O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 48-4-76 (2019)

Judicial in rem tax foreclosures

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) In addition to any other rights and remedies provided under state law for the enforcement of tax liens by the State of Georgia and its counties and municipalities, such governmental entities may proceed with judicial in rem tax foreclosures for delinquent taxes in accordance with the provisions of this article by enactment of an ordinance or resolution of the governing authority of the county in which the property is located which ordinance or resolution shall be sufficient authority for use of the provisions of this article by such county and all municipalities within such county as to their respective taxes. In the event that the governing authority of a county does not so act, a municipality located in such county may, by enactment of its own ordinance or resolution, authorize the use of judicial in rem tax foreclosures for delinquent municipal taxes in accordance with the provision of this article. Any such ordinance or resolution may set forth criteria for selection of properties to be subject to the provisions of this article. (b) Proceedings in accordance with this article are designed solely to enforce the lien for ad valorem taxes against the property subject to such taxation and shall not constitute an action for personal liability for such taxes of the owner or owners of such property. (c) The rights and remedies set forth in this article are available solely to the governmental entities authorized by law to collect ad valorem taxes and shall not extend to any transferee of tax executions or tax liens. (d) The enforcement proceedings authorized by this article may be initiated by a county, by a municipality, by one acting on behalf of the other pursuant to contract, or by joint action in a single proceeding.

History

Code 1981, § 48-4-76, enacted by Ga. L.

1995, p. 272, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1280, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 907, § 4.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Tax foreclosure sale. - Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the county as the nuisance abatement statute did not preclude the county from using a nonjudicial tax foreclosure sale, instead of a judicial in rem tax foreclosure sale, to sell the property because both methods were available for collecting real property ad valorem taxes; judicial in rem tax

foreclosure procedures were an alternative to nonjudicial tax foreclosure procedures, rather than a replacement for them; and the nuisance abatement statute did not require the county to use a judicial in rem tax foreclosure sale when collecting on a nuisance abatement lien. Derby Props., LLC v. Watson, 346 Ga. App. 631, 816 S.E.2d 766, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (2018).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 4 cases, 2014–2018 · leading case: Derby Props., LLC v. J. W. \Bill\" Watson III (2018).
Derby Props., LLC v. J. W. \Bill\" Watson III (2018). · cites it 3× “2 foreclosure procedures, as outlined in OCGA § 48-4-76 et seq. When the County refused to return the money, Derby Properties filed a petition under OCGA § 15-13-3 (the “money rule petition”), in the Superior Court of Paulding County, again challenging the legality of the sale…”
Derby Props., LLC v. Watson, 816 S.E.2d 766 (2018). · cites it 3× “Derby Properties claimed that the tax sale the County had used to enforce the nuisance abatement lien was illegal because the County had utilized the nonjudicial tax foreclosure procedures set forth in OCGA § 48-4-1, instead of the judicial in rem tax foreclosure procedures, as…”
Porche v. Noriega, 754 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “Following a hearing, the *526 superior court denied the petitions, finding that they were not brought against the property to be foreclosed as statutorily required. 1 1. Porche contends that the superior court erred in finding that the petitions were not brought in compliance…”
Robert Porche, in His Capacity as the Tax Comm'r/collector for the City of Woodstock, Georgia v. Juan Pablo (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “1 1 The superior court also found that the abatement liens were void because they were based on City Code sections that do not comply with the provisions of OCGA § 41-2-9, which is the only means by which counties and municipalities may place 3 1.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.