CopyCited 48 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 1, 2004 | 277 Ga. 743, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 763
...326, 329(2),
454 S.E.2d 780 (1995) (using OCGA §
9-6-27 as the alternative to OCGA §
9-11-4). Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the action on procedural grounds. 2. The tax was in effect for the full five-year period. See Jackson v. Shadix,
272 Ga. 631, 632(1),
533 S.E.2d 706 (2000) (construing former OCGA §
48-8-112, which is controlling here as well)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 10, 2000 | 272 Ga. 631, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2574
...ion (March 31, 1999). The Court of Appeals found that the statute was ambiguous regarding the termination of a mixed-purpose SPLOST and construed the ambiguity it perceived against Carroll County. 1. The statute in question, the 1987 version of OCGA §
48-8-112, provided for termination of SPLOSTs as follows: (1) If the [tax] resolution ......
...The "implications" drawn by the Court of Appeals from other parts of the statute do not require a contrary interpretation. None of the statutory provisions relating to the amount specified in the referendum apply to the SPLOST in the present case because OCGA §
48-8-112(b)(3), as it existed in 1987, provided that if the "tax is to be imposed in whole or in part for road, street, and bridge *708 purposes the maximum cost and maximum proceeds to be raised shall be omitted." Since the purposes for the tax h...
...amount of the taxes to be raised that would be spent on road, street, and bridge purposes) is no basis for invalidating the entire scheme of taxation. Finally, as noted by Judge Eldridge in his dissent below, the legislature's 1997 amendment of OCGA §
48-8-112(b)(3), providing that SPLOSTs established for mixed purposes will terminate when the amount provided for has been collected, indicates the General Assembly's belief that the time-based termination provision in the 1987 version of OCGA §
48-8-112(b)(2) controlled the termination of SPLOSTs such as the one involved here....
...basic principles of statutory construction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 1. The 1987 version of the Revenue Code was in effect at the time the Carroll County SPLOST was approved and implemented, and governs the resolution of this appeal. OCGA §
48-8-112, as set forth in the 1987 Code, provided that a SPLOST would terminate on the earliest of the following dates: (1) If the [tax] resolution ......
...Nor does subsection three of the statute control the termination of the Carroll County SPLOST, as that subsection applies to SPLOSTS intended solely for road-related purposes. Therefore, the termination point for the Carroll County SPLOST is determined under subsection two of OCGA §
48-8-112, which requires that collection of the SPLOST will end "on the final day of the maximum period of time specified for the imposition of the tax." [5] As conceded by the majority, the "maximum period of time" for imposition of the Carroll C...
...Construing this referendum language by its plain terms, as this Court is statutorily required to do, [6] I conclude that it was impossible for the voters of Carroll County, when faced with the referendum, to know the "maximum period of time specified" for the SPLOST's imposition. Nothing in OCGA §
48-8-112 prohibited a local government from making the termination date dependent upon the raising of a specified amount of revenue....
...2998, 3005; OCGA §
48-8-111 (allowing counties to impose special purpose taxes for a limited period of time and for one or more statutorily authorized purposes, upon approval by referendum). See generally OCGA §
48-8-110, et seq. [3] Ga. L.1987, p. 1322, codified at OCGA §
48-8-112(b)(1)-(3) (1987). [4] Ga. L.1987, p. 1322, codified at OCGA §
48-8-112(b)(1)-(3) (1987). [5] Id. Of course, it is not entirely clear that OCGA §
48-8-112(2) does apply to this matter, as the 1987 Code does not plainly state that subsection two applies to mixed purpose SPLOSTS such as exists here....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 1992 | 414 S.E.2d 225, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 7
...lection, or runoff is issued. . . . [OCGA §
21-2-70 (3).]
The resolution adopted by the commissioners provided for the tax to begin on April 1, 1992. The November date for the election was necessary to accomplish this, in accordance with (a) OCGA §
48-8-112 (a), which provides:
If the imposition of the tax is approved at the special election, the tax shall be imposed on the first day of the next succeeding calendar quarter which begins more than 80 days after the date of the election at whi...
