CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 22, 2010 | 286 Ga. 731, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 874
...Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Michael B. Terry, Sarah M. Shalf, Houck, Ilardi & Regas, Frank A. Ilardi, Rosser A. Malone, James D. Summerville, Atlanta, for appellees. HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice. This case requires us to assess the constitutionality of OCGA §
51-13-1, which limits awards of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to a predetermined amount....
...The trial court held that the statute violates the Georgia Constitution by encroaching on the right to a jury trial, the governmental separation of powers, and the right to equal protection. Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we find that the noneconomic damages caps in OCGA §
51-13-1 violate the constitutional right to trial by jury, and we therefore affirm....
...On retrial, the jury returned a verdict of $1,265,000, comprised of $115,000 for past and future medical expenses; $900,000 in noneconomic damages for Ms. Nestlehutt's pain and suffering; and $250,000 for Mr. Nestlehutt's loss of consortium. Appellees then moved to have OCGA §
51-13-1, which would have reduced the jury's noneconomic damages award by $800,000 to the statutory limit of $350,000, declared unconstitutional. The trial court granted the motion and thereupon entered judgment for appellees in the full amount awarded by the jury. Oculus moved for a new trial, which was denied, and this appeal ensued. 1. In relevant part, OCGA §
51-13-1 provides: In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against one or more health care providers, the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in...
...laims involving the negligence of a health care provider, with an attendant right to the award of the full measure of damages, including noneconomic damages, as determined by the jury. (b) We next examine whether the noneconomic damages caps in OCGA §
51-13-1 unconstitutionally infringe on this right. By requiring the court to reduce a noneconomic damages award determined by a jury that exceeds the statutory limit, OCGA §
51-13-1 clearly nullifies the jury's findings of fact regarding damages and thereby undermines the jury's basic function....
...Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711(III) (1989) (same). See also Smith v. Department of Insurance,
507 So.2d 1080(II) (Fla.1987) (plaintiff does not receive constitutional benefit of jury trial where jury verdict arbitrarily capped). The fact that OCGA §
51-13-1 permits full recovery of noneconomic damages up to the significant amount of $350,000 cannot save the statute from constitutional attack....
...See Sofie, supra, 771 P.2d at 721 ("the legislative damages limit is fundamentally different from the doctrine of remittitur"); Lakin, supra, 987 P.2d at 472-473 (distinguishing judicial remittitur from statutory damages caps). In sum, based on the foregoing, we conclude that the noneconomic damages caps in OCGA §
51-13-1 violate the right to a jury trial as guaranteed under the Georgia Constitution....
...Findley,
280 Ga. 454(1),
629 S.E.2d 222 (2006). In this case, we do not find that the above factors militate in favor of deviation from the general rule of retroactivity. As to the first factor, while our invalidation of the noneconomic damages caps of OCGA §
51-13-1 certainly constitutes a decision on an issue of first impression, given that the caps have been in effect for only five years, see Ga....
...NAHMIAS, Justice, concurring specially. I join all of the majority opinion except for Division 3, regarding retroactive application, in which I concur only in the result. 1. As the Court correctly and unanimously concludes in Division 2 of the majority opinion, OCGA §
51-13-1's flat caps on noneconomic compensatory damages, as found by juries in common-law medical malpractice cases, violate this State's constitutional guarantee that "[t]he right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Ga....
...nd the availability of health care providers, but the Legislature's discretion is bounded by the fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution. 2. I join only in the result of Division 3 of the majority opinion. I agree that our holding that OCGA §
51-13-1 is unconstitutional must be applied "retroactively" in this case....
...ive acts in violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them." Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V. I do not understand how we could declare a legislative act like OCGA §
51-13-1 void, yet still allow that statute to be applied as good law in pending cases....
...Because of this view, I respectfully can join only in the result of Division 3 of the majority opinion. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice CARLEY and Justice HINES join in this special concurrence. NOTES [1] We express no opinion as to subsection (f) of OCGA §
51-13-1, which provides for periodic payment of future damages awards of $350,000 or more in medical malpractice actions....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2025 | 286 Ga. 731, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 874
...See OCGA §§
51-4-1 et seq.
the decedent, as shown by the evidence.” OCGA §§
51-4-1 and 51-4-
2 (a). After the verdicts, but before entry of final judgment, MCCG
moved the trial court to reduce the $7.2 million noneconomic
damages award to the maximum amount allowable under OCGA §
51-13-1 (b) and (c). 2 Pointing to our decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic
Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt,
286 Ga. 731 (691 SE2d 218) (2010), the
trial court denied MCCG’s motion and concluded that the statutory
2 OCGA §
51-13-1 was enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005 to
“limit[] awards of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to a
predetermined amount.” See Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C....
...he total amount
recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such action
shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless
of the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is
based.
OCGA §
51-13-1 (b) and (c). See also OCGA §
51-13-1 (a) (defining terms) and
OCGA §
51-13-1 (e) (setting an aggregate limit on noneconomic damages
recoverable under subsections (b) and (c)).
2
maximum limits on noneconomic damages (or “caps”) contained in
OCGA §
51-13-1 (b) and (c) were “not applicable” to the wrongful
death noneconomic damages awarded to Turner on the basis that
this Court had already “found [the caps] to be unconstitutional” in
Nestlehutt....
...App. 644, 652-655 (2) (905
SE2d 858) (2024) (rejecting MCCG’s argument that the $7.2 million
noneconomic damages award for wrongful death “must be remitted
and amended because it exceeded the $350,000 cap on noneconomic
damages imposed by OCGA §
51-13-1” on the basis that “this
argument is foreclosed by binding Supreme Court of Georgia
precedent”)....
...Art. I, § I, Par. XI (1983) (“The right to trial by
jury shall remain inviolate . . . .”).
Today, we do not reach the ultimate question of whether
Turner’s constitutional right to trial by jury would be violated by
application of OCGA §
51-13-1’s caps to the $7.2 million
noneconomic damages awarded in this case because the record
shows – and the parties agree – that the lower courts have not
applied the analytical framework set out by our precedent to the
wrongful death claim and the “full value of the life” damages
awarded in this case....
...hat Nestlehutt controlled
the outcome. While we recognize that our decision in Nestlehutt used
broad and, at times, imprecise language when discussing the
interplay between the constitutional right to trial by jury and the
statutory caps in OCGA §
51-13-1, see generally Nestlehutt,
286 Ga.
4
at 732-738 (2), the language relied upon by the lower courts was not
a holding that controls the outcome of this case.
Courts must take care not to apply a...
...consortium) were damages determined by juries for that type of
claim in Georgia in 1798. See Nestlehutt,
286 Ga. at 732-738 (2);
Taylor,
316 Ga. at 59-81 (III). Ultimately, we concluded that the
answer was “yes” as to each of those considerations, such that
application of OCGA §
51-13-1’s caps to the noneconomic damages
for pain and suffering and loss of consortium that were awarded to
the plaintiffs for their successful medical malpractice claims
violated the constitutional right to trial by jury....
...In other words, the analytical framework that we
set out and applied in Nestlehutt – that is, “the reasoning [and]
principles that were necessary to that decision” – was claim- and
remedy-specific. Wierson, __ Ga. at __ (2) (b) (ii). See id. Therefore,
because the question of whether OCGA §
51-13-1’s caps can be
constitutionally applied to statutory wrongful death claims (and
their associated “full value of the life” damages) was not at issue in
Nestlehutt, the Nestlehutt Court could not (and did not) decide the
issue presented in this case....
