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2018 Georgia Code 46-9-45 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 46 PUBLIC UTILITIES AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

Section 9. Transportation of Freight and Passengers Generally, 46-9-1 through 46-9-332.

ARTICLE 3 TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF FREIGHT AND LIVESTOCK

46-9-45. Commencement and termination of carrier's responsibility for goods.

The responsibility of a carrier shall commence with the delivery of the goods to him or to his agent or at the place where the carrier is accustomed or agrees to receive them. The carrier's responsibility shall cease with the delivery of the goods at destination according to the direction of the person sending the goods or according to the custom of the trade.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2043; Code 1868, § 2044; Code 1873, § 2070; Code 1882, § 2070; Civil Code 1895, § 2279; Civil Code 1910, § 2730; Code 1933, § 18-306.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

"Custom of trade" defined.

- The custom of the trade refers to the custom "at destination." Albany & N. Ry. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 137 Ga. 391, 73 S.E. 637 (1912).

Point of which common carrier's responsibility as insurer commences.

- Responsibility of common carrier as insurer of goods commences where there is complete delivery for the purpose of immediate transportation. Bell v. Fitz, 78 Ga. App. 28, 50 S.E.2d 241 (1948).

Carrier liable for delivery of goods within reasonable time. Reception of goods to be carried makes carrier liable for their safe custody and transportation within a reasonable time; if the carrier would relieve oneself from liability, the carrier should, by proof, show such facts as may be necessary for that purpose. Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635, 91 Am. Dec. 783 (1867).

Liability of the common carrier exists only, in the absence of an express or implied contract to the contrary, when the carrier is in complete possession and control of the goods for immediate shipment with nothing remaining to be done by the shipper to complete the consignment to the shipper for the purpose of carriage, and only until the goods are delivered to their destination and notice given to the consignee. Bell v. Fitz, 78 Ga. App. 28, 50 S.E.2d 241 (1948).

Status as carrier or warehouseman distinguished.

- If a common carrier receives goods into the carrier's own warehouse for the accommodation of oneself and the carrier's customers, so that the deposit there is a mere accessory to the carriage and for the purpose of facilitating it, the carrier's liability as a carrier will commence with the receipt of the goods; but, on the contrary, if the goods when so deposited are not ready for immediate transportation, and the carrier cannot make arrangements for their carriage to the place of destination until something further is done, or some further direction is given or communication made concerning them by the owner, or consignor, the deposit must be considered to be in the meantime for the carrier's convenience and accommodation, and the receiver, until some change takes place, will be responsible only as a warehouseman. Bell v. Fitz, 78 Ga. App. 28, 50 S.E.2d 241 (1948).

The relation of shipper and carrier does not begin between the owner of goods and a railway company, though the former may have delivered the goods to the latter, if after such delivery anything required, either by law or the contract, remains to be done by the shipper, and in such case the rights and liability of the company are those only of a warehouseman. Bell v. Fitz, 78 Ga. App. 28, 50 S.E.2d 241 (1948).

Usage or course of dealing may imply duty of safe-keeping.

- Contract imposing upon carrier exclusive duty of safekeeping may be implied by usage or a course of dealing between the parties; but the implication that the carrier assumes the duty of immediate transportation and so responsibility as an insurer, without knowing to what place and to whom goods are to be shipped, must be clear. Bell v. Fitz, 78 Ga. App. 28, 50 S.E.2d 241 (1948).

Shipping directions essential to complete delivery.

- Giving of shipping directions, expressly or impliedly, is essential to complete delivery which causes the liability of the carrier as an insurer to arise. Bell v. Fitz, 78 Ga. App. 28, 50 S.E.2d 241 (1948).

Loading car on sidetrack as delivery.

