O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) It shall be a misdemeanor for any person, by means of telephone communication in this state, to: (1) Make any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent; (2) Make a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number; (3) Make or cause the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called number; or (4) Make repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number. (b) Any person who knowingly permits any telephone under his control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
History
(Ga. L. 1968, p. 9, § 1.)
Annotations
Cross references. - Further provisions regarding unlawful communications by telephone, § 16-11-39.1. JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - Former Code 1933, § 26-2610 (see now § 16-11-39.1) and Ga. L. 1968, p. 9, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-21), which prohibit telephone calls for the purpose of harassing, were clear and can be readily understood by people of ordinary
intelligence seeking to avoid their violation, and therefore these sections were not unconstitutionally vague or broad and did not violate due process. Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 255 S.E.2d 710, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 940, 100 S. Ct. 293, 62 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1979). Evidence sufficient for conviction. - See Moss v. State, 245 Ga. App. 811, 538 S.E.2d 876 (2000).
Cited in Tuggle v. Wilson, 158 Ga. App. 411, 280 S.E.2d 628 (1981); Tuggle v. Wilson, 248 Ga. 335, 282 S.E.2d 110 (1981); Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 499 S.E.2d 630 (1998).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Telecommunications, §§ 194, 195. C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S., Telecommunications, §§ 130, 131. ALR. - Right of telephone or telegraph company to refuse, or discontinue, service because of use of improper language, 32 ALR3d 1041.
Unsolicited mailing, distribution, house call, or telephone call as invasion of privacy, 56 ALR3d 457. Validity, construction, and application of state criminal statute forbidding use of telephone to annoy or harass, 95 ALR3d 411.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1989–2024 · leading case:
Vines v. State, 499 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 1998).
Vines v. State, 499 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 1998).
· cites it 21× “” The State urges that the existence of these specific criminal statutes is irrelevant because, unlike OCGA § 16-6-4 (a), neither contemplates protection of the child against psychological injury resulting from hearing sexually explicit language over the telephone.”
McKenzie v. State, 626 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. 2005).
· cites it 18× “After the trial court denied demurrers challenging the constitutionality of the statute appellant Anthony McKenzie was alleged to have violated, appellant stipulated to the evidence and was convicted in a bench trial of twice violating OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1) as a result of two…”
State v. Vines, 487 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 24× “" I agree with the dissent that obscene telephone calls to minors are governed by OCGA § 46-5-21. I do not believe, however, that a proscription against "obscene telephone calls" protects minors from the same type of harm as is proscribed by the child molestation statute.”
Coleman v. Hous. Auth., 381 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 46-5-21 (1). Direct communications of the same kind of personally obnoxious messages are not protected as a matter of law in the workplace.”
Moss v. State, 538 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 6× “1, and using telephone communication for indecent purposes, OCGA § 46-5-21. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.”
Pierce v. State, 554 S.E.2d 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 46-5-21. See Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.”
Williams, Congresswoman v. Powell, 320 Ga. 221 (Ga. 2024).
· cites it 2× “12 In McKenzie, we held that OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1), which prohibits “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent” telephone calls, is an overbroad infringement on the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, because the Code section does not employ the least…”
David Gaines Gilmore v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 4× “265, 266-267 ( 626 SE2d 77 ) (2005) (holding that OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1) was an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech, in contrast with 6 2.”
Williams, Congresswoman v. Powell (Ga. 2024).
· cites it 2× “12 In McKenzie, we held that OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1), which prohibits “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent” telephone calls, is an overbroad infringement on the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, 16 OCGA § 16-11-34.”
— 46-5-21(a) — 2 cases
Vines v. State, 499 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 1998).
“” The State urges that the existence of these specific criminal statutes is irrelevant because, unlike OCGA § 16-6-4 (a), neither contemplates protection of the child against psychological injury resulting from hearing sexually explicit language over the telephone.”
State v. Vines, 487 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
“" I agree with the dissent that obscene telephone calls to minors are governed by OCGA § 46-5-21. I do not believe, however, that a proscription against "obscene telephone calls" protects minors from the same type of harm as is proscribed by the child molestation statute.”
— 46-5-21(a)(1) — 2 cases
Vines v. State, 499 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 1998).
“” The State urges that the existence of these specific criminal statutes is irrelevant because, unlike OCGA § 16-6-4 (a), neither contemplates protection of the child against psychological injury resulting from hearing sexually explicit language over the telephone.”
State v. Vines, 487 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
“" I agree with the dissent that obscene telephone calls to minors are governed by OCGA § 46-5-21. I do not believe, however, that a proscription against "obscene telephone calls" protects minors from the same type of harm as is proscribed by the child molestation statute.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.