O.C.G.A. § 51-2-3 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. - Juvenile proceedings, parental rights, mental incompetency and dependency for juveniles, T. 15, C. 11. Interstate compact for juveniles, T. 49, C. 4B. Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1997, p. 532, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 1997 amendment to this Code section shall be applicable to willful and malicious acts occurring on or after July 1, 1997. Law reviews. - For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 189 (1969). For article surveying constitutional law, see

34 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1982). For article surveying recent developments in Georgia juvenile law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 395 (1982). For note discussing the family purpose car doctrine as an extension of the principle of respondeat superior, see 3 Ga. St. B. J. 112 (1966). For note, ‘‘Tort Liability in Georgia for the Criminal Acts of Another,’’ see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 361 (1984). For comment on Landers v. Medford, 108 Ga. App. 525, 133 S.E.2d 403 (1963), see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 229 (1964). For comment criticizing Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 776 (1971), as to constitutionality of this section prior to 1976 amendment, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 681 (1972). For comment on Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971), holding parental liability statute which formerly provided for unlimited liability of parents for willful torts of minor children on the basis of parent-child relationship violative of due process, see 9 Ga. St. B. J. 129 (1972).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW General Consideration Section not unreasonable. - O.C.G.A. § 51-2-3, intended to aid in reducing juvenile delinquency by imposing liability upon parents who control minors, is neither unreasonable, arbitrary, nor capricious. Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982). State has legitimate interest in subject of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-3. (controlling juvenile delinquency), and that there is a rational relationship between the means used (imposing of liability upon parents of children who willfully or maliciously damage property) and this object. Hayward v.

Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982). No liability when child’s acts were not reckless. - Parent, whose child stole the parent’s car keys and was driving the parent’s car when the car collided with a bicyclist, was not liable for damages, although the parent was aware that the parent’s son was not a licensed driver and that the child had a juvenile record, when there was no evidence that the parent knew of any proclivity or propensity on the part of the parent’s son for the specific dangerous activity alleged, and there was no evidence that the parent’s child’s acts

General Consideration (Cont’d) were reckless. Jackson v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 329, 378 S.E.2d 726 (1989). Teenaged driver’s negligence could not be imputed to his parents after he drove the girlfriend’s car and injured her. The parents had not allowed their son to drive his girlfriend’s car nor even known about it until after the accident, and there was no proof that their son’s actions were willful or malicious. Cole v. Fauk, 253 Ga. App. 892, 560 S.E.2d 772 (2002). Owner of an automobile whose child let an unlicensed 16-year-old drive has an action against the 16-year-old and the child’s parents for willful or malicious acts and the 16-year-old is not protected by the principles of the family car doctrine. Cabral v. White, 181 Ga. App. 816, 354 S.E.2d 162 (1987). Cited in Herrin v. Lamar, 106 Ga. App. 91, 126 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Vort v. Westbrook, 221 Ga. 39, 142 S.E.2d 813 (1965); Wittke v. Horne’s Enters., Inc., 118 Ga. App. 211, 162 S.E.2d 898 (1968); Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971); Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 600, 284 S.E.2d 416 (1981). Decisions Under Prior Law Liability does not arise out of mere relationship of parent and child. Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965) (decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1). ‘‘Willful and wanton act’’ is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard for consequences. Landers v. Medford, 108 Ga. App. 525, 133 S.E.2d 403 (1963) (decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1). Willful and wanton act in the damaging or destruction of property is one so reckless as to evince an entire want of care on the part of the defendants so as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to the consequences. Mere negligence can never amount to such aggravating circumstances. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 148 S.E.2d 83 (1966) (decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).

Vandalism is willful or malicious destruction of property. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 148 S.E.2d 83 (1966) (decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1). Vandalism does not encompass within its meaning acts directed only against persons. Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965) (decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1). Section generally not applicable to personal injuries. - This section does not apply to the willful torts of a minor under 18 which are directed against the persons of others and not directed against property. Browder v. Sloan, 111 Ga. App. 693, 143 S.E.2d 13 (1965). Liability of a parent for the tort of the parent’s child applies only to acts of the child directed to the damaging of property and to injuries to the person resulting naturally and proximately from those acts. Browder v. Sloan, 111 Ga. App. 693, 143 S.E.2d 13 (1965); Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965) (decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1). Liability of a parent for the tort of the parent’s child in directly inflicting injury on the person of another is governed by the ordinary principles of liability of a principal for the acts of the principal’s agent or a master for the principal’s servant. Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965) (decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1). Section modified common law. - Former statute modified the general rule that liability of a parent for an injury committed by the parent’s child was governed by the ordinary principles of liability of a principal for the acts of the principal’s agent, or a master for the servant, and that a father is not liable for the tort of a minor child, with which he was in no way connected, which he did not ratify, and from which he did not derive any benefit, merely because of the relationship of parent and child. Sagnibene v. State Wholesalers, Inc., 117 Ga. App. 239, 160 S.E.2d 274 (1968) (decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, § 1). Former statute was not applicable when child, being only four years old,

was not capable of committing willful and wanton act. Sagnibene v. State Wholesalers, Inc., 117 Ga. App. 239, 160 S.E.2d 274 (1968) (decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, § 1). Section held unconstitutional. - Former statute contravenes the due pro-

cess clauses of the state and federal Constitutions and is void. Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971) (decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, § 1).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 88 et seq. C.J.S. - 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 329 et seq. ALR. - Liability of parent for injury inflicted by minor child with dangerous instrumentality left accessible to him, 12 ALR 812. Liability of owner under ‘‘family-purpose’’ doctrine, for injuries by automobile while being used by member of his family, 64 ALR 844; 88 ALR 601; 100 ALR 1021; 132 ALR 981. Infant’s liability in tort for own act, or right to recover for another’s tort, as affected by its connection with infant’s contract, 127 ALR 1441. Automobile owner’s common-law liability for negligence in entrusting car to known incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced person as affected by statute limiting owner’s liability to use within terms of consent, 163 ALR 1418. Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct, 26 ALR2d 1320. Liability of person permitting child to have gun, or leaving gun accessible to child, for injury inflicted by the latter, 68 ALR2d 782.

Validity and construction of statutes making parents liable for torts committed by their minor children, 8 ALR3d 612. Modern status of family purpose doctrine with respect to motor vehicles, 8 ALR3d 1191. Parents’ liability for injury or damage intentionally inflicted by minor child, 54 ALR3d 974. Liability of parent for injury caused by child riding a bicycle, 70 ALR3d 611. Liability of owner of powerboat for injury or death allegedly caused by one permitted to operate boat by owner, 71 ALR3d 1018. Liability of one who sells gun to child for injury to third party, 4 ALR4th 331. Criminal responsibility of parent for act of child, 12 ALR4th 673. Modern trends as to tort liability of child of tender years, 27 ALR4th 15. Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct, 45 ALR4th 87. Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile’s offense, 66 ALR4th 985.