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(Code 1981, §51-1-29.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1987, p. 887, § 4; Ga. L. 1987, p. 986, § 2; Ga. L. 1998, p. 859, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 51; Ga. L. 2007, p. 47, § 51/SB 103.)
- The enactment of this Code section by Ga. L. 1987, p. 887, § 4, irreconcilably conflicted with and was treated as superseded by Ga. L. 1987, p. 986, § 2. See County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921).
- For article, "Torts," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 441 (2001).
Prima facie case of immunity under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.1 was established by a physician's affidavit that neither the physician's nor the physician's professional corporation expected or received any public or private source payment for the physician's on-call services. Washington v. Clark, 250 Ga. App. 242, 550 S.E.2d 671 (2001).
In a medical malpractice action, as affidavits from a decedent's mother and girlfriend created a fact issue regarding a doctor's expectation of payment which required resolution by a jury, the trial court erred in granting the doctor's summary judgment motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.1. Travick v. Lee, 278 Ga. App. 823, 630 S.E.2d 99 (2006).
Summary judgment in favor of a doctor and a clinic for the post-op treatment of a patient was upheld on appeal, as: (1) both remained immune from suit under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.1; (2) the doctor's treatment of the decedent's complications immediately following the decedent's surgery did not change the voluntary nature of the treatment as a whole; (3) it was reasonable to expect that a physician would continue to treat a patient following surgery; and (4) the appeals court viewed the doctor's voluntary treatment of the decedent as a whole, not divided into categories of preoperative, operative, and post-operative; moreover, because no evidence was presented that either the doctor or the clinic was a "charitable institution," and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.1 provided no such exception, waiver of any common-law charitable immunity through the doctor's procurement of liability insurance did not apply. Wells v. Rogers, 281 Ga. App. 473, 636 S.E.2d 171 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 101 (Ga. 2007).
Cited in Walker v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 200 Ga. App. 750, 409 S.E.2d 529 (1991); Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997); Washington v. Georgia Baptist Medical Ctr., 230 Ga. App. 654, 501 S.E.2d 1 (1998).
- 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 40. 65A C.J.S., Negligence, § 342.
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This Georgia Code resource is curated by Graham Syfert, a personal injury and workers' compensation attorney admitted in Georgia (State Bar of Georgia No. 881027, since 2006) and Florida. Attorney Syfert regularly works with Title 51 in the context of Georgia personal injury and tort claims and represents clients throughout Northeast Florida and South Georgia. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.