O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 5-5-47 (2019)

Right to give supersedeas bond for bailable offense upon filing of new trial motion; assessment and approval of bond

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) It shall be the right of any person convicted of a crime which is bailable under the law, and in which case a motion for a new trial has been filed as provided by law, to give a supersedeas bond immediately upon the filing of the motion for new trial without having to wait for the filing of a notice of appeal.

(b) The judge of the court having jurisdiction of the case, immediately upon the approval and filing of a motion for new trial therein, shall assess the amount of the bond, which shall be approved in the manner provided by law.

(c) The provisions of Code Section 5-6-45, relating to supersedeas and supersedeas bonds when a notice of appeal is filed, shall apply equally to cases when a motion for a new trial is filed.

History

(Ga. L. 1916, p. 157, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, §§ 6-1006, 6-1007; Ga. L. 1984, p. 415, § 1.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Termination of appeal bonds in criminal cases, § 17-6-1.

Law reviews. - For comment on Ingram v. Grimes, 213 Ga. 652, 100 S.E.2d 914 (1957), holding that the granting of

bail after conviction rests on the discretion of the trial court even when a motion for new trial is pending, see 21 Ga. B.J. 235 (1958).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Statute authorizes trial judge to admit defendant to bail pending disposition of motion. - Proper construction of statute is not that it takes away discretion of trial judge in matter of granting bail after conviction, but that it authorizes trial judge, in the judge’s discretion, to admit the defendant to bail pending disposition of the motion for new trial.

Ingram v. Grimes, 213 Ga. 652, 100 S.E.2d 914 (1957), for comment, see 21 Ga. B.J. 235 (1958). Excessive bail is equivalent of refusal to grant bail, and in such cases habeas corpus is available and appropriate remedy for relief. Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585, 134 S.E.2d 790 (1964).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, §§ 402, 403, 421 et seq. Am. Jur. Proof of Facts. - Excessive Bail, 18 POF2d 149.

ALR. - Review for excessiveness of sentence in narcotics case, 55 ALR3d 812.