O.C.G.A. § 51-7-62 (2019)
Actions for false arrest and false imprisonment for individuals suspected of film piracy
Whenever the owner, operator, or lessee of a motion picture exhibition facility or any agent or employee of the owner, operator, or lessee detains, arrests, or causes to be detained or arrested any person reasonably thought to be engaged in film piracy in violation of Code Section 16-8-62 and, as a result of the detention or arrest, the person so detained or arrested brings an action for false arrest or false imprisonment against the owner, operator, lessee, agent, or employee, no recovery shall be had by the plaintiff in such action where it is established by competent evidence:
(1) That the plaintiff had so conducted himself or herself or behaved in such manner as to cause a person of reasonable prudence to believe that the plaintiff, at or immediately prior to the time of the detention or arrest, was committing the offense of film piracy, as defined by Code Section 16-8-62; or
(2) That the manner of the detention or arrest and the length of time during which such plaintiff was detained was under all the circumstances reasonable.
History
(Code 1981, § 51-7-62, enacted by Ga. L. 2004, p. 341, § 2.)
Annotations
Cross references. - Malicious prosecution, § 51-7-40 et seq.
Law reviews. - For note on 1989 enactment of this article, see 6 Ga. St.
U.L. Rev. 337 (1989). For note on 1989 enactment of this article, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 330 (1989).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Construction. - The abusive litigation tort is in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly limited to the meaning of the language used, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit statutory terms. Kirsch v. Meredith, 211 Ga. App. 823, 440 S.E.2d 702 (1994). Under O.C.G.A. Art. 5, Ch. 7, T. 51, claims are not limited to ‘‘parties,’’ but may be made against any person who actively initiates, continues, or procures abusive proceedings. Watkins v. M & M Clays, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 54, 404 S.E.2d 141 (1991); Kirsch v. Meredith, 211 Ga. App. 823, 440 S.E.2d 702 (1994). Absolute privilege not bar. - The privilege established under O.C.G.A.
§ 51-5-8 does not bar a claim for abusive litigation pursuant to O.C.G.A. Art. 5, Ch. 7, T. 51,. Kluge v. Renn, 226 Ga. App. 898, 487 S.E.2d 391 (1997). Premature claim. - Claim for abusive litigation and attorney fees could not be maintained until underlying litigation had concluded. McCullough v. McCullough, 263 Ga. 794, 439 S.E.2d 486 (1994). Entry of consent decree barred claim. - Entry of a consent decree incorporating the parties’ settlement in a divorce proceeding barred the wife’s subsequent action against the husband for abusive litigation. Kluge v. Renn, 226 Ga. App. 898, 487 S.E.2d 391 (1997).
RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Necessity and permissibility of raising claim for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in same proceeding in
which abuse occurred - state cases, 82 ALR4th 1115.