O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 49-5-60 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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As used in this article, the term: (1) “Center” means a child welfare agency, as defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 49-5-12, which is required to be licensed or registered under Article 1 of this chapter. (2) “Conviction” means a finding or verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty regardless of whether an appeal of the conviction has been sought. (3) “Crime” means any felony; a violation of Code Section 16-5-23 when the victim is a minor; a violation of Code Section 16-12-1; a violation of Chapter 6 of Title 16, excluding the offenses of bigamy or marrying a bigamist; a violation of Code Section 16-4-1 when the crime attempted is any of the crimes specified by this paragraph; or any other offenses committed in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this state, would be one of the enumerated crimes listed in this paragraph. (4) “Criminal record” means: (A) Conviction of a crime; (B) Arrest, charge, and sentencing for a crime where: (i) A plea of nolo contendere was entered to the charge; (ii) First offender treatment without adjudication of guilt pursuant to the charge was granted; provided, however, that this division shall not apply to a violation of Chapter 13 of Title 16, relating to controlled substances, or any other offense committed in another jurisdiction which, if it were committed in this state, would be a violation of Chapter 13 of Title 16 if such violation or offense constituted only simple possession; or (iii) Adjudication or sentence was otherwise withheld or not entered on the charge; provided, however, that this division shall not apply to a violation of Chapter 13 of Title 16, relating to controlled substances, or any other offense committed in another jurisdiction which, if it were committed in this state, would be a

PROGRAMS & PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN

violation of Chapter 13 of Title 16 if such violation or offense constituted only simple possession; or (C) Arrest and being charged for a crime if the charge is pending, unless the time for prosecuting such crime has expired pursuant to Chapter 3 of Title 17. (5) “Director” means the chief administrative or executive officer of a facility. (5.1) “Emergency temporary employee” means an employee other than a director whose duties involve personal contact between that person and any child being cared for at the facility and who is hired on an expedited basis to avoid noncompliance with staffing standards for centers required by law, rule, or regulation. (6) “Employee” means any person, other than a director, employed by a center to perform at any of the center’s facilities any duties which involve personal contact between that person and any child being cared for at the facility and also includes any adult person who resides at the facility or who, with or without compensation, performs duties for the center which involve personal contact between that person and any child being cared for by the center. (7) “Employment history” means a record of where a person has worked for the past ten years. (8) “Facility” means a center’s real property at which children are received for care. (9) “Fingerprint records check determination” means a satisfactory or unsatisfactory determination by the department based upon a records check comparison of GCIC information with fingerprints and other information in a records check application. (10) “Foster care home” means a private home used by a childplacing agency which has been approved by the child-placing agency to provide 24 hour care, lodging, supervision, and maintenance for no more than six children who are unrelated to the foster parent or parents. (11) “Foster parent or parents” means the person or persons who provide care, lodging, supervision, and maintenance in a foster care home used by a child-placing agency. (12) “GCIC” means the Georgia Crime Information Center established under Article 2 of Chapter 3 of Title 35. (13) “GCIC information” means criminal history record information as defined in Code Section 35-3-30. (14) “License” means the document issued by the department to

authorize the center to which it is issued to operate a facility under this chapter. (14.1) “National fingerprint records check determination” means a satisfactory or unsatisfactory determination by the department in accordance with applicable law based upon a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation after a search of bureau records and fingerprints. (15) “Preliminary records check application” means an application for a preliminary records check determination on forms provided by the department. (16) “Preliminary records check determination” means a satisfactory or unsatisfactory determination by the department based only upon a comparison of GCIC information with other than fingerprint information regarding the person upon whom the records check is being performed. (17) “Records check application” means two sets of classifiable fingerprints, a records search fee to be established by the department by rule and regulation, payable in such form as the department may direct to cover the cost of a fingerprint records check under this article, and an affidavit by the applicant disclosing the nature and date of any arrest, charge, or conviction of the applicant for the violation of any law, except for motor vehicle parking violations, whether or not the violation occurred in this state, and such additional information as the department may require. (18) “Satisfactory determination” means a written determination that a person for whom a records check was performed was found to have no criminal record. (18.1) “State fingerprint records check determination” means a satisfactory or unsatisfactory determination by the department in accordance with applicable law based upon a records check comparison of GCIC information with fingerprints and other information in a records check application. (19) “Unsatisfactory determination” means a written determination that a person for whom a records check was performed has a criminal record.

