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Call Now: 904-383-7448Since no particular estate is necessary to sustain a remainder, the defeat of the particular estate for any cause does not destroy the remainder.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2246; Code 1868, § 2238; Code 1873, § 2264; Code 1882, § 2264; Civil Code 1895, § 3099; Civil Code 1910, § 3675; Code 1933, § 85-702; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 44.)
- For article discussing destructibility of contingent remainders, see 3 Ga. B.J. 57 (1940). For article, "Descendible Future Interests in Georgia: The Effect of the Preference for Early Vesting," see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 443 (1973). For article, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Georgia Wills and Trusts," see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 235 (1982).
Section presupposes some estate. Lanier v. Lanier, 218 Ga. 137, 126 S.E.2d 776 (1962) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-62).
Contingent-remainder interest in land is an "estate." Phelps v. Palmer, 192 Ga. 421, 15 S.E.2d 503 (1941).
Section widely differs from the common law, and wholly abrogates any defeat of remainders by the destruction or defeat of the particular estate; correspondingly, if any doctrine of representation or quasi representation by the life tenant of the remaindermen, so far as to bind the remaindermen by a judgment against the life tenant, was established, it does not exist under Georgia law. Brown v. Brown, 97 Ga. 531, 25 S.E. 353, 33 L.R.A. 816 (1895) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-62).
- Ordinarily, election of the widow to take against will has effect of accelerating any remainders limited to take effect after a life estate given to her. Toombs v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 766, 57 S.E. 59 (1907); Bank of Statesboro v. Futch, 164 Ga. 181, 138 S.E. 60 (1927).
- When an estate was left by will to support the family until the widow's death, but the widow elected to take dower, the remainder was not accelerated by her part of the life estate ending for a remainder will not fail for want of a particular estate. Nor did the estate stand as if the testator had died intestate for the defeat of a particular estate does not destroy the remainder. Toombs v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 766, 57 S.E. 59 (1907).
- L and L's brother N each took a vested remainder in the property bequeathed to M for life, and this remainder vested in L and N when the will took effect at the death of the testator. Vason v. Estes, 77 Ga. 352, 1 S.E. 163 (1887).
Cited in Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ga. 670, 163 S.E. 736 (1932); Raney v. Smith, 242 Ga. 809, 251 S.E.2d 554 (1979).
- 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates, §§ 230, 241 et seq.
- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, § 249 et seq. 31 C.J.S., Estates, § 95 et seq. 96 C.J.S., Wills, § 910.
- Effect of premature termination of precedent estate to accelerate remainder of which there is an alternative substantial gift, 164 A.L.R. 1297.
Effect of premature termination of precedent estate to accelerate a contingent remainder, 164 A.L.R. 1433.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-01
Citation: 298 Ga. 390, 782 S.E.2d 251, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 102
Snippet: this legal impossibility. See generally OCGA § 44-6-62; Gresham v. Gannon, 243 Ga. 269 (253