- Where a railroad company, in pursuance of an agreement with a warehouse company, places one of its cars on a sidetrack in front of the warehouse, for the purpose of having the car loaded with cotton stored in the warehouse, for immediate shipment, the railroad company to pay for the work of loading, and the cotton was loaded onto the car by employees of the warehouse company, properly marked as to destination, and with name of consignor and consignee, this was a delivery under former Civil Code 1910, § 2730 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-45) to the railroad company as a common carrier of the cotton, and the railroad company would be responsible to the owner of the cotton for its destruction by fire while in its possession. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Bird, 10 Ga. App. 423, 73 S.E. 599 (1912).

Removing car from sidetrack.

- There is nothing in the laws or public policy of this state which prevents a shipper and a railroad company from making a contract in relation to the use of a sidetrack, wherein it is agreed that, as to cars loaded by the shipper on the sidetrack, delivery to the carrier is understood to have taken place whenever the carrier removes the car from the sidetrack and places it in its freight train for shipment. Bainbridge Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 8 Ga. App. 677, 70 S.E. 154 (1911).

Reception of goods at depot.

- If the agent of a carrier agreed to receive goods at the depot where they were at the time, the liability as a common carrier began under former Code 1863, § 2043 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-45). Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635, 91 Am. Dec. 783 (1867).

Delivery to carrier must be proved.

- Delivery of the goods must be proved in order to charge a common carrier for their loss. It is a fact for the jury to determine, and if there is any evidence of delivery, the case will go to the jury on that fact. Dibble v. Brown & Harris, 12 Ga. 217, 56 Am. Dec. 460 (1852).

Ending responsibility as carrier.

- As a general rule a railroad company is responsible as common carrier only for the safe deposit of goods shipped by freight upon the platform or in the warehouse of the road at the end of their transit, there to await delivery to the consignee when the consignee should call for them; and from the time of such deposit, even without notice by the carrier to the consignee, the liability of the railway is usually changed from that of a common carrier to that of a warehouseman. Georgia & A. Ry. v. Pound, 111 Ga. 6, 36 S.E. 312 (1900).

Where goods were shipped by railway, and arrive at their destination within the usual time required for transportation, and were there deposited by the company in a place of safety and held by them ready to be delivered on demand, their liability as common carriers ceased under former Code 1868, § 2044 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-45) (unless the custom of the trade was shown to be otherwise as to delivery), and that of warehouseman began. Southwestern R.R. v. Felder, 46 Ga. 433 (1872); Kight v. Wrightsville & T.R.R., 127 Ga. 204, 56 S.E. 363 (1906); Allen v. Southern Ry., 33 Ga. App. 209, 126 S.E. 722 (1924).

Carrier was not liable for the injuries sustained by the injured party when a valve on a container holding hazardous materials exploded after delivery of the container; under O.C.G.A. § 46-9-45, the carrier's responsibility ceased with the delivery of the goods to their destination. Booth v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 406, 623 S.E.2d 244 (2005).

Delivery of loaded cars to consignee.

- Under former Civil Code 1910, § 2730 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-45), it was held that the carrier's relation as such ceased on delivery of loaded cars to the consignee, and until it retook possession of the cars after unloading. The railroad was not liable, therefore for a destruction of the cars by fire. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Milledgeville Ry., 138 Ga. 434, 75 S.E. 614 (1912).

Notice to consignee.

- The law nowhere imposes upon common carriers the obligation of notifying consignees of the arrival of their freight at the point of destination; provided, it has arrived in the due course of transportation. Southwestern R.R. v. Felder, 46 Ga. 433 (1872); Georgia & A. Ry. v. Pound, 111 Ga. 6, 36 S.E. 312 (1900).

If goods arrive out of time, and after they have been demanded by the consignee, it might require notice of their arrival to the consignee, and a reasonable time after, to relieve the company from the extraordinary liability imposed by law upon a common carrier. Southwestern R.R. v. Felder, 46 Ga. 433 (1872).

Delivery at destination to agent.

- A delivery of goods to the duly authorized agent of the owner or assignee is a good delivery. Southern Express Co. v. Everett, 37 Ga. 688 (1868).

Goods remaining in car after verification at destination.

