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2018 Georgia Code 51-3-23 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 51-3-23 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 51-3-23

TITLE 51 TORTS

Section 3. Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land, 51-3-1 through 51-3-44.

ARTICLE 2 OWNERS OF PROPERTY USED FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES

51-3-23. Effect of invitation or permission to use land for recreation.

Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51-3-25, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby:

  1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose;
  2. Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or
  3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.

(Ga. L. 1965, p. 476, § 4.)

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on local government law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 205 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Section not applicable to invitation to use residential swimming pool.

- Georgia Recreational Property Act, adopted to promote the public use of land and facilities, was not meant to apply to the friendly neighbor who permits friends and neighbors to use one's swimming pool without charge. Herring v. Hauck, 118 Ga. App. 623, 165 S.E.2d 198 (1968).

Owner not liable to persons admitted free, although others were charged.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-23 of the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., a city operating a stadium was shielded from liability for injuries sustained by a six-year-old child who fell from the bleachers because children under six were not charged a fee to enter the stadium, although adults and older children were charged. Mayor & Aldermen of Garden City v. Harris, 302 Ga. 853, 809 S.E.2d 806 (2018).

Liability distinguished from general liability to licensees.

- The owner or occupier of premises coming within the terms of the Georgia Recreational Property Act did not have "substantially" the same duties toward a user of the premises as that owed to a licensee under former Code 1933, § 105-402 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2). Herring v. Hauck, 118 Ga. App. 623, 165 S.E.2d 198 (1968).

Under Ga. L. 1965, p. 476, § 4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-3-23), the injured party coming within the provisions of Ga. L. 1965, p. 476, § 4 would be obligated to show a willful and malicious failure to guard or warn, that is, a failure to use even slight care; whereas a licensee under former Code 1933, § 105-402 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2) may recover by showing a lack of ordinary care, which under the circumstances may amount to willful and wanton negligence. Herring v. Hauck, 118 Ga. App. 623, 165 S.E.2d 198 (1968).

Public use not proven.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for a school board as to an injured party's personal injury claim based on the Georgia Recreational Purposes Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-22 and51-3-23, as the school board presented no evidence that the playground was open to the public and the injured party presented evidence that the playground: (1) was fenced-in; (2) was only for the use of children enrolled in the school; and (3) was not open to any segment of the general public. Hart v. Appling County Sch. Bd., 266 Ga. App. 300, 597 S.E.2d 462 (2004).

Parking fee not "charge."

- State park's collection of a $1.00 parking fee upon all motor vehicles did not constitute a charge imposing liability for personal injuries sustained by a park visitor under the Georgia Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq. Majeske v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 209 Ga. App. 118, 433 S.E.2d 304 (1993).

Voluntary fee not a "charge."

- Georgia Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., applied to a negligence action against the boys and girls club because the nominal voluntary fee some members paid did not constitute a "charge" to the public as contemplated by the Act. Gayle v. Frank Callen Boys & Girls Club, Inc., 322 Ga. App. 412, 745 S.E.2d 695 (2013).

Attractive nuisance theory was inapplicable since the injured child was not a trespasser but rather a person permitted on the property but to whom only a limited duty of care was owed. Edmondson v. Brooks County Bd. of Educ., 205 Ga. App. 662, 423 S.E.2d 413 (1992).

Fee for use of park.

- The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendant since the trial court was authorized to conclude as a matter of law that the $4.00 fee charged to each vehicle to enter the park did not constitute a charge for the recreational use of the park land itself and the plaintiff's alleged injuries resulted from the plaintiff's general recreational usage of the park premises, for which no fee was charged, rather than from the use of any of the facilities for which a fee was charged. Therefore, the provisions of the Georgia Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., operate to prevent the plaintiff from recovering from the defendant based on allegations of simple negligence. Quick v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 204 Ga. App. 598, 420 S.E.2d 36, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 420 S.E.2d 36 (1992).

Power company liability under Georgia Recreational Property Act.

