Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 548, and former Code 1873, § 514, former Code 1882, § 514, and former Civil Code 1895, § 404, former Civil Code 1910, § 513 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Intent is to cover same purposes as expressed in Constitution.

- Statute is intended to cover the same purposes expressed in Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VII, Sec. VI, Para. II (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I-III), although the language is not the same as that employed in the Constitution. Richter v. Bacon, 145 Ga. 408, 89 S.E. 367 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Section intended to inform public as to use of county funds.

- Statute is of great importance, and ordinaries (now county governing authority) and treasurers who neglect to conform to this salutary law are greatly to blame. By the division of the funds into as many as nine or ten smaller funds, the public are made aware of the uses to which the taxes are to be applied, and a far better control over the public money is secured. Mitchell v. Speer, 39 Ga. 56 (1869) (decided under former Code 1868, § 548).

When a tax is levied for any one of the purposes set forth in this statute it includes all items named in that purpose. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 132 S.E. 449 (1926), aff'd, 165 Ga. 43, 139 S.E. 909 (1927) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Identification of purposes for which tax levied.

- It is sufficient if each item of a tax levy under this statute gives the percent of the tax levied under that item, and it is not necessary that the percent levied for each separate purpose expressed in the item be stated. Southern Ry. v. Whitfield County, 38 Ga. App. 703, 145 S.E. 668 (1928) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Publication of treasurer's annual statement not covered by section.

- Publication of the treasurer's annual statement required by former Code 1895, § 460 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-6-14) was not a court expense and as such a legal charge against the county by virtue of former Civil Code 1895, § 404. Howard v. Early County, 104 Ga. 669, 30 S.E. 880 (1898) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 404).

Amendment of levy when item of levy is indefinite but not void.

- When an item of a tax levy under this statute is indefinite but not void, it may be clarified and made definite by an amendment which does not change the purpose or the amount of the original levy. This is true even though the generality of taxpayers have paid their taxes and the amendment is made after the property of a protesting taxpayer has been levied on under a tax fi. fa., and an affidavit of illegality has been interposed to the levy. Southern Ry. v. Whitfield County, 38 Ga. App. 703, 145 S.E. 668 (1928) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Scope of and payment for legal county debts.

- Term "legal indebtedness" (now "debt"), properly construed, includes legal liabilities other than current expense and bonded debt. A legal indebtedness on the part of a county arises whenever a county by contract receives either material or services of value, to be paid for out of available funds in the hands of the treasurer or out of the proceeds of taxes that have been or may be lawfully levied during the year in which such contracts are made. When a county has not paid such a demand and there is no available fund in the treasury with which to pay the demand, the county authorities may during a subsequent year levy a tax for the discharge of such liabilities. A county may levy taxes to pay legal indebtedness of the county due, or to become due, or past due. Atlanta Distrib. Terms., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 177 Ga. 250, 170 S.E. 52 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Applicability to accumulated indebtedness.

- Under the terms "due" and "past due" in former Civil Code 1910, § 513(1) (see now paragraph (2) of this Code section) was embraced, necessarily, the accumulated indebtedness of the county. Indebtedness of the county due or past due may possibly be more extensive, in the last analysis of those expressions, than "accumulated indebtedness," but "accumulated indebtedness" cannot be more extensive than the aggregate of the indebtedness which is due and that which is past due. Consequently, a tax for the purpose of paying accumulated indebtedness is provided for exclusively under the statute. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 132 S.E. 449 (1926), aff'd, 165 Ga. 43, 139 S.E. 909 (1927) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Unpaid lawful current expenses are accumulated debts.

- Unpaid lawful current expenses incurred in one year, which were not discharged by payment, and for which county warrants were legally issued, are accumulated debts of the county falling within the statute. Southern Ry. v. Fulton County, 170 Ga. 248, 152 S.E. 567 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Extra and special taxes excluded from computation of limitation on debt for certain purposes.

- No extra or special taxes provided by local or general laws as fixed charges upon the particular county are to be included in computing limitations on debt so as to affect or prevent the levy of such taxes as may be necessary to pay the county's legal indebtedness and the county's current expenses. Alabama G.S.R.R. v. Harrison, 54 Ga. App. 368, 188 S.E. 49 (1936).