- Where a railroad company has transported a carload of goods and notified the consignee of their arrival, the delivery is complete when the agent of the consignee verifies the goods in the car and gives a receipt for the same; and where the agent of the consignee removes most of the goods, but leaves some in the car on account of approaching night, and the car is broken open after having been closed and sealed by the agent of the railroad company, and some of the goods stolen therefrom, the railroad company, if liable at all, is liable only for gross neglect, as a gratuitous bailee. Allen v. Southern Ry., 33 Ga. App. 209, 126 S.E. 722 (1924).

Delivery beyond terminus.

- Whether a railroad company is bound to carry or transport goods to a point of destination beyond the terminus of its road, depends upon the contract between the parties. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Collins, 77 Ga. 376, 3 S.E. 416, 4 Am. St. R. 87 (1886).

Boat landing as destination.

- If the owner of a boat directs cotton to be left at a particular landing on the river, agreeing to receive it there, a deposit of the cotton at that place constitutes a good delivery. Fleming v. Hammond, 19 Ga. 145 (1855).

Parol evidence of custom not admissible to vary contract.

- Under former Civil Code 1910, § 2730 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-45), parol evidence of usage and custom to vary the terms of a plain, unambiguous written contract was not admissible. Albany & N. Ry. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 137 Ga. 391, 73 S.E. 637 (1912).

Proving custom as to notice.

- In order to show the existence of a custom varying the general rule as announced in former Civil Code 1895, § 2279 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-45) at a particular place, by reason of the railroad company having observed a usage of notifying consignees of the arrival of goods, it must be affirmatively proved that this usage was of an established and general nature. Georgia & A. Ry. v. Pound, 111 Ga. 6, 36 S.E. 312 (1900); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Salios, 14 Ga. App. 711, 82 S.E. 59 (1914).

Chartered car.

- In the case of a chartered car, as in other cases of carriage of freight, the responsibility was that prescribed by former Code 1873, § 2070 (see O.C.G.A § 46-9-45). Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Anderson, 58 Ga. 393 (1877).

Measure of damages.

- When a common carrier fails to deliver goods according to the terms of the contract, the measure of damages is the value of the goods at the time and place at which it is agreed to deliver them, less the transportation charges. Edward T. Taylor & Co. v. Collier, 26 Ga. 122 (1858); Albany & N. Ry. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 137 Ga. 391, 73 S.E. 637 (1912); Lamb v. McHan, 17 Ga. App. 5, 86 S.E. 252 (1915).

Delivery presents jury question.

- As to what constitutes a good delivery, under the facts of a case is a question for the jury. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Hines, Perkins & Co., 19 Ga. 203 (1856).

Cited in Baugh v. McDaniel & Strong, 42 Ga. 641 (1871); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Leverette, 34 Ga. App. 304, 129 S.E. 292 (1925); Powell v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 Ga. App. 648, 199 S.E. 668 (1938); Washburn Storage Co. v. Elliott, 93 Ga. App. 456, 92 S.E.2d 28 (1956).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Duty of carrier to deliver goods on siding or private track of consignee, 1 A.L.R. 1425.

Carrier: delivery of goods to one whose authority to act for consignee has ceased, 2 A.L.R. 279.

Rights and duties of carrier and consignee as to freight unloaded from cars and left on right of way, 38 A.L.R. 676.

Carrier's employees as agents of shipper or consignee in unloading or caring for livestock at destination, 62 A.L.R. 525.

What constitutes delivery of freight to carrier, 113 A.L.R. 1459.

Consignee's refusal to accept delivery at place specified in the contract, or carrier's inability to make delivery at that place, as terminating liability as carrier, 149 A.L.R. 1118.

Initial carrier's liability as that of carrier or of warehouseman in respect of goods while in its warehouse awaiting delivery to connecting carrier, 172 A.L.R. 802.

Shipper's misdescription of goods as affecting carrier's liability for loss or damage, 1 A.L.R.3d 736.

Liability of carrier by land for damage to goods resulting from improper packing by carrier, 7 A.L.R.3d 723.

Liability of carrier for delivering goods sent C.O.D. without receiving cash payment, 27 A.L.R.3d 1320.

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