- The Georgia Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., provided immunity to the defendant power company as the owner of recreational property in an action arising from the murder of a teenage boy on a 65 acre tract made available at no charge to the public for boating, fishing, sailing, swimming, picnicking, camping, hunting, hiking, and scenic viewing of a lake and surrounding area since: (1) the boy was not on the property to further any commercial interests of the power company; (2) there was no mixture of commercial and recreational activities taking place on the property; (3) there was no admission fee to get onto the property, no parking fees, and no costs for the use of any of the facilities once a visitor entered the property; and (4) there were no vendors on the property from whom visitors could buy anything. Hendrickson v. Georgia Power Co., 240 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 2001).

Debris pile on state land.

- Evidence did not show that the Georgia Department of Natural Resources violated the Georgia Recreational Property Act (RPA), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., because it willfully and maliciously failed to warn people of the danger posed by a debris pile that was located near a public restroom on state land, and the trial court's judgment finding that the RPA applied to an action which a spouse filed against the Department seeking damages for injuries sustained when the injured spouse tripped on the debris pile, and dismissing the action, was upheld. Lee v. Dep't of Natural Res. of Ga., 263 Ga. App. 491, 588 S.E.2d 260 (2003).

Application to rest areas.

- Recreational Property Act (RPA), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., applies to rest areas maintained by the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), and the DOT was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with regard to a visitor's premises liability and negligence suit against the DOT resulting from the visitor's trip and fall while attempting to place garbage in a trash can at a rest area, because the DOT was immune from liability as a result of the application of the RPA and the visitor failed to show that the DOT was wilful or wanton in its placement of its trash can or that it charged money for the use of their rest areas. Ga. DOT v. Thompson, 270 Ga. App. 265, 606 S.E.2d 323 (2004).

Application to welcome center.

- Georgia Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., was not limited to privately held land; a welcome center where a traveler was injured was recreational, and thus the department which owned the welcome center was immune from liability and any connection between brochures offered at the welcome center and the state's eventual "profit" from increased tax revenue was far too tenuous to render the venture commercial. Matheson v. Ga. DOT, 280 Ga. App. 192, 633 S.E.2d 569 (2006).

Motorcycle driver injured on public land.

- Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a city on allegations of negligence asserted against it by an injured motorcycle driver as the Recreational Property Act (Act), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., prevented the driver from recovering from the city based on allegations of simple negligence; moreover, the Act clearly applied because it was undisputed that the injuries occurred when the driver collided with the cable fence on the city's recreational property, and the city permitted the general public to use the park and open field where the accident occurred for recreational purposes without charge. Carroll v. City of Carrollton, 280 Ga. App. 172, 633 S.E.2d 591 (2006).

Drowning.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Georgia Department of Natural Resources and a power company in a mother's wrongful death action after the mother's child drowned at a visit to a state park as the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., absolved the entities from any liability since there was no evidence that the drowning resulted from a willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. Ray v. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res., 296 Ga. App. 700, 675 S.E.2d 585 (2009).

References to "recreational" in complaint.

- Pedestrian's complaint for injuries suffered while walking on a city-owned recreational walkway were barred by the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-22 and51-3-23. The pedestrian could not circumvent the judicial admissions in the pedestrian's first complaint by amending the complaint to remove references to "recreational." City of Chickamauga v. Hentz, 300 Ga. App. 249, 684 S.E.2d 372 (2009).

Complaint for injuries suffered on recreational walkway.

- Pedestrian's complaint for injuries suffered while walking on a city-owned recreational walkway were barred by the Recreational Property Act (RPA), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq. The pedestrian could not circumvent the judicial admissions in the pedestrian's first complaint by amending the complaint to remove references to "recreational." City of Chickamauga v. Hentz, 300 Ga. App. 249, 684 S.E.2d 372 (2009).

