Carrier's duty to receive ordinary merchandise at full liability and at reasonable rates.

- Carrier was bound under former Civil Code 1895, § 2278 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40) to receive ordinary merchandise for transportation with the full measure of liability and at reasonable rates on demand, and in case of its refusal to do so the shipper has a remedy in damages. Inman & Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 159 F. 960 (S.D. Ga. 1908).

Carrier under duty to furnish cars for usual quantity of goods.

- A railroad company is under a duty to provide sufficient cars for transporting, without reasonable delay, the usual and ordinary quantity of freight offered to it, or which might be ordinarily expected in its business. Wadley S. Ry. v. Kent & Downs, 145 Ga. 689, 89 S.E. 765 (1916).

Carrier not bound to anticipate unexpected increase of business.

- It is the duty of a railroad company to provide facilities for the transportation of goods, but this duty is not an absolute one, the company must furnish cars sufficient to transport goods offered in the usual and ordinary course of business, but it is not bound to anticipate and prepare for an unexpected press of business. Central of Ga. Ry. v. George P. Greene & Co., 41 Ga. App. 794, 154 S.E. 809 (1930).

Ordinarily a shipper, on reasonable demand, would be entitled to all the cars which it could promptly load with freight to be transported over the carrier's line. But that is not an absolute right, and the carrier is not liable if its failure to furnish cars was the result of sudden and great demands which it had no reason to apprehend would be made, and which it could not reasonably have been expected to meet in full. Central of Ga. Ry. v. George P. Greene & Co., 41 Ga. App. 794, 154 S.E. 809 (1930).

Character of goods.

- There may be things of such an unusual character that a railroad company is not bound, under its general duty as a common carrier, to provide cars or special facilities for their transportation. But if in the ordinary course of its business it is accustomed to receive lumber which requires cars 40 feet in length for transportation, or holds itself out as a common carrier thereof, the duty to furnish cars for that purpose arises. Wadley S. Ry. v. Kent & Downs, 145 Ga. 689, 89 S.E. 765 (1916).

Carrier's regulations must yield to state's regulations.

- Power of common carrier to make reasonable regulations must yield where regulations are made by authority of state, unless they are invalid. Railroad Comm'n v. Louisville & N.R.R., 140 Ga. 817, 80 S.E. 327, 1915E L.R.A. 902, 1915A Ann. Cas. 1018 (1913).

Regulation requiring knowledge of goods valid.

- A carrier may adopt reasonable rules and regulations for the carrier's own safety and the benefit of the public, such as requiring the nature and value of the goods delivered to the carrier to be made known, and any fraudulent acts, sayings or concealments by the carrier's customers, will release the carrier from liability. Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635, 91 Am. Dec. 783 (1867).

Regulation providing for nonstoppage at certain place valid.

- If a railway company may under former Civil Code 1910, § 2729 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40) make reasonable regulations in the conduct of its business, in the absence of a statute to the contrary a schedule which provided for the nonstoppage of a certain train at a particular place will not be considered unreasonable, where it appeared that other trains were scheduled to stop at such place, and it was not alleged that they did not afford adequate service. Southern Ry. v. Bailey, 143 Ga. 610, 85 S.E. 847, 1915E L.R.A. 1043 (1915).

Regulation permitting stopping only at designated places valid.

- In the absence of statutory prohibition or regulation, a railroad company may adopt a rule under former Civil Code 1910, § 2729 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40), that certain passenger trains, running regularly on its road, will stop only at designated places. Southern Ry. v. Flanigan, 10 Ga. App. 745, 74 S.E. 85 (1912).

Regulation requiring reservation of ship space valid.

- Under former Civil Code 1910, § 2729 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40) it was held that a rule that ship space must be reserved before lumber cars were switched from railroad yards to ship docks was reasonable. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Dixon, 141 Ga. 755, 82 S.E. 37 (1914).

Rule stipulating no responsibility until goods received with instructions valid.

