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2018 Georgia Code 46-2-59 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 46-2-59 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 46-2-59

TITLE 46 PUBLIC UTILITIES AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

Section 2. Public Service Commission, 46-2-1 through 46-2-95.

ARTICLE 3 INVESTIGATIONS AND HEARINGS

46-2-59. Permissible parties in proceedings before commission; intervention in proceedings generally; limited appearances; procedure for granting leave to intervene.

  1. In all proceedings before the commission, the parties to such proceeding shall consist of the affected applicant, any person who is permitted to intervene as provided in this Code section, and the Utility Finance Section established pursuant to Article 2A of this chapter.
  2. Any person on whom a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene may intervene by filing a notice of intervention with the commission or hearing officer, as appropriate.
  3. Any other person desiring to intervene must file an application for leave to intervene within 30 days following the first published notice of the proceeding. Any such application shall be in writing, shall be verified either by the party intervening or by his attorney on information and belief, shall identify the party requesting the intervention, and shall set forth with particularity the facts pertaining to his interest and the grounds upon which his application for intervention are based. Such application shall be served on all other parties in the proceeding, including those who have previously applied for leave to intervene. No untimely application for leave to intervene shall be granted by the presiding authority except for good cause shown.
  4. Any party or person who has previously applied for leave to intervene in a proceeding in which leave to intervene is sought by another person may file a response to the application for leave to intervene within 15 days after the application is served.
  5. The commission or hearing officer shall permit only the following persons to intervene:
    1. A person upon whom a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene;
    2. A person who demonstrates a legal, property, or other interest in the proceeding. In determining whether to permit intervention, the hearing officer may consider whether the person's interest is adequately represented by other parties and whether the intervention will unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice the rights of other parties;
    3. Any member of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, who may without fee intervene on behalf of his constituents with the full rights and privileges of a designated party.
  6. The commission or hearing officer may condition any order permitting intervention so as to assure the orderly conduct of the proceeding.
  7. A person who is not a party may make a limited appearance by making an oral or written statement of his position on the issues within such limits and on such conditions as may be fixed by the hearing officer; but he may not otherwise participate in the proceeding.
  8. A party granted leave to intervene shall be present, absent good cause shown, during that portion of the proceedings for which that party has indicated a desire to be heard.
  9. An order by a hearing officer denying or conditioning an application for leave to intervene shall be immediately reviewable by the commission. An order by the commission denying or conditioning an application for leave to intervene shall be immediately reviewable as provided by law for the judicial review of final commission orders.
  10. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit the commission from taking any action prior to the expiration of the 30 day period during which persons are permitted to file applications for leave to intervene.

(Code 1933, § 93-502a, enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 121, § 6.)

Cross references.

- Intervention in administrative proceedings generally, § 50-13-14.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of administrative law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 17 (1986). For article, "Administrative Law," see 63 Mercer L. Rev. 47 (2011).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Where intervention application granted without condition, intervener actual party to proceedings.

- Where the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) was authorized to condition the basis upon which intervention would be allowed and the scope of participation by the intervenor in a proceeding and the application which had prayed for leave to intervene "with full rights as a party" was granted without any such condition by the PSC, the intervenor was an actual party to the contested proceedings. Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia v. Georgia Power Co., 174 Ga. App. 263, 329 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 255 Ga. 253, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985).

Party must be "aggrieved" to seek judicial review.

- One who has been made a party to a Public Service Commission regulatory proceeding under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 46-2-59 does not have automatic standing to petition for judicial review of the Public Service Commission's decision without the necessity of being an "aggrieved person" under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a). Georgia Power Co. v. Campaign For A Prosperous Ga., 255 Ga. 253, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985).

Municipalities had standing to appeal agency's ruling despite failing to intervene in agency proceedings.

- As a municipal association intervened in rate-making proceedings before the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC), and certain municipalities joined the association's arguments in the trial court, the municipalities had standing to appeal the PSC's decision concerning a reallocation of franchise fees paid to the cities, even though the municipalities did not apply to intervene before the PSC under O.C.G.A. § 46-2-59. Unified Gov't v. Ga. PSC, 293 Ga. App. 786, 668 S.E.2d 296 (2008).

Lack of standing to seek judicial review.

- Trial court properly concluded that taxpayers lacked standing to seek judicial review of the Georgia Public Service Commission's (PSC) certification order because the taxpayers did not file a timely application to intervene in the certification proceedings and, thus, did not satisfy the first requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a); the taxpayers had an available administrative remedy by applying for intervention status in the proceedings conducted by the PSC on the company's application for certification within 30 days following the first published notice of the proceeding, O.C.G.A. § 46-2-59(c), but the taxpayers did not seek to intervene until eight months after notice of the proceedings were first published by the PSC. Fulton County Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 287 Ga. 876, 700 S.E.2d 554 (2010).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 46-2-59

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Georgia Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia, 336 S.E.2d 790 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 2, 1985 | 255 Ga. 253