History

Code 1981, § 49-5-60, enacted by Ga. L. 1984, p. 1397, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 963, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 822, § 2; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1416, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1605, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 6, § 49; Ga. L. 1993, p. 757, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 539, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 574, § 3; Ga. L. 2004, p. 333, § 2; Ga. L.

2004, p. 645, § 10; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 2-23/HB 228; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 49/HB 79; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 457/HB 242.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 54(f)/HB79, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “In the event of a conflict between a

PROGRAMS & PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN

provision in Sections 1 through 53 of this Act and a provision of another Act enacted at the 2013 regular session of the General Assembly, the provision of such other Act shall control over the conflicting provision in Sections 1 through 53 of this Act to the extent of the conflict.” Accordingly, the amendment to paragraph (3) of this Code section by Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 49(6)/HB 79 will not be given effect in this Code section effective January 1, 2014. Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date.

Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions.” Law reviews. For note on 1999 amendments to Code sections in this article, see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 227 (1999).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Supervisor of corporate child care institution was not foster parent. - Trial court erred in ruling that a supervisor of a corporate child care institution was a foster parent, and therefore a state employee for whose negligence the state waived sovereign immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 5021-20 et seq., in a wrongful death suit when a juvenile that the Georgia Department of Human Resources (now Depart-

ment of Human Services) and the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice placed in the corporate child care institution was accidentally killed. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Johnson, 264 Ga. App. 730, 592 S.E.2d 124, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1476 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0606, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Ga. Mar. 8, 2004), aff’d, 278 Ga. 714, 606 S.E.2d 270, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 1039 (2004).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1993–2022 · leading case: State of Georgia v. Ryan Duncan, 831 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
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State of Georgia v. Ryan Duncan, 831 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 14× “Instead, "[a] person bringing an action against the state under the provisions of this article must name as a party defendant only the state government entity for which the state officer or employee was acting and shall not name the state officer or employee individually.”
Johnson v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 606 S.E.2d 270 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 8× “See OCGA§ 49-5-60. There, the General Assembly defined “foster parent or parents” as “the person or persons who provide care, lodging, supervision, and maintenance in a foster care home used by a child-placing agency.”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Johnson, 592 S.E.2d 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “” OCGA § 49-5-60 (11). OCGA § 49-5-60 (10) defines “foster home” as “a private home used by a child-placing agency .”
Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 596 S.E.2d 604 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 2× “, OCGA § 49-5-60 et seq. (requiring employee records checks for day-care centers and other child-caring institutions).”
Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. 1993). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 49-5-60 et seq. and § 49-5-110 et seq.”
Coleman v. State, 708 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “” See OCGA § 49-5-60 (10). And, generally, a court order removing a child from the child’s home is based upon a finding by the court that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child.”
Harrill v. Rosenbaum (S.D. Ga. 2022). · cites it 8× “In Johnson, the Georgia Supreme Court borrowed the definitions of “foster parent” and “foster care home” from O.C.G.A. § 49-5-60, a Georgia statute that “protect[s] children placed in day-care centers or child-caring institutions,” and applied those definitions to tort claims…”
Coleman v. State, 708 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “" See OCGA § 49-5-60(10). And, generally, a court order removing a child from the child's home is based upon a finding by the court that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child.”
Daniel v. Georgia Dep't of Human Servs. (N.D. Ga. 2019). · cites it 3× “” § 49-5-60(10). The Georgia Supreme Court did the same.”
— 49-5-60(10) — 3 cases
Coleman v. State, 708 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). “" See OCGA § 49-5-60(10). And, generally, a court order removing a child from the child's home is based upon a finding by the court that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child.”
Daniel v. Georgia Dep't of Human Servs. (N.D. Ga. 2019). “” § 49-5-60(10). The Georgia Supreme Court did the same.”
Harrill v. Rosenbaum (S.D. Ga. 2022). “In Johnson, the Georgia Supreme Court borrowed the definitions of “foster parent” and “foster care home” from O.C.G.A. § 49-5-60, a Georgia statute that “protect[s] children placed in day-care centers or child-caring institutions,” and applied those definitions to tort claims…”
— 49-5-60(11) — 1 case
Harrill v. Rosenbaum (S.D. Ga. 2022). “In Johnson, the Georgia Supreme Court borrowed the definitions of “foster parent” and “foster care home” from O.C.G.A. § 49-5-60, a Georgia statute that “protect[s] children placed in day-care centers or child-caring institutions,” and applied those definitions to tort claims…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.