Constitutionality.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-2610 (see now § 16-11-39.1) and Ga. L. 1968, p. 9, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-21), which prohibit telephone calls for the purpose of harassing, were clear and can be readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence seeking to avoid their violation, and therefore these sections were not unconstitutionally vague or broad and did not violate due process. Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 255 S.E.2d 710, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S. Ct. 293, 62 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1979).

Defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 46-5-21(a)(1) was reversed as the statute was an overbroad infringement on defendant's First Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V rights to free speech; the statute does not contain the necessary language setting out the least restrictive means to further a compelling state interest as it applies to indecent or obscene speech, whether heard by children or adults, and whether not welcomed by listeners or spoken with intent to please. McKenzie v. State, 279 Ga. 265, 626 S.E.2d 77 (2005).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- See Moss v. State, 245 Ga. App. 811, 538 S.E.2d 876 (2000).

Cited in Tuggle v. Wilson, 158 Ga. App. 411, 280 S.E.2d 628 (1981); Tuggle v. Wilson, 248 Ga. 335, 282 S.E.2d 110 (1981); Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 499 S.E.2d 630 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Telecommunications, §§ 194, 195.

C.J.S.

- 86 C.J.S., Telecommunications, §§ 130, 131.

ALR.

- Right of telephone or telegraph company to refuse, or discontinue, service because of use of improper language, 32 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Unsolicited mailing, distribution, house call, or telephone call as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457.

Validity, construction, and application of state criminal statute forbidding use of telephone to annoy or harass, 95 A.L.R.3d 411.