | 268 Ga. 40, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 1624
...The property is the sole asset of the estate. The mother's will was presented for probate in August 1993 but her estate has not been fully administered. In June 1995, appellee Charles Clay petitioned the trial court for statutory partition of the property pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160....
...Appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the partition proceeding. As to appellant's argument that appellee did not have standing to bring an action for partition because he was not the owner of the property, see OCGA §
44-6-160, we find no error in the trial court's determination that appellee, as co-executor to the will, can assent to the devise, OCGA § 53-2-108, and that appellant's refusal to assent does not bar the partitioning....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 12, 2010 | 287 Ga. 746, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2301
...sentatives of the estates of John, Theodore and the granddaughter jointly filed this appeal. 1. It is axiomatic that to effect the partitioning of real property, the parties must hold the land in coparcenary, joint tenancy or tenancy in common. OCGA §
44-6-160; see Southall v....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2008 | 284 Ga. 75, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2141
...e property. See Blalock v. Blalock,
250 Ga. 862,
301 S.E.2d 876 (1983). As a tenant in common of land with no provision as to how the land shall be divided, appellant Harvey was authorized to file a petition seeking statutory partitioning under OCGA §
44-6-160....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 2017 | 805 S.E.2d 817
...enants with right of survivorship except in actions for divorce. In the order denying Vargo’s petition for equitable partition, the trial judge advised Vargo that he may sever the joint tenancy and then seek either a statutory partition under OCGA §
44-6-160, or equitable partition if no sufficient remedy at law exists....
...ned by Adams, but denied Vargo’s claim for attorney fees. Vargo filed this appeal.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. When Vargo dismissed his original claim for statutory partition, he correctly concluded that partition pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160, known as statutory partition, is available only to tenants in *638common.2 Because Vargo and Adams are owners of the subject property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, statutory partition is unavailable to Vargo....
...See OCGA §
15-3-3.1 (a), effective January 1, 2017 (Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, § 6-1 (c)/HB 927). Appeals in future cases of this sort in which the notice of appeal was filed on or after January 1, 2017 will go to the Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160, when persons are “common owners of land” for which no provision is made by will or otherwise concerning the division of the land, any owner may apply by petition to the superior court in the county in which the land is located for a writ of partition.
299 Ga....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 8, 2016 | 788 S.E.2d 769
...aim deed transferring to Reed
any and all interest Page had in the property.3
On August 27, 2014, Reed filed a petition for an equitable partitioning of
the property and an accounting. McConathy moved to dismiss, asserting that
under OCGA §
44-6-160,4 equitable partitioning is only available when property
is held by tenants in common, not joint tenants with the right of survivorship,
which she contended the parties were....
...y virtue of that deed, and presented her
motion to dismiss on that basis.
3
Both quitclaim deeds were recorded on October 30, 2007; the October 23rd deed appears
in the deed book before the October 24th deed.
4
OCGA §
44-6-160 reads:
When two or more persons are common owners of lands and tenements, whether by descent,
purchase, or otherwise, and no provision is made, by will or otherwise, as to how such lands
and tenements shall be divide...
...After a hearing on McConathy’s
motion to dismiss, the trial court granted the motion.5
McConathy’s motion to dismiss the petition for partition would have been
properly granted if the parties were, at the time of the petition, joint tenants with
the right of survivorship as OCGA §
44-6-160 does not provide for partition by
such owners, only those who hold title as tenants in common....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 16, 2004 | 592 S.E.2d 836, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 1013
...Mansour asserts that the parties waived the right to partition by virtue of the language of the tenancy-in-common agreement.
One who holds land as a tenant in common has a statutory right to seek a writ of partition where no provision is made as to how the lands shall be divided. OCGA §
44-6-160; Paris v....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 7, 2001 | 546 S.E.2d 508
Carley, Justice.
Doris Cochran brought suit to partition certain property pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160 et seq....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2012 | 732 S.E.2d 69
...valid order for the public sale and neither Mary Young, her estate, nor the trustees of the Young Trust were given notice of the sale.
(a) Under Georgia’s statutory partition statutes, a courtis authorized to divide commonly owned land under OCGA §
44-6-160, or if a party in interest convinces the court that the land cannot be divided fairly, the land may be appraised and a party in interest given the opportunity to purchase the petitioner’s share before a public sale is ordered.2 OCGA §
44-6-166.1....
...As no allegations of error are raised in Brown’s cross-appeal, it presents nothing for our review.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
The trial court did so pursuant to its authority under OCGA §
44-6-170, which authorizes a trial court in an extraordinary case not covered by Code sections
44-6-160-
44-6-169 to frame its proceeding and order so as to meet the exigency of the case without forcing the parties into equity.
A party in interest is defined as “any person, other than a petitioner, having an interest in property.” OCGA §...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 18, 1999 | 522 S.E.2d 455, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3790
...Leonard, for appellant.
Tyron C. Elliott, for appellees.
The partitioning was sought under OCGA §
44-6-140, the equitable partitioning statute. Whether the facts authorized an equitable partitioning as opposed to statutory partitioning under OCGA §
44-6-160 et seq....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2015 | 522 S.E.2d 455, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3790
...Property be partitioned or that she be awarded 50% of its value. In fact, a
consent order issued in which the parties agreed, inter alia, to add a count to the
divorce complaint to petition the superior court to partition the Property
pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160,5 to the extent that the Property or the equity
or language essentially the same as one of these forms of expression shall create a joint
tenancy estate or interest that may be severed as to the interest of any owner by the...
...nterest; provided,
however, that, if all persons owning joint tenant interests in a property join in the same
recorded lifetime transfer, no severance shall occur.
...
5
OCGA §
44-6-160 provides:
When two or more persons are common owners of lands and tenements, whether by
descent, purchase, or otherwise, and no provision is made, by will or otherwise, as to how
such lands and tenements shall be...
...the court’s equitable division of the parties’ marital assets in the divorce
proceeding. However, insofar as the superior court sought to statutorily
partition the Property in accord with the prior consent order, statutory
partitioning pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160 applies only to tenants in common,
not to joint tenants with a right of survivorship.8 Wallace v....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 1, 2010 | 288 Ga. 135, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3475
...binson and her husband. [2] The pleadings state that Busbin's wife died in 1981, and previously had quitclaimed her right, title, and interest in the subject property to Robinson and her husband. [3] In the petition, Robinson cites, inter alia, OCGA §
44-6-160, which provides for statutory partitioning, but plainly the remedy she is seeking is that reflected in the styling of her petitionequitable partitioning, OCGA §
44-6-140 et seq....
...rinciples if the circumstances of the case warrant it. Ononye v. Ezeofor,
287 Ga. 201, 202(2),
695 S.E.2d 234 (2010). [4] Judge McCorvey had originally issued an order, on June 26, 2006, which purported to grant a "writ of partition pursuant to OCGA §
44-6-160," but the order of July 21, 2006, expressly deleted the language regarding the grant of partitioning, and in lieu thereof, granted Robinson only standing to seek partitioning of the subject property....
