Jury may weigh worldly circumstances.

- It is the general rule that evidence of the parties' worldly circumstances is inadmissible. The reverse is true, however, in malicious prosecution cases, and the jury is constrained, in determining damages, to weigh worldly circumstances along with other relevant considerations. Atlantic Zayre, Inc. v. Meeks, 194 Ga. App. 267, 390 S.E.2d 398 (1990).

In case of malicious prosecution, there is no exact measure of damages except enlightened conscience of impartial jurors, and that the worldly circumstances of the parties and all the attendant facts should be weighed, except that if there be proof of expenses or loss of time the court should discriminate between the two types of damages and should not leave the entire measure of damages to the unlimited discretion of the jury. Simmons v. Edge, 155 Ga. App. 6, 270 S.E.2d 457 (1980).

The jury should weigh the worldly circumstances of the parties, all the attendant facts, and the proof of expenses, loss of time, and other damages. Medoc Corp. v. Keel, 166 Ga. App. 615, 305 S.E.2d 134 (1983).

The measure of damages in malicious prosecution cases is the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. Atlantic Zayre, Inc. v. Meeks, 194 Ga. App. 267, 390 S.E.2d 398 (1990).

Attorney fees, bail bonds, and loss of time are special damages which may be recovered in action for malicious prosecution. Segars v. Cornwell, 128 Ga. App. 245, 196 S.E.2d 341 (1973).

Attorney fees, bail bonds, and loss of time arising from the defense of the criminal prosecution are distinguishable from the expenses of litigation arising from the subsequent tort action, and represent a proper element of actual damages. Rae v. Griffin, 160 Ga. App. 96, 286 S.E.2d 64 (1981).

Malicious prosecution verdict allowing the expense of defending the criminal charge is authorized, assuming evidence on this issue was received by the jury without objection. Rae v. Griffin, 160 Ga. App. 96, 286 S.E.2d 64 (1981).

Attorney fees paid to defend against the criminal prosecution instigated constitute recoverable damages in an action for malicious prosecution. Medoc Corp. v. Keel, 166 Ga. App. 615, 305 S.E.2d 134 (1983).

Evidence of pecuniary circumstances is admissible in actions for malicious prosecution. Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 5 S.E. 204 (1887); Simmons v. Edge, 155 Ga. App. 6, 270 S.E.2d 457 (1980).

Vindictive or punitive damages are only allowed when the act of the defendant was influenced by malicious motives and without probable cause. Dixie Broadcasting Corp. v. Rivers, 209 Ga. 98, 70 S.E.2d 734 (1952), later appeal, 88 Ga. App. 131, 76 S.E.2d 229 (1953); Atlantic Zayre, Inc. v. Meeks, 194 Ga. App. 267, 390 S.E.2d 398 (1990).

Punitive damages instruction proper.

- The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on punitive damages when there was sufficient evidence from which rational jurors could infer both lack of probable cause and malice in light of the defendant's failure to verify the substance of the defendant's claim (property damage) before swearing out warrants. Branson v. Donaldson, 206 Ga. App. 723, 426 S.E.2d 218 (1992).

Jury instructions on damages.

- It was not harmful error in a suit for malicious trespass (by virtue of a levy under an execution against another) in charging to the jury the language of former Code 1933, § 105-808 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-7-47), although it relates to cases of malicious prosecution, since the rule as here generally stated was substantially similar to that of former Code 1933, § 105-2002 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5), relating to exemplary damages in cases of aggravating circumstances, which was applicable to the case, and which the judge also charged. Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587, 4 S.E.2d 458 (1939).

In a suit for malicious prosecution, a charge that "reasonable counsel fees and expenses of defending the criminal case would be legitimate items on which damages could be awarded if the plaintiff is entitled to recover" was not erroneous. Sloan v. Glaze, 72 Ga. App. 415, 33 S.E.2d 846 (1945).

Appeals court review of damage award limited in scope.

- An appeals court has no power to review and set aside the finding of the jury as to damages because their verdict is claimed to be excessive, unless it appears that the verdict was due to prejudice or bias, or was influenced by corrupt means. Kviten v. Nash, 150 Ga. App. 589, 258 S.E.2d 271 (1979).

Cited in Stewart v. Mulligan, 11 Ga. App. 660, 75 S.E. 991 (1912); Auld v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 76 Ga. App. 329, 45 S.E.2d 827 (1947); Progressive Life Ins. Co. v. Doster, 98 Ga. App. 641, 106 S.E.2d 307 (1958); Lovinger v. Pfeffer, 107 Ga. App. 636, 131 S.E.2d 137 (1963); Gibson's Prods., Inc. v. Edwards, 146 Ga. App. 678, 247 S.E.2d 183 (1978); Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 282 S.E.2d 393 (1981); Atlantic Zayre, Inc. v. Williams, 172 Ga. App. 43, 322 S.E.2d 83 (1984); Munford, Inc. v. Anglin, 174 Ga. App. 290, 329 S.E.2d 526 (1985); Willis v. Brassell, 220 Ga. App. 348, 469 S.E.2d 733 (1996); K-Mart Corp. v. Lovett, 241 Ga. App. 26, 525 S.E.2d 751 (1999).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Malicious Prosecution, § 109 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 54 C.J.S., Malicious Prosecution, §§ 148 et seq.

ALR.

- Expense of litigation, other than taxable costs, as basis of separate action against party to former suit, 39 A.L.R. 1218.

Attorneys' fees as element of damages in action for false imprisonment or arrest, or for malicious prosecution, 21 A.L.R.3d 1068.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 35 A.L.R.4th 441.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for malicious prosecution, 50 A.L.R.4th 843.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 12 A.L.R.5th 195.