Judgment is effective only upon entry.

- Rule is clear under Civil Practice Act, and under Appellate Practice Act, that a judgment is effective only upon entry. Minnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 154 Ga. App. 439, 268 S.E.2d 688 (1980).

Judgment cannot be considered appealable until actually entered. Cunningham v. State, 131 Ga. App. 133, 205 S.E.2d 899, rev'd on other grounds, 232 Ga. 416, 207 S.E.2d 48 (1974).

Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider enumerations of error arising from breach of contract claim, since the jury's verdict on the claim was never reduced to judgment because of the plaintiff's election to have judgment entered on the plaintiff's theory of fraud. Miner v. Harrison, 205 Ga. App. 523, 422 S.E.2d 899, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 900, 422 S.E.2d 899 (1992).

Judgment must be signed and filed for notice of appeal time to begin running.

- O.C.G.A. § 5-6-31 plainly provides that the filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of a judgment within the meaning of the Appellate Practice Act, and as a result the 30-day limit under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) for filing a notice of appeal does not begin to run until a judgment, signed by the judge, is filed with the clerk; to the extent that Ross v. State, 259 Ga. App. 246 (2003) holds otherwise, it is hereby overruled. Rocha v. State, 287 Ga. App. 446, 651 S.E.2d 781 (2007).

When notice of appeal is filed before entry of judgment, appeal must be dismissed. Cunningham v. State, 131 Ga. App. 133, 205 S.E.2d 899, rev'd on other grounds, 232 Ga. 416, 207 S.E.2d 48 (1974).

Both written judgment and entry by filing with clerk are prerequisite.

- Under the Appellate Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-30 et seq., the well established rule that what the judge orally declares is no judgment until put into writing and entered as such, is still of force, and both written judgment and the judgment's entry by filing writing with clerk are essential prerequisites to appeal. Boynton v. Reeves, 226 Ga. 202, 173 S.E.2d 702 (1970).

Filing judgment signed by judge with clerk constitutes entry. Minnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 154 Ga. App. 439, 268 S.E.2d 688 (1980).

Entry means filing judgment signed by judge in office of clerk of court. Joiner v. Perkerson, 160 Ga. App. 343, 287 S.E.2d 327 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Southall v. State, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 33 (Ga. 2017).

Construction with Civil Practice Act.

- What additional requirements are imposed by the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b), for entry of a judgment are not relevant for purposes of the Appellate Practice Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-31 and5-6-38(a), which has its own definition of when a judgment is entered. GMC Group, Inc. v. Harsco Corp., 293 Ga. App. 707, 667 S.E.2d 916 (2008).

Filing of judgment in open court with trial judge as provided in § 9-11-5(e) is the entry of judgment within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-31. Storch v. Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 181 Ga. App. 627, 353 S.E.2d 350 (1987).

Directed verdict is reduced to writing by virtue of recitation in verdict signed by judge.

- Although directed verdict is normally issued ore tenus, it becomes reduced to writing by virtue of its recitation in the verdict which is signed by the judge and therefore is reviewable as a final judgment. Crowe v. Holloway Dev. Corp., 114 Ga. App. 856, 152 S.E.2d 913 (1966).

Entry of oral order.

- Oral order is not final nor appealable until and unless the order is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk. This constitutes "entry;" and it is only an "entered" decision or judgment which is appealable. Sharp v. State, 183 Ga. App. 641, 360 S.E.2d 50 (1987).

Because the notice of appeal was from an unappealable oral order, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant's motion to remand was, therefore, moot. In the Interest of W.P.B., 269 Ga. App. 101, 603 S.E.2d 454 (2004).

To the extent that a later contempt finding was based on the trial court's oral pronouncement, it was a nullity. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006).

Nunc pro tunc entry.

- Under O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-31 and5-6-38(a), the 30-day time period for filing a notice of appeal did not begin to run until a judgment, signed by the judge, was filed with the clerk; thus, a defendant's appeal was timely as the 30 days did not begin to run on the nunc pro tunc date, but on the date the signed judgment was filed. Rocha v. State, 287 Ga. App. 446, 651 S.E.2d 781 (2007).

While a nunc pro tunc entry does not extend the statutory period for filing a notice of appeal, case law does not stand for the proposition that a nunc pro tunc entry can shorten the statutory period for filing a notice of appeal provided in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a), which begins to run when judgment is entered in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 5-6-31. Rocha v. State, 287 Ga. App. 446, 651 S.E.2d 781 (2007).

Change of decision after oral order.

- Because the trial court orally granted the bank's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim but then the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a), the trial court was entitled to change the court's mind, as the oral decision had not been reduced to writing pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-31. Wachovia Bank Savannah, N.A. v. Kitchen, 272 Ga. App. 601, 612 S.E.2d 885 (2005).

Date on a copy of a judgment bearing a certification by a deputy clerk to the effect that the copy is a true and correct reproduction of the original on file with the court, serves as the starting date of the appeal period if no evidence is presented as to the actual date of the filing of judgment. Swinney v. City of Atlanta, 176 Ga. App. 823, 338 S.E.2d 52 (1985).

Time for filing a motion for attorney fees.

- As real property contestants failed to file a request for attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 within 45 days following a trial court's final disposition in a real property proceeding, the trial court erred in granting the contestants' request because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion; the time for filing the motion began to run when judgment was entered under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-31, and the time when a civil disposition form was filed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) had no effect on the timing for purposes of the motion. Horesh v. DeKinder, 295 Ga. App. 826, 673 S.E.2d 311 (2009).

Relief from default judgment denied.

- Petitioner was not entitled to relief from default judgment entered in favor of the judgment creditor because the petitioner did not seek relief from the default judgment until well outside the 60-day window pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-4-91. W. Ray Camp, Inc. v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 308 Ga. App. 597, 708 S.E.2d 560 (2011).

Cited in Gibson v. Hodges, 221 Ga. 779, 147 S.E.2d 329 (1966); Langdale Co. v. Day, 115 Ga. App. 30, 153 S.E.2d 671 (1967); Spadea v. Spadea, 225 Ga. 80, 165 S.E.2d 836 (1969); Turner v. Harper, 231 Ga. 175, 200 S.E.2d 748 (1973); Alexander v. Blackmon, 129 Ga. App. 214, 199 S.E.2d 376 (1973); Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 131 Ga. App. 699, 206 S.E.2d 603 (1974); Pilgrim v. Brookfield West, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 619, 222 S.E.2d 137 (1975); Lewis & Sheron Enterprises, Inc. v. Great A & P Tea Co., 136 Ga. App. 910, 222 S.E.2d 659 (1975); Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 238 S.E.2d 62 (1977); Murff v. State, 165 Ga. App. 808, 302 S.E.2d 697 (1983); Davis v. Langham, 170 Ga. App. 346, 317 S.E.2d 903 (1984); Ramirez v. State, 196 Ga. App. 11, 395 S.E.2d 315 (1990); Smith v. State, 242 Ga. App. 459, 530 S.E.2d 223 (2000); Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 658 S.E.2d 567 (2008); State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (2015).

C.J.S.

- 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1109 et seq.

ALR.

- Appeal as affecting time allowed by judgment or order appealed from for the performance of a condition affecting a substantive right or obligation, 28 A.L.R. 1029.