Rules on salability and leviable interests applicable to both remainders and reversions.

- As both a remainder and a reversion are referred to in this statute as "an estate," whatever rule is properly applied as to the salability or leviable interest in the one would apply to the other. Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ga. 670, 163 S.E. 736 (1932) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-60).

Rule against perpetuities is not applicable to vested remainder or reversion. Smith v. Francis, 221 Ga. 260, 144 S.E.2d 439 (1965).

Cited in Taylor v. Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp., 190 Ga. 349, 9 S.E.2d 165 (1940); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 192 Ga. 754, 16 S.E.2d 743 (1941); Saxon v. Aycock, 72 Ga. App. 728, 34 S.E.2d 914 (1945); Shedden v. Donaldson, 207 Ga. 77, 60 S.E.2d 158 (1950); Stokes v. Trust Co., 507 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1975); Seymour v. Presley, 239 Ga. 572, 238 S.E.2d 347 (1977); Georgia Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, Inc. v. Atlanta Faith Mem. Church, Inc., 267 Ga. 59, 472 S.E.2d 66 (1996).

Words creating multiple estates with temporary exclusive possession create remainder.

- Any words that show it was the intention of the creator to create, by one instrument, two or more estates, so that the possession incident to one is temporarily exclusive of the possession incident to another, will create an estate in remainder. Smith v. Smith, 200 Ga. 373, 37 S.E.2d 367 (1946).

Estate in remainder is one limited to be enjoyed upon the determination of another estate. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Marshall, 424 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1970).

"Limitation over", or remainder, includes any estate in the same property created or contemplated by the conveyance to be enjoyed after the first estate granted expires or is exhausted. When two or more estates of freehold in the same property are granted by the same conveyance to be enjoyed successively, or one in lieu of another, each of the estates, except the first, is a limitation over. Lane v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 195 Ga. 828, 25 S.E.2d 800 (1943).

Remainder part of whole title.

- While no particular estate is necessary to sustain a remainder, nevertheless an estate in remainder is but a part of the whole title. Torbit v. Jones, 145 Ga. 610, 89 S.E. 696 (1916).

Life estate not inconsistent with remainder.

- When estates for life under former Civil Code 1910, § 3663 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-81) and estates in remainder under former Civil Code 1910, § 3674 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-60) were created by the same grant in the same land in favor of different persons, the possession of the life tenant was not adverse to the estate in remainder; accordingly, in such cases prescription will not run against the remaindermen, based on the possession of the life tenant or the life tenant's privy in estate, during the term of the life tenant. Ayer v. Chapman, 146 Ga. 608, 91 S.E. 548 (1917).

Remainder estate is not necessarily entire estate that is left after previous estate is determined. A legatee may have an estate for life, the legatee's own or that of some other person, and still be a remainderman. Dodson v. Trust Co., 216 Ga. 499, 117 S.E.2d 331 (1960).

Contingent remainder an estate.

- Some courts and text writers declare a contingent remainder not an estate, but only a chance to have one; whatever differences may have heretofore existed between courts and text writers upon this subject, this statute has settled it by declaring that a contingent remainder is an estate. McGowan v. Lufburrow, 82 Ga. 523, 9 S.E. 427, 14 Am. St. R. 178 (1889) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-60).

Contingent remainder is an estate. Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ga. 670, 163 S.E. 736 (1932).

Contingent remainder interest in land is an "estate". Phelps v. Palmer, 192 Ga. 421, 15 S.E.2d 503 (1941).

Contingent remainderman may sell and assign the contingent estate. Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ga. 670, 163 S.E. 736 (1932).

Reversion of remainder to testator's estate.

- When contingency on which it is based never happens, remainder estate reverts to testator's estate. Kemp v. Lewis, 147 Ga. 254, 93 S.E. 404 (1917).

Remainder vested when present capacity for possession exits.

- An estate is vested when there is an immediate right of enjoyment or a present fixed right of future enjoyment. It is the present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession were to become vacant, that distinguishes a vested from a contingent remainder. Refinance Corp. v. Wilson, 183 Ga. 336, 188 S.E. 707 (1936).

Interest limited to stockholder upon death of another vested remainder.

- When a corporate resolution uses the term "reversion" to describe the estate of a stockholder, the estate is a vested remainder if the remainder interest is limited to that stockholder upon the death of another, and the stockholder's rights are the same as those of a vested remainderman. J.B. McCrary Co. v. Peacock, 223 Ga. 476, 156 S.E.2d 57 (1967).

Construction of defeasible fee as remainder.

- If remainder is a defeasible fee, law favors construction making fee absolute at earliest time, consistent with intent of the testator, as expressed in the will. Sanders v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 Ga. 450, 6 S.E.2d 294 (1939).

Deed conveyed life estate and an estate in remainder.

- Trial court erred in declaring that a deed conveyed a joint tenancy to a decedent and widow because the trial court construed the deed in a manner contrary to the deed's terms, ignoring the provision granting the decedent's widow a tenancy in common for their joint lives; instead, the deed should have been construed to convey first a life estate and then an estate in remainder, so as to give effect to all of the deed's provisions. Greene v. Greene, 311 Ga. App. 132, 714 S.E.2d 650 (2011).

Deed conveyed to a widow a fee simple estate in the property upon a decedent's death because the deed conveyed to the decedent and widow a life estate in the property as tenants in common, which terminated upon the death of either of them, and the language of the deed conveyed a fee simple estate in remainder to the surviving grantee; therefore, upon the decedent's death, the life estate of the decedent and widow in the property ended and fee simple title to the property vested in the widow. Greene v. Greene, 311 Ga. App. 132, 714 S.E.2d 650 (2011).