Factual dispute as to whether purpose of property was commercial or recreational.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to cemetery owner and maintenance company in a visitor's personal injury action because the evidence presented a factual dispute as to whether the owner's purpose of the property was commercial or recreational; the owner pointed to evidence reflecting that the cemetery did not limit access, was open to the public, and was available to the public for recreational purposes such as picnics, jogging, or walking pets, while the evidence also reflected that the owner operated the cemetery as part of the owner's for-profit business and sold grave sites and interment rights for burial in accordance with a commercial enterprise. Martin v. Dempsey Funeral Servs. of Ga., Inc., 319 Ga. App. 343, 735 S.E.2d 59 (2012).

Cited in Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n v. Herrington, 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969); Georgia Power Co. v. McGruder, 229 Ga. 811, 194 S.E.2d 440 (1972); Epps v. Chattahoochee Brick Co., 140 Ga. App. 426, 231 S.E.2d 443 (1976); Erickson v. Century Mgt. Co., 154 Ga. App. 508, 268 S.E.2d 779 (1980); North v. Toco Hills, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 116, 286 S.E.2d 346 (1981); Georgia Marble Co. v. Warren, 183 Ga. App. 866, 360 S.E.2d 286 (1987); Nye v. Union Camp Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Ga. 1987); Cooley v. City of Carrollton, 249 Ga. App. 387, 547 S.E.2d 689 (2001); Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116, 598 S.E.2d 471 (2004); Norton v. Cobb, 284 Ga. App. 303, 643 S.E.2d 803 (2007); Word of Faith Ministries, Inc. v. Hurt, 323 Ga. App. 296, 746 S.E.2d 777 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Liability of owner of private residential swimming pool for injury or death occasioned thereby, 64 A.L.R.5th 1.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-23

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 345 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 66 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 23, 2000 | 273 Ga. 113

...dment freedoms must be examined in light of facts of case at hand). The RPA limits, with certain exceptions, the liability of an owner of land who has made property available without charge to the public for recreational purposes. OCGA §§ 51-3-22, 51-3-23....
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Atlanta Comm. for Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 598 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2004 | 278 Ga. 116

...ist on the property, the nature and extent of the mixed uses of the property may nevertheless raise a jury question about the owner's purpose for "directly or indirectly invit[ing] or permit[ting] without charge any person to use the property." OCGA § 51-3-23....
...at 899(1), 584 S.E.2d 16. Given that factual finding, [4] we consider the more pertinent issue for jury resolution to be whether ACOG directly or indirectly invited or permitted without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes, OCGA § 51-3-23, in light of any relevant evidence that may be adduced that ACOG's purpose in allowing the public free of charge on the locus delicti was to derive, directly or indirectly, a financial benefit for pecuniary gain from business interests thereon....
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Mayor of Garden City v. Harris, 302 Ga. 853 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 29, 2018 | 809 S.E.2d 806

...creational Property Act, OCGA § 51-3-20 et seq. (RPA), which shields from potential liability landowners who “either directly or indirectly invite[ ] or permit[ ] without charge any person to use the[ir] propertyfor recreational purposes.” OCGA § 51-3-23....
...d suffered serious injuries after falling to the ground nearly thirty feet below. The Harrises sued the City to recover for Riley’s injuries, and the City moved for summary judgment, relying on the immunity provided by the RPA. Specifically, OCGA § 51-3-23 states: Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51-3-25, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes does not there...
...ain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). With these principles in mind, a natural reading of the plain language of OCGA § 51-3-23 indicates that a landowner remains free from potential liability to any individual person who is injured on the landowner’s property who has been allowed to use the property for recreational purposes free of charge....
...cally and unambiguously references “any person” who is not charged a fee to use a landowner’s property for recreational purposes as being such a “person” to whom the landowner does not owe a duty of care. Because the statutory text of OCGA § 51-3-23 is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning of shielding landowners from potential liability to individual persons whom they have invited to use their property for recreational purposes free of charge, “and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Deal, supra, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a). Our interpretation of the plain meaning of OCGA § 51-3-23 is not diminished when the statute is considered in the context of the exceptions to the statute set forth in OCGA § 51-3-25....
...rty is a person who has been charged a fee to use the landowner’s property for recreational purposes, the landowner would not be immune from potential liability to such paying persons, because the landowner *856only receives the protections ofOCGA § 51-3-23 with respect to those persons who have not been charged a fee to use the property for recreational purposes....
...rty for recreational purposes obviously could not qualify as “any person [who has been invited] to use the property for recreational purposes” “without charge” and to whom the landowner could not be liable based on the plain language of OCGA § 51-3-23.1 This is also consistent with the stated legislative purpose of the RPA, which “is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the owners’ liability toward pe...
... (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 51-3-20. A landowner’s liability is limited to those injured persons who have paid to use the landowner’s property for recreational purposes, and there is nothing in the natural reading of the plain text of OCGA §§ 51-3-23 and 51-3-25 to suggest that the legislature intended instead to leave in place the potential liability of landowners to persons who have not paid to use an owner’s property for recreational purposes just because the landowner would be potentially liable to others who have paid to use the property for such purposes....
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Mercer Univ. v. Stofer, 830 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2019 | 306 Ga. 191