Whether a bridge is built and repaired from funds raised under this statute does not determine whether the bridge is a public bridge. Early County v. Fain, 2 Ga. App. 288, 58 S.E. 528 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 404).

Limitation on taxes assessed for building, erecting, or repairing bridges.

- There is no limitation on the amount of taxes which may be assessed and collected within the year for the purpose of building and repairing bridges within the counties of this state, excepting the cost of erecting the bridges. Settle v. Howell, 174 Ga. 792, 164 S.E. 189 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Provision for advertising of orders is directory, not mandatory.

- Provision of former Civil Code 1910, § 515, in reference to advertising the order levying county taxes was directory and not mandatory, and a failure to comply with such provision did not render the tax levy void. Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744, 74 S.E. 541 (1912) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 515); Dunn v. Harris, 144 Ga. 385, 87 S.E. 299 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 515); McGregor v. Hogan, 153 Ga. 473, 112 S.E. 471 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 515); McMillan v. Tucker, 154 Ga. 154, 113 S.E. 391 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 515).

Advertisement effective as notice of levy.

- Whether the requirement of former Civil Code 1910, § 515 be deemed mandatory or directory, or partly one and partly the other, the advertising in a public newspaper follows the passing of the order and the entry of the order on the minutes, and gives notice to the public of the levy which has been made. Dunn v. Harris, 144 Ga. 157, 86 S.E. 556 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 515).

Inapplicable to order to collect balance due on previous levy.

- An order by the county authorities directing the tax collector to proceed with the collection of the balance due on previous levy did not constitute a new tax levy or assessment, and did not fall within the provisions of the statute. Johnson v. Pinson, 127 Ga. 144, 56 S.E. 238 (1906) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 406).

Workers compensation.

- Trial court properly determined that a county could not provide workers compensation coverage to Georgia superior court judges as the judges were not county employees; counties were specifically authorized by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220 to provide workers compensation to "county officials," such as a sheriff, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1, but judges were deemed state employees. Freeman v. Barnes, 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

Cited in Board of Comm'rs v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482, 396 S.E.2d 903 (1990); Hay v. Newton County, 246 Ga. App. 44, 538 S.E.2d 181 (2000).

Inquest fees to coroner.

- County is liable to suit by coroner for fees for inquests. Davis v. County of Bibb, 116 Ga. 23, 42 S.E. 403 (1902) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 404).

Compensating appointed counsel from county funds prohibited.

- Attorney at law who is assigned by the judge as counsel for an indigent defendant is not entitled to be paid for such services out of the county funds. Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348 (1873) (decided under former Code 1873, § 514).

Payment for publishing general presentment of grand jury does not come within the terms of the statute. Houston County v. Kersh & Wynne, 82 Ga. 252, 10 S.E. 199 (1889) (decided under former Code 1882, § 514).

Levy of taxes to supplement salaries of county agents.

- While the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, through the College of Agriculture, controls the general scope of the agricultural extension work and is empowered to employ and discharge county agents, the counties may levy a tax to supplement the salaries of county agents. Royal Indem. Co. v. Humphries, 90 Ga. App. 567, 83 S.E.2d 565 (1954).

Hospitalization, medical, or other care to indigents.

- Authority of counties to provide hospitalization and medical or other care to indigent sick people of the county is not limited to personal administration by officers or agents of the governing authority, but such authority may, except as otherwise limited by law, enter into a contract with a corporation having appropriate charter power, under the terms of which the latter corporation will care for the poor in the matter of medical and surgical treatment. Brock v. Chappell, 196 Ga. 567, 27 S.E.2d 38 (1943).

Contract by county authorities with a hospital in the county to provide a ward for the hospitalization and medical treatment of the indigent sick of the county is neither a gratuity nor otherwise prohibited, unless in violation of statutory limitations on the levy taxes to support such a contract. Brock v. Chappell, 196 Ga. 567, 27 S.E.2d 38 (1943).

Levy of tax to pay for county's liability for diminution in value of land.

- County may be held liable for a diminution in the value of land resulting from the alteration and relocation of a public road passing through the county, and the county authorities may lawfully levy a tax to pay such liability. Hall County v. Smith, 178 Ga. 212, 172 S.E. 645 (1934) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 513).

Contract between county and airport authority valid.