...BELL, Justice. This case is here on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Campaign For A Prosperous Ga. v. Ga. Power Co., 174 Ga. App. 263 (329 SE2d 570) (1985). Campaign For A Prosperous Georgia (Campaign) filed a motion to intervene, pursuant to OCGA § 46-2-59, [1] in proceedings on an application *254 by the Georgia Power Company (Georgia Power) to the Public Service Commission (PSC) for a rate increase....
..."Since the proceeding was of an appellate nature and the statute specifically requires only service of the petition, the deficiency in the style of the petition was an insufficient basis upon which to grant a motion to dismiss." Campaign, supra, 174 Ga. App. at 265. It further found, largely on the basis of OCGA § 46-2-59, that Campaign had standing to seek judicial review of the PSC's decision. We granted certiorari to consider the following two questions: "1. Whether one who has been made a party to a Public Service Commission regulatory proceeding under the provisions of OCGA § 46-2-59 has automatic standing to petition for judicial review of the Public Service Commission's decision without the necessity of being *255 an `aggrieved person' under OCGA § 50-13-19 (a)." "2....
..."In 1981, the General Assembly again addressed the topic of the applicable administrative procedure as to the PSC," id. at 266, declaring a public policy that consumers of utility services "deserve adequate representation in proceedings affecting utility rates and service," Ga. L. 1981, pp. 121, 122. OCGA § 46-2-59, one of the provisions enacted to effectuate the foregoing public policy, provides, inter alia, that persons who are allowed to intervene by the PSC, see OCGA § 46-2-59 (e), are automatically elevated to the status of a party to the proceedings, OCGA § 46-2-59 (a)....
...n allowed to intervene in an agency proceeding does not automatically attain the status of a full party to the proceeding. Based on the termination of the PSC's exemption from the APA in 1975, and the elevation of an intervenor to a party under OCGA § 46-2-59 and the express statement of public policy by the General Assembly in 1981, the Court of Appeals rejected Georgia Power's argument that it was possible for one to be a party to a rate-hike proceeding and still fail to meet the "aggrieved person" standard of OCGA § 50-13-19 (a)....
...Town of East Haven, 419 A2d 349 (1) (Conn. 1979); Jordan v. Hamada, 643 P2d 73 (2) (Hawaii 1982). Thus, the language of OCGA § 50-13-19 (a) does not permit the construction given to it by the Court of Appeals. In addition, we do not find that the enactment of OCGA § 46-2-59 compels a contrary conclusion. As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals concluded that the public policy of providing consumers "adequate representation in proceedings affecting utility rates," which OCGA § 46-2-59 was enacted to implement, would be frustrated unless the court construed OCGA § 50-13-19 (a) as granting parties to a PSC proceeding an automatic right to judicial review of the PSC decision. We do not find, however, that the policy behind the enactment of OCGA § 46-2-59 will be frustrated if OCGA § 50-13-19 (a) is applied according to its plain language. First, it is clear that OCGA § 46-2-59 was enacted to effectuate the specific purpose, unrelated to judicial review of PSC decisions, of expanding the extremely limited right of participation theretofore given to intervenors in agency proceedings under the APA. The provision of the APA governing hearings provides *257 that only parties to the hearings are entitled "to respond and present evidence on all issues involved." OCGA § 50-13-13 (a) (3). Moreover, OCGA § 46-2-58, enacted along with OCGA § 46-2-59, sets out procedures for conducting PSC hearings, and provides, similarly to OCGA § 50-13-13 (a) (3), that "[t]he hearing officer or commission shall permit only the Commissioners, the hearing officer, the parties, or the attorneys of record of the Commissioners, hearing officers, or parties to examine or cross-examine witnesses, except with the consent of the witness." OCGA § 46-2-58 (c). Before the enactment of OCGA § 46-2-59, the intervention provision applicable to the PSC and other agencies was OCGA § 50-13-14, which did not grant party status, for purposes of the agency proceeding, to persons permitted to intervene. Thus, before the enactment of OCGA § 46-2-59, intervenors in PSC proceedings were not entitled to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise be fully heard on the issues involved. OCGA § 46-2-59, by providing that persons allowed to intervene are given party status, grants this critical right to intervenors in PSC proceeding, and thus effectuates, in a manner unrelated to judicial review, the public policy of granting consumers of utility services adequate representation in rate cases. We do not find that OCGA § 50-13-19 (a), by requiring that all persons seeking review of a PSC or other agency decision must demonstrate their "aggrieved" status in order to have standing to do so, frustrates the clearly intended purpose of OCGA § 46-2-59. Conversely, we find nothing in OCGA § 46-2-59 to indicate, that, in addition to the above purpose, it was intended to impact on the plain language of the standing provisions of OCGA § 50-13-19 (a)....
...ble within the agency" in "contested cases," OCGA § 50-13-19 (a), and since the PSC has the authority to limit the number of intervenors before it and place conditions on the participation of those to whom it does grant the right to intervene. OCGA § 46-2-59 (c), (e), (f)....
...the trial judge was correct in dismissing the complaint for nonjoinder. Loyd v. Ga. State Health Planning &c. Agency, 168 Ga. App. 850 (310 SE2d 738) (1983); Judd v. Valdosta Zoning Bd. of App., 147 Ga. App. 128 (248 SE2d 196) (1978). NOTES [1] OCGA § 46-2-59 provides in relevant part as follows: "(a) In all proceedings before the commission, the parties to such proceeding shall consist of the affected applicant, any person who is permitted to intervene as provided in this Code section, and the...
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Fulton Cnty. Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 700 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 4, 2010 | 287 Ga. 876, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3581

...Appellants had an available administrative remedy by applying for intervention status in the proceedings conducted by the PSC on Georgia Power's application for certification "within 30 days following the first published notice of the proceeding." OCGA § 46-2-59(c)....
...able within the agency" in "contested cases," OCGA § 50-13-19(a), and since the PSC has the authority to limit the number of intervenors before it and place conditions on the participation of those to whom it does grant the right to intervene. OCGA § 46-2-59(c), (e), (f)....