Peterson, Justice. **191The Recreational Property Act shields from liability a property owner "who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes[.]" OCGA § 51-3-23....
...rpose; (2) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons. OCGA § 51-3-23....
...799, 801-802 (2), 301 S.E.2d 265 (1983) (no immunity because the key public activity was purchasing food, merchandise, and services). Although these examples emphasize the actions of the people invited to use the property, as discussed further in Division 3, application of the phrase "invites or permits" in OCGA § 51-3-23 necessarily involves some consideration from the perspective of the landowner in the sense that immunity under the Act turns on whether the landowner actually invited people onto the property (directly or indirectly) to do something "recre...
...With only one exception not relevant here,9 "purpose" appears in the Act only as part of the defined term "recreational purposes." See OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) (non-exclusive list of a variety of activities). When we read that defined term in the context of its *176use in OCGA § 51-3-23, that term does not refer to a landowner's reason for opening land; rather, the statute uses the term to refer to the activities in which invited people will engage....
...e public was allowed free of charge into the Park as it existed during the Olympics, and most pertinently, on the date the bomb exploded in the Park." Id. at 120 (3), 598 S.E.2d 471 (emphasis in original; citation and punctuation omitted). See OCGA § 51-3-23 (1) (landowners inviting people to use their property for a recreational purpose do not thereby "[e]xtend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose " (emphasis added)). We note that Hawthorne 's "directly or indirectly" language has been repeated in only two Court of Appeals cases....
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The Mayor & Alderman of Garden City v. Harris, 302 Ga. 853 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 29, 2018