- Even though, under a contract between a county and an airport authority for use by the county of an expanded airport facility, the consideration to be paid by the county was not expressed in terms of a definite dollar amount, it was not an unconstitutional "new debt" under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a); the contract was a valid intergovernmental contract pursuant to paragraph (14) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220. Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).

Contract between the county and the airport authority, which managed the airport, qualified as an enforceable intergovernmental agreement (IGA) that did not violate the Debt Clause in the Georgia Constitution because the IGA was between appropriate governmental entities; the agreement's term did not exceed 50 years; the agreement related to both the provision of services and the joint use of facilities as the airport authority agreed to manage and maintain the expanded taxiway, and the county, in return, agreed to provide funding and manage the debt required to be incurred to complete the expansion; and the agreement dealt with services and facilities about which the county had the authority to enter contracts. Avery v. State of Ga., 295 Ga. 630, 761 S.E.2d 56 (2014).

Affirmative action programs.

- After the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220 in connection with the operation of a county's minority and female business enterprise program, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the statute does not prohibit the conduct of which the plaintiffs complain and there is no authority that allows a private right of action in cases when the statutory scheme does not provide for one. Webster v. Fulton County, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D. Ga. 1999).

Transcript costs for indigents.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-34 of the Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council is not required to pay for indigent defendants' costs of transcripts in criminal cases; under laws existing before the Act, counties were required to pay for such transcripts, and the Act does not repeal these laws by implication. Ga. Public Defender Stds. Council v. State of Ga., 284 Ga. App. 660, 644 S.E.2d 510 (2007).

Witness fees.

- County must pay per diem witness fees to witnesses summoned in civil or criminal cases; the source of funds for witness fees is from county taxes. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-11.

Source of funds for county roads.

- Board of education may not use the board's funds for laying out, altering, maintaining, and improving a public, county-maintained road even though school transportation would be facilitated thereby; it is the sole duty and responsibility of the local officials in charge of county matters to lay out, alter, maintain, and improve the subject road in the manner they deem best suited to the needs of the county. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 189.

"Public health purpose" construed.

- Disposal and burial of diseased livestock so as to prevent the spread of disease is within "... public health purposes ..." in paragraph (7) of this statute. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-172.

Salaries and expenses of county and home demonstration agents.

- When county taxes are levied under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I-III) and this statute, the expenses and salaries of the county and home demonstration agent would be paid by the governing authority of the county. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 127.

Statute does not provide any limitation upon the rate of taxation for welfare purposes, other than that stated in Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I). 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 357.

County may donate funds to be used for child day care services as part of the state's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-1.

Private day care centers not open to eligible children may not receive county funds.

- Since the Constitution limits county taxation and expenditures to welfare programs as provided for by law, and since the only welfare provided for by law which may include this type of day care services is the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, there is no authority for a county to appropriate money for the private day care center which is not operated as a service for eligible children. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-1.

Sheriff's widow is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 612.

Workers' compensation for county administrative personnel.

- Administrative personnel who assisted the clerk of court, judge of the probate court and the tax commissioner and who were paid by those persons with funds received from the county were covered by former Code 1933, Ch. 114 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34). 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 612.

Teacher retirement benefits for county agricultural agent.

- County may levy taxes to provide teacher retirement benefits for a county agricultural agent. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 209.

Emergency management within meaning of this statute.

- Civil defense (now emergency management) coordination and preparation for better utilization of county facilities is within the meaning of this statute. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 27.

Order need not be advertised in official county newspaper.

- Advertising of a tax levy in the paper which is approved for county advertisements, once a week for a period of 30 days would comply with the provisions of former Code 1933, § 92-3802. However, it was not mandatory upon the county commissioners to publish the levy in the official newspaper of the county; the commissioners may, if the commissioners so desire, publish the levy in any other paper, either daily or weekly, in the commissioners' discretion. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 42.

Former Code 1933, § 92-3802 was directory and not mandatory, and a failure to comply with the provision did not render the tax levy void. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 707.

Effect of mistake in publication of tax levy.

- Since the failure to publish the county tax levy as required by former Code 1933, § 92-3802 did not invalidate the levy, it is obvious that in a case when a mistake is made in the publication of the tax levy that the levy would not be void. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 707.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 35 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 369 et seq. 84 C.J.S., Taxation, §§ 467 et seq., 472, 534 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity and construction of statute or ordinance providing for relief of poor persons from taxes, 123 A.L.R. 597.