Land reverts to grantor when company abandons right of way with conditional limitation.

- If the grant had been to the railroad company or the company's assigns "for railroad purposes only," with no words of reverter or of limitation, the deed would pass the fee. The phrase "for railroad purposes only" would be merely a declaration of the purpose for which the land conveyed was intended to be used. There would be no reversion. But there are the added words, "and for the time that they shall so use it." The habendum clause was a conditional limitation, and the land reverted to the grantor when the company abandoned the right of way. Lawson v. Georgia S. & F. Ry., 142 Ga. 14, 82 S.E. 233 (1914).

Reversion created in estate when will creates beneficiary for life with no remainder.

- When one is a beneficiary for life with no remainder created by the will, a reversion is created in the estate, which reversionary interest vests immediately upon the testator's death. Smith v. Francis, 221 Ga. 260, 144 S.E.2d 439 (1965).

When remainder estate fails because of want of remainderman, realty reverts to estate of testatrix, to be disposed of as intestate property. Armstrong Junior College Comm'n v. Livesey, 189 Ga. 825, 7 S.E.2d 678 (1940).

Testator by will created a trust estate with a limitation over to the testator's heirs at law who might be in life at the time of the termination of the trust estate. Applying the provisions of former Code 1933, § 85-504 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-23), the words "heir at law" would mean children and the descendants of children, and since the only children of the testator had died without issue, this remainder failed, and the reversionary interest in the testator's estate vested, upon the testator's death, in those who were then the testator's heirs at law, with the right of possession postponed until the death of the last life tenant. Dodson v. Trust Co., 216 Ga. 499, 117 S.E.2d 331 (1960).

Effect of qualified fee with power of appointment.

- When the owner, by deed of gift, conveyed certain described lands to the owner's daughter, her bodily heirs and assigns forever, and if no bodily heirs then to be left to her choice any member of her family, brother or sister, nephew or niece, she took a base, or qualified fee, subject to be divested upon her dying without bodily heirs, and having died without bodily heirs subsequent to the death of the grantor intestate, and having failed to exercise the power of appointment, a reversion resulted upon her death to the heirs at law of the grantor. Guess v. Morgan, 196 Ga. 265, 26 S.E.2d 424 (1943).

Title reverting to testator's estate goes to those who were testator's heirs at testator's death.

- When a will provides that the title, on a certain contingency, reverts to the testator's estate, the language means that it goes to the heirs of the testator. This means those who were the heirs at law of the testator at the time of the testator's death. Shockley v. Storey, 185 Ga. 790, 196 S.E. 702 (1938).

Heirs previously took such contingent estate as assignable during devisee's lifetime.

- Under a will which gave lands to a certain devisee but contained a provision that, if the devisee dies without issue, the land should revert to the devisee's estate, the heirs at law of the testator took such a contingent estate therein as was assignable during the lifetime of the devisee. Shockley v. Storey, 185 Ga. 790, 196 S.E. 702 (1938).

No reversion when grant for named purpose only.

- When the grant is for a named purpose only, with no words of reverter or of limitation, the grant is a mere declaration of the purpose to which the land conveyed was intended to be used, and in such a case there is no reversion. Heyward v. Hatfield, 182 Ga. 373, 185 S.E. 519 (1936).

Rights of a reversioner are the same as those of a vested remainderman, and such an estate devolves by operation of law upon those who answer the description of heirs at law as of the time of the testator's or grantor's death, with possession postponed until the termination of the prior estate. Guess v. Morgan, 196 Ga. 265, 26 S.E.2d 424 (1943).

When a reversion is contingent, the rights would be the same as contingent remainders. Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ga. 670, 163 S.E. 736 (1932).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates, §§ 197 et seq., 217 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, § 249 et seq. 31 C.J.S., Estates, §§ 97, 130, 131. 96 C.J.S., Wills, §§ 1269, 1302.

ALR.

- Postponing distribution until payment of debts or settlement of estate as violating rule against perpetuities, 13 A.L.R. 1033.

Conveyance by life tenant and remaindermen in esse as cutting off interest of unborn persons under devise for life with remainder to a class, 25 A.L.R. 770.

Relative rights of life beneficiary and remainderman as to return on bonds or other obligations for the payment of money, bought at a premium or at a discount, 101 A.L.R. 7; 131 A.L.R. 1426.

Necessity that living members of the same class be parties to give court jurisdiction, under the doctrine of representation in respect of interests of unborn contingent remaindermen, 120 A.L.R. 876.

Relative rights of tenant for years or life and remainderman as to return on bonds or other obligations for the payment of money bought at a premium or discount, 131 A.L.R. 1426.

Rule limiting duration of restraints on alienation as applicable to covenant in deed restricting use of property, 10 A.L.R.2d 824.

Grant to one for life, and afterwards, either absolutely or contingently, to grantor's heirs or next of kin, as leaving reversion or creating remainder, 16 A.L.R.2d 691.

Devisability of possibility of reverter, or of right of reentry for breach of condition subsequent, 16 A.L.R.2d 1246.

Title to buildings when school lands revert for nonuse for school purposes, 28 A.L.R.2d 564.

Provision of will that children, etc., of remainderman who dies before expiration of precedent estate or time fixed for distribution to remaindermen, shall take the share to which he would have been entitled, as affecting the character of remainder as vested or contingent, 47 A.L.R.2d 900.