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Call Now: 904-383-7448This chapter applies to any claim defined in this chapter as an asbestos claim or as a silica claim.
(Code 1981, §51-14-2, enacted by Ga. L. 2007, p. 4, § 1/SB 182.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 51, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Superior and state courts did not err in entering nearly identical orders which held that because O.C.G.A. § 51-14-1 et seq. required asbestos plaintiffs to provide proof that exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor in their medical condition, it unconstitutionally affected an employee's substantive rights by establishing a new element which did not exist when the original cause of action accrued and, hence, could not be applied retrospectively; moreover, because these requirements and limitations were the heart of the statute, their severance would result in a statute that failed to correspond to the main legislative purpose, or give effect to that purpose. DaimlerChrysler v. Ferrante, 281 Ga. 273, 637 S.E.2d 659 (2006)(decided under former O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 51).
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1975-01-28
Citation: 233 Ga. 512, 212 S.E.2d 345, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1361
Snippet: Morris v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 202 Ga. 51 (1) (42 SE2d 215). In order for Paul Mincey to have inherited