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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1; Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 511, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 849, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1987, p. 3, § 51; Ga. L. 1997, p. 532, § 1.)
- Georgia Laws 1976, p. 511, § 2 entirely superseded the former section which was held unconstitutional in Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971), insofar as it made parents liable without limits for willful torts of their children which resulted in personal injury.
- Juvenile proceedings, parental rights, mental incompetency and dependency for juveniles, T. 15, C. 11.
Interstate compact for juveniles, T. 49, C. 4B.
- Ga. L. 1997, p. 532, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 1997 amendment to this Code section shall be applicable to willful and malicious acts occurring on or after July 1, 1997.
- For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 189 (1969). For article surveying constitutional law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1982). For article surveying recent developments in Georgia juvenile law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 395 (1982). For note discussing the family purpose car doctrine as an extension of the principle of respondeat superior, see 3 Ga. St. B. J. 112 (1966). For note, "Tort Liability in Georgia for the Criminal Acts of Another," see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 361 (1984). For comment on Landers v. Medford, 108 Ga. App. 525, 133 S.E.2d 403 (1963), see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 229 (1964). For comment criticizing Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 776 (1971), as to constitutionality of this section prior to 1976 amendment, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 681 (1972). For comment on Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971), holding parental liability statute which formerly provided for unlimited liability of parents for willful torts of minor children on the basis of parent-child relationship violative of due process, see 9 Ga. St. B. J. 129 (1972).
- O.C.G.A. § 51-2-3, intended to aid in reducing juvenile delinquency by imposing liability upon parents who control minors, is neither unreasonable, arbitrary, nor capricious. Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
State has legitimate interest in subject of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-3. (controlling juvenile delinquency), and that there is a rational relationship between the means used (imposing of liability upon parents of children who willfully or maliciously damage property) and this object. Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
- Parent, whose child stole the parent's car keys and was driving the parent's car when the car collided with a bicyclist, was not liable for damages, although the parent was aware that the parent's son was not a licensed driver and that the child had a juvenile record, when there was no evidence that the parent knew of any proclivity or propensity on the part of the parent's son for the specific dangerous activity alleged, and there was no evidence that the parent's child's acts were reckless. Jackson v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 329, 378 S.E.2d 726 (1989).
Teenaged driver's negligence could not be imputed to his parents after he drove the girlfriend's car and injured her. The parents had not allowed their son to drive his girlfriend's car nor even known about it until after the accident, and there was no proof that their son's actions were willful or malicious. Cole v. Fauk, 253 Ga. App. 892, 560 S.E.2d 772 (2002).
Owner of an automobile whose child let an unlicensed 16-year-old drive has an action against the 16-year-old and the child's parents for willful or malicious acts and the 16-year-old is not protected by the principles of the family car doctrine. Cabral v. White, 181 Ga. App. 816, 354 S.E.2d 162 (1987).
Cited in Herrin v. Lamar, 106 Ga. App. 91, 126 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Vort v. Westbrook, 221 Ga. 39, 142 S.E.2d 813 (1965); Wittke v. Horne's Enters., Inc., 118 Ga. App. 211, 162 S.E.2d 898 (1968); Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971); Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 600, 284 S.E.2d 416 (1981).
Liability does not arise out of mere relationship of parent and child. Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).
"Willful and wanton act" is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard for consequences. Landers v. Medford, 108 Ga. App. 525, 133 S.E.2d 403 (1963);(decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).
Willful and wanton act in the damaging or destruction of property is one so reckless as to evince an entire want of care on the part of the defendants so as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to the consequences. Mere negligence can never amount to such aggravating circumstances. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 148 S.E.2d 83 (1966);(decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).
Vandalism is willful or malicious destruction of property. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 148 S.E.2d 83 (1966);(decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).
Vandalism does not encompass within its meaning acts directed only against persons. Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).
- This section does not apply to the willful torts of a minor under 18 which are directed against the persons of others and not directed against property. Browder v. Sloan, 111 Ga. App. 693, 143 S.E.2d 13 (1965).
Liability of a parent for the tort of the parent's child applies only to acts of the child directed to the damaging of property and to injuries to the person resulting naturally and proximately from those acts. Browder v. Sloan, 111 Ga. App. 693, 143 S.E.2d 13 (1965); Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965)(decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).
Liability of a parent for the tort of the parent's child in directly inflicting injury on the person of another is governed by the ordinary principles of liability of a principal for the acts of the principal's agent or a master for the principal's servant. Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1).
- Former statute modified the general rule that liability of a parent for an injury committed by the parent's child was governed by the ordinary principles of liability of a principal for the acts of the principal's agent, or a master for the servant, and that a father is not liable for the tort of a minor child, with which he was in no way connected, which he did not ratify, and from which he did not derive any benefit, merely because of the relationship of parent and child. Sagnibene v. State Wholesalers, Inc., 117 Ga. App. 239, 160 S.E.2d 274 (1968);(decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, § 1).
Former statute was not applicable when child, being only four years old, was not capable of committing willful and wanton act. Sagnibene v. State Wholesalers, Inc., 117 Ga. App. 239, 160 S.E.2d 274 (1968);(decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, § 1).
- Former statute contravenes the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions and is void. Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971);(decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, § 1).
- 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 88 et seq.
- 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 329 et seq.
- Liability of parent for injury inflicted by minor child with dangerous instrumentality left accessible to him, 12 A.L.R. 812.
Liability of owner under "family-purpose" doctrine, for injuries by automobile while being used by member of his family, 64 A.L.R. 844; 88 A.L.R. 601; 100 A.L.R. 1021; 132 A.L.R. 981.
Infant's liability in tort for own act, or right to recover for another's tort, as affected by its connection with infant's contract, 127 A.L.R. 1441.
Automobile owner's common-law liability for negligence in entrusting car to known incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced person as affected by statute limiting owner's liability to use within terms of consent, 163 A.L.R. 1418.
Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor's application for vehicle operator's license liable for licensee's negligence or willful misconduct, 26 A.L.R.2d 1320.
Liability of person permitting child to have gun, or leaving gun accessible to child, for injury inflicted by the latter, 68 A.L.R.2d 782.
Validity and construction of statutes making parents liable for torts committed by their minor children, 8 A.L.R.3d 612.
Modern status of family purpose doctrine with respect to motor vehicles, 8 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Parents' liability for injury or damage intentionally inflicted by minor child, 54 A.L.R.3d 974.
Liability of parent for injury caused by child riding a bicycle, 70 A.L.R.3d 611.
Liability of owner of powerboat for injury or death allegedly caused by one permitted to operate boat by owner, 71 A.L.R.3d 1018.
Liability of one who sells gun to child for injury to third party, 4 A.L.R.4th 331.
Criminal responsibility of parent for act of child, 12 A.L.R.4th 673.
Modern trends as to tort liability of child of tender years, 27 A.L.R.4th 15.
Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor's application for vehicle operator's license liable for licensee's negligence or willful misconduct, 45 A.L.R.4th 87.
Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 A.L.R.4th 985.
No results found for Georgia Code 51-2-3.