Right of special possession will support trover action.

- Right of possession, through some special title in property, such as the legal impounding of cattle by the defendant, detention of property by the defendant for charges as depository for hire will defeat an action of trover by the holder of the legal title to such property as also will a right of possession through some special title in property support an action of trover even as against the holder of the legal title to the property. Livingston v. Epsten-Roberts Co., 50 Ga. App. 25, 177 S.E. 79 (1934).

To recover in trover action, plaintiff must first show either title or right of possession. Powell v. Riddick, 89 Ga. App. 505, 80 S.E.2d 70 (1954).

Possession of personal property stands as prima facie evidence of title, until evidence to the contrary is introduced. Powell v. Riddick, 89 Ga. App. 505, 80 S.E.2d 70 (1954).

Against whom action to recover personal property may be maintained.

- The true owner of personal property, which has been stolen from the owner, may maintain the owner's action in trover against one who purchases the property from another and pays to that person the purchase price thereof, although the defendant has no knowledge that the property has been stolen and in good faith believes that the person selling the property to the defendant has the right to dispose thereof; and the subsequent sale of such property by the defendant to a third person, before the acquisition of any knowledge that the property was stolen property, constitutes a conversion thereof by the defendant. Briscoe v. Pool, 50 Ga. App. 147, 177 S.E. 346 (1934).

Mere possession insufficient to retain possession as against true owner.

- Mere possession of property by a defendant in a suit in trover under a contract with the plaintiff by which the defendant was to make repairs upon the property, when the defendant had not completed the contract but had only ordered from a factory necessary parts for the making of the repairs and had made arrangements in the defendant's shop for the purpose of making the repairs, affords, as against the right and title of the plaintiff as the true owner of the property, no right to the possession of the property by the defendant merely for the purpose of enabling the defendant to complete the contract when the defendant claims no lien on the property. Denny v. Belsinger, 52 Ga. App. 851, 184 S.E. 914 (1936).

Buyer at foreclosure sale had no claim against true owner of car.

- Because a foreclosure sale of a car had been held void, buyers who purchased the car after the foreclosure were not the car's true owners and could not bring a claim of trespass to personalty against the corporation that was the car's true owner. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc. v. Sheridan, 286 Ga. App. 791, 650 S.E.2d 357 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1842, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 751 (Ga. 2007).

Possession must be in plaintiff's own right and not as agent.

- While, at common law and by statute in this state, mere possession of a chattel will give a right of action for any interference therewith, such possession must be in the plaintiff's own right, and not as agent of another. Zugar v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 63 Ga. App. 660, 11 S.E.2d 839 (1940).

As against wrongdoer, mere possession of property by one in one's own right will support action of trover as such wrongdoer will not be heard to set up the "jus tertii." Livingston v. Epsten-Roberts Co., 50 Ga. App. 25, 177 S.E. 79 (1934).

Vendee in conditional sale contract may maintain trover against third person wrongfully depriving the vendee of possession of such property. Painter v. McGaha, 6 Ga. App. 54, 64 S.E. 129 (1909); Livingston v. Epsten-Roberts Co., 50 Ga. App. 25, 177 S.E. 79 (1934).

Damage to unauthorized cotenant's property.

- Landlord could not raise question of tenant's possessory interest in damaged goods in tenant's action for damages to unauthorized cotenant's property due to alleged unlawful eviction by landlord. Kerlin v. Lane Co., 165 Ga. App. 622, 302 S.E.2d 369 (1983).

Protection of purchasers for value.

- This section does not operate to divest the title of bona fide purchaser of property which was acquired when the true owner lost possession through negligence and fraud of the owner's agents. Macon, Dublin & Savannah R.R. v. Heard Bros., 27 Ga. App. 382, 108 S.E. 481 (1921).

Purchaser at a sheriff's sale.

- A purchaser at a sheriff's sale is protected only when the sale of property set apart by an ordinary was the only property of the debtor. Gillespie v. Chastain, 57 Ga. 218 (1876).

Pendency of actions.

