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(Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 16; Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, §§ 15, 16; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1014, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 871, §§ 1, 2.)
§ 50-13-15(4). - O.C.G.A. § 50-13-15(4) did not authorize the Board of Dentistry to use the board's expertise to compensate for the absence of key evidence not presented or noticed in issuing a letter of concern regarding a dentist's recommended treatment that allegedly fell below minimal professional standards. Thebaut v. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry, 235 Ga. App. 194, 509 S.E.2d 125 (1998).
- Last sentence of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-15(4) provides that the agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge may be utilized in the evaluation of the evidence. However, this in no way takes away from the requirement that in order to take official notice of a technical or scientific fact, the party shall be notified either before or during the hearing that such notice will be taken and the party should be afforded an opportunity to contest this issue. Hicks v. Harden, 133 Ga. App. 789, 213 S.E.2d 49 (1975).
Administrative agency must confine itself to record before the agency and afford opportunity for showings contrary to material facts of which official notice has been taken; to constitute fatal error it must appear that an administrative agency's journey outside the record worked substantial prejudice. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 152 Ga. App. 366, 262 S.E.2d 628 (1979).
Preponderance of evidence standard was applicable in a disciplinary proceeding conducted by the Board of Dentistry. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry v. Pence, 223 Ga. App. 603, 478 S.E.2d 437 (1996).
Proviso for use of certain evidence is that it is necessary to establish facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under the usual rules of evidence in civil nonjury cases. Finch v. Caldwell, 155 Ga. App. 813, 273 S.E.2d 216 (1980).
- In rate increase request hearings, when the power company failed to object to an expert witness' qualifications either before or during the expert's testimony, any objection the company might have had was waived. Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 196 Ga. App. 572, 396 S.E.2d 562 (1990).
- Mere failure to call witnesses apparently readily available does not render the witnesses' testimony not reasonably susceptible of proof under the usual rules of evidence. Finch v. Caldwell, 155 Ga. App. 813, 273 S.E.2d 216 (1980); McGahee v. Yamaha Motor Mfg. Corp., 214 Ga. App. 473, 448 S.E.2d 249 (1994).
- What clearly is hearsay cannot be viewed as commonly relied upon by individuals in conduct of their affairs. Finch v. Caldwell, 155 Ga. App. 813, 273 S.E.2d 216 (1980).
- Fact that medical reports are hearsay does not mean that such reports could not be considered by a hearing officer in making a determination when the reports satisfy the requirements of this section. Nolen v. Department of Human Resources, 151 Ga. App. 455, 260 S.E.2d 353 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092, 100 S. Ct. 1059, 62 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1980).
- Mere fact that the determining body has looked beyond the record proper does not invalidate the body's action unless substantial prejudice is shown to result. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 152 Ga. App. 366, 262 S.E.2d 628 (1979).
- Results of polygraph examination are not admissible into evidence, having no probative value. Feltham v. Cofer, 149 Ga. App. 379, 254 S.E.2d 499 (1979).
In the absence of a stipulation of admissibility, the general rule that the results of polygraph tests are not admissible into evidence applies; thus, the Board of Public Safety did not err in refusing to consider the results of the test. Feltham v. Cofer, 149 Ga. App. 379, 254 S.E.2d 499 (1979).
Cited in Cofer v. Summerlin, 147 Ga. App. 721, 250 S.E.2d 174 (1978); Jackson Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 294 Ga. App. 253, 668 S.E.2d 867 (2008).
- With the passage of Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50), the bell was tolled on the practice of conducting hearings in an informal manner except by stipulation of the parties, agreed settlement, the entry of consent orders, or defaults. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-36.
- 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 344 et seq.
- 73A C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, §§ 235 et seq., 264 et seq.
- Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A.) § 4-201 et seq.
- Necessity of some evidence at hearing to support decision of public board or official required to be made after or upon hearing, 123 A.L.R. 1349.
Administrative decision or finding based on evidence secured outside of hearing, and without presence of interested party or counsel, 18 A.L.R.2d 552.
Hearsay evidence in proceedings before state administrative agencies, 36 A.L.R.3d 12.
Total Results: 4
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-02-20
Snippet: Procedure Act,’ relating to contested cases.” OCGA § 50-13-15 governs evidentiary
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-09-10
Citation: 819 S.E.2d 20, 304 Ga. 425
Snippet: standards prescribed in paragraph (5) of Code Section 50-13-15. Upon the request of any party to the proceeding
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-03-25
Citation: 298 Ga. 779, 784 S.E.2d 781, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 247
Snippet: in accordance with Code Sections 50-13-13 and 50-13-15 with the Department of Community Health. The Department
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-11-25
Citation: 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827
Snippet: opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. OCGA § 50-13-15. The final decision is subject to judicial review