...ional Property Act, OCGA § 51-3-20 et seq. (RPA), which shields from potential liability landowners who “either directly or indirectly invite[ ] or permit[ ] without charge any person to use the[ir] property for recreational purposes.” OCGA § 51-3-23....
...d serious injuries after falling to the ground nearly thirty feet below. The Harrises sued the City to recover for Riley’s injuries, and the City moved for summary judgment, relying on the immunity provided by the RPA. Specifically, OCGA § 51-3-23 states: Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51-3-25, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational...
...d our search for statutory meaning is at an end. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). With these principles in mind, a natural reading of the plain language of OCGA § 51-3-23 indicates that a landowner remains free from potential liability to any individual person who is injured on the landowner’s property who has been allowed to use the property for recreational purposes free of charge. Indeed, a landowne...
...“any person” who is not charged a fee to use a landowner’s property for 4 recreational purposes as being such a “person” to whom the landowner does not owe a duty of care. Because the statutory text of OCGA § 51-3-23 is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning of shielding landowners from potential liability to individual persons whom they have invited to use their property for recreational purposes free of charge, “and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Deal, supra, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a). Our interpretation of the plain meaning of OCGA § 51-3-23 is not diminished when the statute is considered in the context of the exceptions to the statute set forth in OCGA § 51-3-25....
...rty is a person who has been charged a fee to use the landowner’s property for recreational purposes, the landowner would not be immune from potential liability to such paying persons, because the landowner only receives the protections of OCGA § 51-3-23 with respect to those persons who have not been charged a fee to use the property for 5 recreational purposes....
...for recreational purposes obviously could not qualify as “any person [who has been invited] to use the property for recreational purposes” “without charge” and to whom the landowner could not be liable based on the plain language of OCGA § 51-3-23.1 This is also consistent with the stated legislative purpose of the RPA, which “is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available 1 Contrary to the assertions of the dissent, we have done nothing in our ruling today to overrule any of our prior case law....
...(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 51-3-20. A landowner’s liability is limited to those injured persons who have paid to use the landowner’s property for recreational purposes, and there is nothing in the natural reading of the plain text of OCGA §§ 51-3-23 and 51-3-25 to suggest that the legislature intended instead to leave in place the potential liability of landowners to persons who have not paid to use an owner’s property for recreational purposes just because the landowner would be...
...All the Justices concur, except Benham and Hunstein, JJ., who dissent. 8 HUNSTEIN, Justice, dissenting. For decades the Georgia courts have held that a landowner is shielded from liability pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-23 only where its property is open to the public for a recreational purpose without charge....
...charge within the meaning of this Code section. Id. The majority concludes, after ostensibly applying the “plain language” of the above-quoted provisions without citation to meaningful authority, that the liability waiver of OCGA § 51-3-23 applies (and, consequently, that OCGA § 51-3-25 does not) because Riley did not pay the admission fee. At first glance, 4 such a reading appears correct. However, simply parsing the language of OCGA § 51-3-23 does not end the analysis. The plain language of that Code section — indeed the first sentence — states that the RPA’s general liability protection is expressly controlled by the provisions of OCGA § 51-3-25. See OCGA § 51-3-23 (“Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51-3-25 ....
...at 175. Consistent with these long-standing decisions, as well as a natural reading of the statute, I conclude that it is the fee associated with the use of the property that controls our analysis, not whether a specific individual was charged.3 Such a resolution of the ambiguity between OCGA §§ 51-3-23 and 51-3-25 (2) is consistent with the requirement that we narrowly construe the liability waiver, which abrogates the common law right of an invitee to sue a landowner. 3 Even in “business interest” cases, where the...
...at 175- 176, n.3 (where the parties do not dispute the purely recreational purpose of the property, then no need to review individual plaintiff’s use of premises). 8 Furthermore, this construction maintains the liability shield envisioned by the General Assembly in OCGA § 51-3-23, encouraging landowners to allow the public to use their lands free of charge, while also protecting the waiver exemption codified in OCGA § 51-3-25 (2)....
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Mercer Univ. v. Stofer, 306 Ga. 191 (Ga. 2019).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2019

...STOFER et al. PETERSON, Justice. The Recreational Property Act shields from liability a property owner “who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes[.]” OCGA § 51-3-23....
...n such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons. OCGA § 51-3-23....
...dise, and services). Although these examples emphasize the actions of the people invited to use the property, as discussed further in Division 3, 11 application of the phrase “invites or permits” in OCGA § 51-3-23 necessarily involves some consideration from the perspective of the landowner in the sense that immunity under the Act turns on whether the landowner actually invited people onto the property (directly or indirectly) to do something ...
...With only one exception not relevant here,9 “purpose” appears in the Act only as part of the defined term “recreational purposes.” See OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) (non-exclusive list of a variety of activities). When we read that defined term in the context of its use in OCGA § 51-3-23, that term does not refer to a landowner’s reason for opening land; rather, the statute uses the bombing to the extent that evidence may help the jury to determine why the public was allowed free of charge into the Park as it existed during the Olympics, and most pertinently, on the date the bomb exploded in the Park.” Hawthorne, 278 Ga. at 120 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). 9See OCGA § 51-3-23 (1) (landowners inviting people to use their property for a recreational purpose do not thereby “[e]xtend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose” (emphasis added)). 19 term to re...