- The pendency of a suit to recover possession of personalty by possessory warrant is no ground for an abatement of a suit in trover between the same parties for the conversion of the same property. Palmer v. Shiver, 31 Ga. App. 605, 121 S.E. 852 (1924).

When the plaintiff in a trover action alleges facts upon which the plaintiff bases the plaintiff's title, it becomes question of law, whether or not the facts alleged support the allegation of ownership. Livingston v. Epsten-Roberts Co., 50 Ga. App. 25, 177 S.E. 79 (1934).

Judgment on the pleadings proper.

- In a case dealing with a sale and repossession of a business, summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings were properly granted in favor of the buyer on the buyer's breach of contract, trespass to personal property, and conversion claims as the sellers' claim of a breach of an alleged oral agreement that the buyer obtain a liquor license, business permits, and insurance in the buyer's name was meritless because there was no evidence that the oral agreement changed the requirement that the sellers obtain the buyer's written consent to remove equipment from the business premises, or that it added new provisions allowing the sellers to evict the buyer and repossess the business and all of the business's assets upon a breach of the oral agreement. Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852, 802 S.E.2d 835 (2017).

Allegation in trover suit to effect that plaintiff is owner of property sued for is sufficient and is not subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss) as being a conclusion of the pleader, and the plaintiff cannot be required to allege the plaintiff's evidence upon which the plaintiff expects to show title to the property. Livingston v. Epsten-Roberts Co., 50 Ga. App. 25, 177 S.E. 79 (1934).

Measure of damages to special interest.

- While in an ordinary trover action brought by the owner of the entire interest in property, the plaintiff may recover in an alternative verdict the highest proved value of the property, when the plaintiff has no title but only a special interest in the property, and elects to take a money verdict, the measure of the damage is the value of that interest. Zugar v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 63 Ga. App. 660, 11 S.E.2d 839 (1940).

Necessity of alleging extent of special interest in order to measure damages.

- In an action by the holder of a special interest in property for damages alleged to have been caused by failure of sheriff to make levy and seizure of the property under a bail-trover proceeding, it is necessary to allege the extent of the interest held in order to determine the amount of the damages, damages being given as compensation for injury done and a failure to make such allegations as to the damage done to the special interest will subject the petition to demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Zugar v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 63 Ga. App. 660, 11 S.E.2d 839 (1940).

Action by estate administrator to recover legal fees paid by spouse who killed other spouse.

- Court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's order granting defense attorneys and their law firm summary judgment in an administrator's action alleging that they converted estate property when they accepted certain sums as payment for their services in representing a decedent's widow after the widow was indicted for the decedent's murder because O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5 did not place possession or an immediate right to possession of the estate property in the administrator at the time the widow dispersed and appellees received the funds in issue; when the widow dispersed the funds, the widow had qualified as executor of the decedent's estate and letters testamentary had been issued to the widow, the widow had not yet pled guilty to the murder charges, no final judgment of conviction had been entered in regard to the criminal indictment, and the widow's felonious and intentional killing of the decedent had not been established by clear and convincing evidence in any judicial proceeding. Levenson v. Word, 286 Ga. 114, 686 S.E.2d 236 (2009).

Cited in Daniel v. Perkins Logging Co., 9 Ga. App. 842, 72 S.E. 438 (1911); Palmer v. Shiver, 31 Ga. App. 605, 121 S.E. 852 (1924); Pollard v. Walton, 55 Ga. App. 353, 190 S.E. 396 (1937); Sellers v. Sellers, 76 Ga. App. 410, 46 S.E.2d 205 (1948).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Property, § 58.

C.J.S.

- 87 C.J.S., Trespass, § 14 et seq.

ALR.

- Recovery by conditional seller or buyer, or person standing in his shoes, against third person for damage or destruction of property, 67 A.L.R.2d 582.

Recovery by chattel mortgage or mortgagor, or person standing in his shoes, against third person for damage or destruction of property, 67 A.L.R.2d 1599.

Measure and elements of damages, in action other than one against a carrier, for conversion, injury, loss, or destruction of livestock, 79 A.L.R.2d 677.

What conduct by repossessing chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor entails tort liability, 99 A.L.R.2d 358.