O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 46-3-112 (2019)

Creation of authority; status of authority as instrumentality of state; location of principal office and legal situs or residence of authority

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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There is created a public body corporate and politic to be known as the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, which shall be a public corporation of the State of Georgia and shall have a perpetual existence. This authority, however, shall not be a state institution nor a department or agency of the state but shall be an instrumentality of the state, a mere creature of the state, having distinct corporate entity and being exempt from Article 2 of Chapter 17 of Title 50. The authority shall have its principal office in Fulton County, and its legal situs or residence for the purpose of this article shall be Fulton County.

History

(Ga. L. 1975, p. 107, § 2; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1200, § 1.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Creation of authority and grant of powers to it not unconstitutional. - As the Municipal Electric Authority is a public corporation of the state, the creation of the authority and the granting of powers to it do not constitute a grant of corporate powers and privileges to a private company in violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. V (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V). Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976). Immunity from antitrust laws. - The Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia (MEAG) is an ‘‘instrumentality of the state’’

as are its participants, political subdivisions who entered long-term power supply agreements, and is therefore immune from the antitrust laws under the state action immunity doctrine broadened by the Supreme Court in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 85 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1985) and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 85 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1985). Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff ’d, 844 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 29 C.J.S., Electricity, § 25.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 1 case, 1986–1986 · leading case: Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986).

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Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986). · cites it 4× “O.C.G.A. § 46-3-112 provides that MEAG “shall be a public corporation of the State of Georgia and shall have a perpetual existence.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.