Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 48-13-13 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 48-13-13 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 48-13-13

TITLE 48 REVENUE AND TAXATION

Section 13. Specific, Business, and Occupation Taxes, 48-13-1 through 48-13-133.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

48-13-13. Prohibitions on occupation tax levies by local governments.

Local governments are not authorized to:

  1. Require a business or practitioner to pay more than one occupation tax for each office or location, except that businesses or practitioners with multiple services or products shall be taxed in accordance with Code Section 48-13-12;
  2. Levy occupation tax on more than 100 percent of the total gross receipts of the business or practitioner, when occupation taxes of all local governments are added together;
  3. Levy occupation tax on any practitioner whose office is maintained by and who is employed in practice exclusively by the United States, the state, a municipality or county of the state, or instrumentalities of the United States, the state, or a municipality or county of the state;
  4. Require the payment of a fee by whatever name in any amount by a business or practitioner for the cost of ascertaining whether such a business or practitioner has paid occupation tax to another local government; or
  5. Levy any occupation tax, regulatory fee, or administrative fee on any state or local authority, nonprofit organization, or vendor operating under a contract with a tax-exempt agricultural fair, as that term is defined in Code Section 2-2-8.

(Code 1981, §48-13-13, enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 1292, § 7; Ga. L. 1995, p. 419, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1268, § 3; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 48.)

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1993, p. 1292, § 9, effective January 1, 1995, renumbered former Code Section 48-13-13 as present Code Section 48-13-22.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Local authority explained.

- In enacting O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13, the General Assembly did not intend the term "local authority" in O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13(5) to refer to a local government corporation, that is, a municipality or a county, but only to a local authority in the narrower sense, and therefore, § 48-13-13(5) does not prohibit one municipality from levying, assessing, and collecting an occupation tax from another municipality that conducts proprietary (nongovernmental) revenue-generating activities within the geographical corporate limits of the first municipality; use of the phrase "local authority" shows that the General Assembly views a local government, that is, a county or municipality, and a local authority as distinct categories, and a "local authority" means an agency created by one or more local governments to carry out certain discrete governmental functions for a local purpose. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011).

City was not a local authority.

- Trial court erred in determining that a first city was a local authority that was statutorily exempt from liability to a second city for any occupation tax for the first city's proprietary business operations because the first city was not a local authority within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13(5), such that the second city was prohibited from taxing the first city; in enacting O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13, the General Assembly did not intend the term "local authority" in § 48-13-13(5) to refer to a local government corporation, that is, a municipality or a county, but only to a local authority in the narrower sense, and therefore, § 48-13-13(5) does not prohibit one municipality from levying, assessing, and collecting an occupation tax from another municipality that conducts proprietary (nongovernmental) revenue-generating activities within the geographical corporate limits of the first municipality. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011).

In a declaration suit, a city was properly determined not to be a local authority as that term is used in O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13(5) and, thus, was subject to the levy of occupation taxes by another municipality for the city's proprietary operations at the city's airport, which was in the other municipality's city limits, because the terms local authority and municipality were not the same under the statute. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 292 Ga. 741, 741 S.E.2d 147 (2013).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13

Total Results: 1  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

City of Atlanta v. City of Coll. Park, 292 Ga. 741 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 28, 2013 | 741 S.E.2d 147, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1338

...in College Park. Both Atlanta and College Park moved for partial summary judgment, and, in ruling on the cross-motions, the trial court found that Atlanta and College Park’s 1969 Agreement was unenforceable. The trial court further ruled that OCGA § 48-13-13 (5), which prohibits local governments from levying an occupation tax on any “local authority,” precluded College Park from levying an occupation tax on Atlanta’s proprietary operations because Atlanta met the definition of a “local authority” under the statute.1 Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment invalidating the 1969Agreement, but reversed the trial court’s finding that the term “local authority” as used in OCGA § 48-13-13 (5) included municipalities....
...City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62 (2) (715 SE2d 158) (2011). This Court granted Atlanta’s petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the City of Atlanta was not a “local authority” as that term is used in OCGA § 48-13-13 (5)....
...App. at 68 (2), n. 15. The Public Revenue Code makes clear, however, that “[ljocal governments [such as the government of College Park] are not authorized to... [l]evy any occupation tax... on[, among other entities,] any... local authority.” OCGA § 48-13-13 (5). See also OCGA §§ 48-13-16 (a); 43-12-1. The City of Atlanta argues that it qualifies as a ‘local authority” under OCGA § 48-13-13 (5) such that it would not have to pay occupation taxes to the City of College Park for conducting proprietary operations there. “Municipalities” that engage in revenue generating business within the corporate limits of another municipality are not specifically listed as entities that would be exempt from paying occupation taxes. See generally OCGA § 48-13-13. Nor is the term “local authority” defined in OCGA § 48-13-13 to include municipalities....
...Accordingly, in order for the City of Atlanta to be exempt from paying occupation taxes for conducting revenue generating business within the city limits of College Park, it would have to be the case that the Legislature specifically intended for municipalities to be exempt “local authorities” under OCGA § 48-13-13 (5) despite failing to list municipalities as exempt entities and failing to define the term “local authority’ to specifically include municipalities. In this regard, it can be said that, if the Legislature intended to exempt municipalities from paying occupation taxes as “local authorities” under OCGA § 48-13-13 (5), it could have expressly stated so in the statute....
...In order to determine whether the Legislature truly intended for the *744term “local authority” to include municipalities, we must turn to the basic rules of statutory construction to determine what the Legislature intended for the term “local authority’to mean in OCGA § 48-13-13 (5)....
...At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature. (Citations omitted.) Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191 (587 SE2d 24) (2003). Where, as here, the term “local authority’ is undefined and its plain meaning is not made clear from the language in OCGA § 48-13-13 (5) itself, “the cardinal rule is to glean the intent of the legislature.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Retention Alternatives, Ltd....
...Atlanta’s arguments to the contrary do not show that the Legislature intended for the terms “local authority” and “municipality’ to be one and the same for purposes of the section of the Public Revenue Code at issue here. See generally OCGA § 48-13-13. As a result, we conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the City of Atlanta was not a “local authority” as that term is used in OCGA § 48-13-13 (5). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents. OCGA § 48-13-13 (5) states in relevant part that “[l]ocal governments are not authorized to ....