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Call Now: 904-383-7448An appeal by the state, except as otherwise provided for in this chapter, and certiorari by the state, when authorized by this chapter, shall be governed by the same laws and provisions as to time and other procedures as apply to other appellants in criminal cases.
(Ga. L. 1973, p. 297, § 4.)
State is authorized to appeal a void sentence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(5), and the state's appeals are governed by the same time limitations as those applied to other appellants in criminal cases. State v. Jones, 265 Ga. App. 493, 594 S.E.2d 706 (2004).
In the absence of express statutory authority requiring the state to file a motion to amend an improper sentence as a prerequisite to appealing that sentence, the state may appeal directly the sentence imposed by the trial court or file a motion to amend the sentence and then directly appeal the denial thereof, but in any event, the state has 30 days from judgment or from the denial of the motion to amend to file its notice of appeal; however, should the defendant file a motion for new trial, that motion tolls the time within which the state can directly appeal the sentence, and in that case, the state has 30 days from the denial of the motion for new trial to appeal the alleged improper sentence. State v. Jones, 265 Ga. App. 493, 594 S.E.2d 706 (2004).
- Defendant's out-of-time appeal was dismissed as defendant's attorney was not entitled to file a sua sponte notice of out-of-time appeal based on the subjective acknowledgment of the attorney's own ineffectiveness; only the trial court could determine whether the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was attributable to an attorney's ineffectiveness and, if so, grant a right to file an out-of-time appeal. Carr v. State, 281 Ga. 43, 635 S.E.2d 767 (2006).
- Only the trial court can determine whether the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was attributable to an attorney's ineffectiveness and, if so, grant a right to file an out-of-time appeal; Adams v. State, 440 S.E.2d 639 (1994), and other such decisions cited in Rowland v. State, 452 S.E.2d 756 (1995), are expressly overruled to the extent that they approve another method for addressing procedurally deficient criminal appeals. Carr v. State, 281 Ga. 43, 635 S.E.2d 767 (2006).
Total Results: 11
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24
Citation: 830 S.E.2d 119, 306 Ga. 252
Snippet: for the claim was not privileged under OCGA § 51-5-7 (4) ; and that the claim was not interposed for any
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-08
Citation: 298 Ga. 464, 782 S.E.2d 665, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 136
Snippet: to other appellants in criminal cases.” OCGA § 5-7-4. Accordingly, the appeal is taken by filing a notice
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-11-23
Citation: 298 Ga. 221, 780 S.E.2d 311
Snippet: 1, it must be privileged pursuant to OCGA § 51-5-7(4). See OCGA § 9-11-11.1(b) ; Atlanta Humane
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-10
Citation: 295 Ga. 29, 755 S.E.2d 770, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 442, 2014 WL 902258, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 189
Snippet: (“CUYA”) for 18 different parcels. See OCGA § 48-5-7. 4 The number “2008” was handwritten on the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2009-11-02
Citation: 686 S.E.2d 244, 286 Ga. 98, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3465, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 674
Snippet: subsection (a), (b), or (c) of OCGA § 5-6-34. OCGA § 5-7-4 describes criminal appeals by the State as “authorized
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2007-09-24
Citation: 282 Ga. 422, 651 S.E.2d 45, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2919, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 592
Snippet: appealed to the Board of Equalization. OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (j) (1). See also Department of Revenue Reg. 560-11-6-
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-09-27
Citation: 603 S.E.2d 289, 278 Ga. 451
Snippet: the statements to be privileged under OCGA § 51-5-7 (4), one of three substantive means for dismissing
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-09-27
Citation: 603 S.E.2d 247, 278 Ga. 416, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3121, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 810
Snippet: is prohibited in the district. Further, Section 5.7(4) of the ordinance provides that if a use is prohibited
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-05-24
Citation: 597 S.E.2d 114, 277 Ga. 850, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 1710, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 411
Snippet: understanding was incorrect, contending OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (n) (3) allows early termination without penalty
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2001-07-16
Citation: 549 S.E.2d 373, 274 Ga. 137, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2217, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 579
Snippet: Par. I), and has exercised that power in OCGA § 5-7-4. Since the inherent power of the courts is to be
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1994-09-26
Citation: 264 Ga. 761, 450 S.E.2d 192, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 179, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 783
Snippet: correcting. [Cits.]” Gober v. State, 203 Ga. App. 5, 7 (4) (416 SE2d 292) (1992). 5. During her opening statement