- A rule that no responsibility for freight would be assumed until received with proper shipping instructions and receipted for, was valid. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Smith, 31 Ga. App. 135, 120 S.E. 30 (1923).

Use of rules to relieve legal obligations impermissible.

- The law will not sanction any practice of a common carrier, under the guise of regulating its business, that will relieve the carrier of its legal obligation. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co. v. Granger & Lewis, 132 Ga. 167, 63 S.E. 700 (1909).

Invalid ordinance impermissible as excuse for nonreception of goods.

- A common carrier, able and accustomed to transport and deliver goods, cannot lawfully refuse to do so merely because of the passage of an invalid municipal ordinance regulating the transporting of the goods in question. Southern Express Co. v. Rose Co., 124 Ga. 581, 53 S.E. 185, 5 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619 (1906).

Mandamus to enforce duty of carrier.

- A private party may, by mandamus, enforce the performance of the public duty imposed by former Civil Code 1895, § 2278 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40) by a common carrier as to matters in which such party had a special interest. Southern Express Co. v. Rose Co., 124 Ga. 581, 53 S.E. 185, 5 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619 (1906).

Common carrier by sea may make bookings for transportation of goods.

- The obligation of receiving goods without preference under former Civil Code 1895, § 2278 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40) did not inhibit common carrier by sea from making bookings, that was, from making specific arrangements for the transportation of goods by a particular vessel in advance of its sailing day, provided this privilege was indifferently extended to all patrons, or if the grant of this privilege to shippers of one commodity did not interfere with the carrier's discharge of its duty to the shippers of other commodities with respect to the receipt and transportation of goods. Ocean S.S. Co. v. Savannah Locomotive Works & Supply Co., 131 Ga. 831, 63 S.E. 577, 127 Am. St. R. 265, 20 L.R.A. (n.s.) 867, 15 Ann. Cas. 1044 (1909); Merchants & Miners Transp. Co. v. Granger & Lewis, 132 Ga. 167, 63 S.E. 700 (1909).

Liability of carrier for conversion.

- Where a common carrier received goods offered under former Civil Code 1895, § 2278 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40), the possession thereof by the person offering the same as freight being apparently rightful, though as a matter of fact it may not be actually so, the carrier will not be liable as for a conversion, in an action brought by the true owner, unless the latter intervened before the goods were delivered and demanded them or gave notice of the owner's right to the property in question and of the owner's intention to enforce it. Shellnut v. Central of Ga. Ry., 131 Ga. 404, 62 S.E. 294, 18 L.R.A. (n.s.) 494 (1908).

Jury instructions.

- The court having charged the jury in the language of former Civil Code 1910, § 2729 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-40), as to the duty of a common carrier generally, it was not error not to repeat the expression "which he is able and accustomed to carry" in other portions of the judge's charge dealing with the duty of a railroad company to furnish cars for transportation of freight without unreasonable delay. Wadley S. Ry. v. Kent & Downs, 145 Ga. 689, 89 S.E. 765 (1916).

Considerations for jury.

- The condition of business, the demand for cars, whether usual and ordinary, or unusual and extraordinary, what the defendant had done with a view of providing facilities for the usual and ordinary demands of its business, and the ability or inability to get cars at the time in question, were facts for the consideration of the jury in determining whether the defendant had complied with its duty. Wadley S. Ry. v. Kent & Downs, 145 Ga. 689, 89 S.E. 765 (1916).

Cited in Miller & Co. v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 88 Ga. 563, 15 S.E. 316 (1891); Southern Ry. v. Watson, 110 Ga. 681, 36 S.E. 209 (1900); Southern Ry. v. Moore, 133 Ga. 806, 67 S.E. 85, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 851 (1910); Beck & Gregg Hdwe. Co. v. Cook, 210 Ga. 608, 82 S.E.2d 4 (1954).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers, §§ 294, 300, 305, 313.

C.J.S.

- 13 C.J.S., Carriers, § 386.