Instruments containing conditions construed to enforce intent.

- Cardinal rule of construction, under both common and statutory law, is that instruments containing conditions, limitations, and restrictions are to be construed in each case in such a way as to carry into effect the intent of the parties as gathered from the instrument as a whole. Wadley Lumber Co. v. Lott, 130 Ga. 135, 60 S.E. 836 (1908).

General rule of construction for condition subsequent.

- While it is not always easy to determine whether the condition created by the terms of a conveyance is precedent or subsequent, the general rule is that if the act or condition required does not necessarily precede the vesting of the estate, but may accompany or follow the estate, and if the act may as well be done after as before vesting of the estate, or if from the nature of the act to be performed, it is evidently the intention of the parties that the estate shall vest and the grantee perform the act after taking possession, then the condition is subsequent. Gordon v. Whittle, 206 Ga. 339, 57 S.E.2d 169 (1950).

Words necessary to create conditions in wills.

- No precise form of words is necessary to create conditions in wills. Any expression disclosing the intention will be sufficient to create a condition, but such intention must be definitely expressed. Hilton v. Sherman, 155 Ga. 624, 118 S.E. 356 (1923).

Deed not construed as grant on condition subsequent unless express language used or intent clear.

- Deed will not be construed as a grant on condition subsequent, unless the language used by express terms creates an estate on condition, or unless the intent of the grantor to create a conditional estate is manifest from a reading of the entire instrument. Gordon v. Whittle, 206 Ga. 339, 57 S.E.2d 169 (1950); Floyd v. Hoover, 141 Ga. App. 588, 234 S.E.2d 89 (1977).

Words of covenant distinguished from condition.

- When the words, "On the express understanding and agreement on the part of said A.H.S. (the grantee) that the lot of land so conveyed is never to be sold to or occupied by negroes," are attached to a deed, those are words of covenant and not of condition. Anthony v. Stephens, 46 Ga. 241 (1872).

Words of forfeiture, avoidance, or defeasance will convey estate in fee on a condition subsequent. Floyd v. Hoover, 141 Ga. App. 588, 234 S.E.2d 89 (1977).

Conditions subsequent in deeds, although not favored, will be enforced by the court when the conditions are clearly created and are not inconsistent with the other terms of the conveyance, and are not rendered impossible by act of God or by subsequent conduct of the grantor. Evans v. Brown, 196 Ga. 634, 27 S.E.2d 300 (1943).

Deed conditioned upon paying judgments by time certain deemed condition subsequent.

- Deed which was conditioned upon the payment of certain judgments by a time certain and to become absolute on default thereof is a deed upon a condition subsequent and not a mortgage. Burnside v. Terry, 45 Ga. 621 (1872).

Grantor may convey land on condition that grantee shall care for grantor for life, and provide therein that a failure to perform the condition shall have the effect of defeating the estate granted. Jones v. Williams, 132 Ga. 782, 64 S.E. 1081 (1909).

Without proper words, grantor given only equity action to rescind support contract if grantee insolvent.

- Deed executed upon a consideration to support the grantor, without apt or proper words to create a condition, a breach of which would render the estate defeasible at the grantor's election, passes title to the grantee, and the failure of the grantee to maintain and support the grantor may give the latter a right of action in equity to rescind the contract if the grantee is insolvent. McCardle v. Kennedy, 92 Ga. 198, 17 S.E. 1001, 44 Am. St. R. 85 (1893); Jones v. Williams, 132 Ga. 782, 64 S.E. 1081 (1909).

Devise with condition subsequent inhibiting alienation to devisee's wife or her children valid.

- Devise of land in fee with a condition subsequent inhibiting alienation to the wife of the devisee or her children directly, or indirectly as by "any legal proceedings or order of court," as the restriction against alienation was limited to one person and her children and did not extend generally to all persons, was valid as against the objection that it was repugnant to the estate devised, nor was it void on the ground that it was repugnant to the nature of the estate granted, contrary to law, contrary to public policy, or prevented performance of parental duties. Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E.2d 662 (1940).

Grant of land "so long as".

- Provision granting land so long as used for school purposes creates estate upon condition subsequent, upon the breach of which the land would revert to the grantor, the grantor's estate, or heirs. Williams v. Thomas County, 208 Ga. 103, 65 S.E.2d 412 (1951).

Conditional estate not created by deed entitling grantor to purchase property upon violation of agreement.

- When a deed in consideration of $10.00 was executed by a corporation and delivered, purporting to convey fee simple title to a tract of land, which deed contained an agreement that the property "will be used for county school purposes only, and should this provision be violated, the grantor herein shall have the right to purchase the above property for $2,000.00," such clause did not create a conditional estate dependent upon a condition subsequent. Gearhart v. West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. 25, 90 S.E.2d 10 (1955).

Cited in Johnson v. Hobbs, 149 Ga. 587, 101 S.E. 583 (1919); Hollomon v. Board of Educ., 168 Ga. 359, 147 S.E. 882 (1929); Lucas v. Lucas, 171 Ga. 806, 156 S.E. 680 (1931); Moore v. Wells, 212 Ga. 446, 93 S.E.2d 731 (1956); Roe v. Doe, 246 Ga. 138, 268 S.E.2d 901 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates, § 148.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Covenants, § 1. 26A C.J.S., Deeds, §§ 246, 273, 304 et seq., 326. 31 C.J.S., Estates, §§ 7, 8, 10, 12, 21 et seq. 96 C.J.S., Wills, §§ 1238, 1239, 1254 et seq, 1280. 97 C.J.S., Wills, § 1380.

ALR.

- Reservation by successive grantors of re-entry for breach of conditions subsequent in deeds, 114 A.L.R. 566.

Distinction between contingent estates and estates vested, subject to defeasance, 131 A.L.R. 712.

Provision of will for forfeiture in case of contest, as applied to contest by one not a beneficiary, 7 A.L.R.2d 1357.

Nature of estate conveyed by deed for park or playground purposes, 15 A.L.R.2d 975.

Validity and effect of transfer of possibility of reverter or right of re-entry, following conveyance of determinable fee or fee subject to condition subsequent, 53 A.L.R.2d 224.