Property interest entitling employee to due process.

- A public employee governed by the Georgia Merit Systems Act and the State Board Personnel Rules has a property interest in the employee's job entitling the employee to the protections of due process. Brown v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue, 881 F.2d 1018 (11th Cir. 1989).

Employees in the classified service may be terminated only after an evidentiary hearing on the grounds of their discharge, employees in the unclassified service have no such rights. Ray v. Edwards, 557 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ga. 1982), modified on other grounds, 725 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1984).

Employee's statutory right to a hearing.

- Trial court did not err when the court held that the State Personnel Board exceeded the board's authority in adopting regulations authorizing an administrative law judge to resolve an appeal from the board's termination of a classified state employee without holding an evidentiary hearing because the regulation at issue, Ga. Pers. Bd. R. & Regs., Reg. 478-1-.24(6)(e) and (x), did not comport with the Georgia Merit System Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 45-20-8 and45-20-9, in that the regulation denied the employee, who had been deemed "voluntarily separated" from employment, the statutory right to a hearing. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Dillard, 313 Ga. App. 782, 723 S.E.2d 23 (2012).

Those portions of Ga. Pers. Bd. R. & Regs., Reg. 478-1-.24(6)(e) and (x) which dispense with the need for an evidentiary hearing in cases involving the voluntary separation of a classified employee are contrary to law; the curtailed procedure laid out in Ga. Pers. Bd. R. & Regs., Reg. 478-1-.24(6)(e) and (x) cannot be reconciled with either the statutory scheme, which contemplates that the State Personnel Board must provide the classified employee with reasons for the action and an opportunity to file an appeal and request a hearing, the Georgia Merit System Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-20-8(b), or the rule's own more general procedures, which require that, within seven days of the filing of an appeal, the administrative law judge or the board shall designate an appropriate time and place to conduct the hearing. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Dillard, 313 Ga. App. 782, 723 S.E.2d 23 (2012).

Jurisdiction over application to waive mandatory retirement.

- A conservation ranger's right to apply for a waiver of mandatory retirement pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 47-2-224 imposed a duty on the board to consider the application and the board's refusal to consider it adversely affected the employee's "employment status" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 45-20-8; accordingly, the board had jurisdiction over the subject matter. State Personnel Bd. v. Adams, 216 Ga. App. 341, 453 S.E.2d 821 (1995).

Demotion must be pursuant to Act as existed at hiring.

- The Merit System Act creates a constitutionally protected contract between the merit system member and the state; therefore, merit system employees can be demoted only in compliance with the Act as it existed at the time they assumed their classified positions. Clark & Stephenson v. State Personnel Bd., 252 Ga. 548, 314 S.E.2d 658 (1984).

Board authorized to modify action of appointing authority.

- O.C.G.A. § 45-20-8(d) endows the board with authority to reduce a sanction imposed by the appointing authority even though the board finds sufficient evidence to support a charge for which the sanction of dismissal is authorized. Dollar v. Department of Human Resources, 196 Ga. App. 698, 396 S.E.2d 913 (1990).

Board authorized to reinstate dismissal by appointing authority.

- When the State Personnel Board, in reviewing the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) decreasing the sanction imposed on a state employee from dismissal to a 30-day suspension, reimposed the dismissal, it was error for a trial court to find that the board's decision was not supported by a sufficient rationale; the board properly adopted findings and conclusions of the ALJ which were consistent with the board's own decision and then explained that the ALJ's recommended sanction was too lenient for the proved misconduct, as the misconduct was so severe as to warrant dismissal, so the board's decision was within the board's broad authority to impose sanctions on state employees under O.C.G.A. § 45-20-8(d). Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Willis, 274 Ga. App. 801, 619 S.E.2d 335 (2005).

Involuntary demotions do not conflict with the prohibition against involuntary servitude. Brown v. State Merit Sys. of Personnel Admin., 245 Ga. 239, 264 S.E.2d 186 (1980).

Determination of whether retention points have been properly calculated does not require an evidentiary hearing. Brown v. State Merit Sys. of Personnel Admin., 245 Ga. 239, 264 S.E.2d 186 (1980).

Employment reclassification with adverse racial impact not implemented.

- White employee had no vested property rights in a promotion recommended by a 1984 reclassification proposal which was flawed and likely to have an adverse racial impact. Williams v. Ledbetter, 685 F. Supp. 247 (M.D. Ga. 1988).

Cited in Herault v. Department of Human Resources, 137 Ga. App. 446, 224 S.E.2d 480 (1976); Hall v. Department of Natural Resources, 139 Ga. App. 298, 228 S.E.2d 174 (1976); Stanley v. Department of Human Resources, 146 Ga. App. 450, 246 S.E.2d 459 (1978); Beall v. Department of Revenue, 148 Ga. App. 5, 251 S.E.2d 4 (1978); Department of Human Resources v. Green, 160 Ga. App. 37, 285 S.E.2d 772 (1981); Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 291 S.E.2d 418 (1982); Georgia Dep't of Labor v. Sims, 164 Ga. App. 856, 298 S.E.2d 562 (1982).

Resignation of employee.

- An employer has the discretion to accept or refuse a letter of resignation that is tendered prior to the effective date of a proposed dismissal. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-6.

Due process does not require specific procedure when employee resigns either by letter or abandonment.

- Since employees in classified services of state merit system have no property interest in continuing employment or ownership over any position, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that any specific procedure be followed when such an employee resigns, whether pursuant to formal letter or resignation or by abandoning that position for more than five workdays. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-104.