O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 53-12-246 (2019)

Duty to avoid conflict of interest

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. (b) This Code section shall not preclude the following transactions, if fair to the beneficiaries: (1) An agreement between a trustee and a beneficiary relating to the appointment or compensation of the trustee; (2) Payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee; or (3) Performing and receiving reasonable compensation for performing services of a managerial, executive, or business advisory nature for a corporation or other business enterprise, where the trust estate owns an interest in the corporation or other business enterprise.

History

Code 1981, § 53-12-246, enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 579, § 1/SB 131.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Dual role permitted. - O.C.G.A. § 53-12-246(b) expressly recognizes that

trustees may act in a dual role when the trust estate owns an interest in a corpo-

ration or business enterprise, as long as it is fair to the beneficiaries. Rollins v. Rollins, 294 Ga. 711, 755 S.E.2d 727 (2014). Sale of trust asset to a co-trustee through a straw man. - Because there were genuine issues as to whether trustees fraudulently concealed their breach of fiduciary duty in selling the principal trust asset to a co-trustee at a discount through a straw man in 1979, tolling the statute of limitations, and whether the beneficiaries exercised diligence in discovering the fraud, summary judgment was improper. Smith v. SunTrust Bank, 325 Ga. App. 531, 754 S.E.2d 117 (2014). Making offer to distribute contingent on immunity violated trustee’s fiduciary duty. - Trustee’s offer to execute the mandatory duty to distribute trust property contingent on immunity from liability for trustee actions violated the trustee’s fiduciary duties and was for the trustee’s sole benefit and possibly to the detriment of the beneficiaries. Callaway v. Willard, 351 Ga. App. 1, 830 S.E.2d 464 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1589, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 165 (Ga. 2020). No conflict of interest existed. - Trial court erred by awarding summary judgment to a beneficiary on the question of whether the trustee acted under a conflict of interest simply by serving as trustee of the marital trust while at the same time serving as co-chair of a university’s capital campaign committee to which a gift was made from trust assets because the trustee did not stand to gain any tangible benefit solely by being co-chair of the committee while concurrently serving as trustee of the marital trust. Hasty v. Castleberry, 293 Ga. 727, 749 S.E.2d 676 (2013). Trustee’s/executor’s powers did not entitle trustee to ignore purpose of

trust or commit waste. - Trial court erred in concluding that a widow’s considerable powers of control over two testamentary trusts as trustee and executor entitled her to summary judgment on two of the children’s/beneficiaries’ claims against the trust created for the purpose of supporting them during their lifetimes; she was required to diligently and in good faith ascertain whether they required support, and her powers over the assets did not entitle her to commit waste. Peterson v. Peterson, 303 Ga. 211, 811 S.E.2d 309 (2018). Fiduciary duty of co-trustee breached. - Trial court erred by finding that the decedent’s widow, who was also a co-trustee, did not owe the appellants, two sons of the decedent and the widow, a fiduciary duty when the widow exercised power of appointment under both the marital and by-pass trusts because the court found no law excusing the widow from the widow’s fiduciary duty under the trust, even if acting solely as a beneficiary under the trust, and prior appellate decisions had found that the primary purpose of the by-pass trust was to support both the widow and the decedent’s children. Peterson v. Peterson, 352 Ga. App. 675, 835 S.E.2d 651 (2019). Jury question as to whether duty breached. - Jury question was presented as to whether two trustees of their children’s trusts acted against the interests of the beneficiaries (their children) in bad faith by amending a partnership agreement to concentrate all voting power in themselves to the exclusion of the beneficiaries, who otherwise would have become partners when they turned 45. Likewise, the trustees as partners owed duties to the trusts as partners in the partnership. Rollins v. Rollins, 338 Ga. App. 308, 790 S.E.2d 157 (2016).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2013–2026 · leading case: Callaway v. Willard., 830 S.E.2d 464 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
Callaway v. Willard., 830 S.E.2d 464 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 10× “Why would I? Lucinda argued below that, under OCGA § 53-12-246 (a), a trustee cannot condition performance of a mandatory fiduciary duty on a release from liability, and the trial court agreed.”
Peterson v. Peterson, 811 S.E.2d 309 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 2× “' " (quoting OCGA § 53-12-246 (a) ) ). For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the claims of waste on this ground.”
Peterson v. Peterson, 303 Ga. 211 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 2× “’” (quoting OCGA § 53-12-246 (a))). For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the claims of waste on this ground.”
Rollins Et Al. v. Rollins Et Al., 790 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “Georgia trust law requires trustees to “administer the trust[s] solely in the interests of the beneficiaries[,]” OCGA § 53-12-246 (a), and imposes upon them a duty of impartiality unless the “trust instrument clearly manifests an intention that the trustee shall or may favor one…”
Hasty v. Castleberry, 749 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 53-12-246 (a). That being said, here, there is no apparent or *736 inherent conflict between the interests of the Trust beneficiaries and William’s personal interests as co-chair of Reinhardt’s Capital Campaign Committee.”
Smith v. Suntrust Bank, 754 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 53-12-246 (“A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.”
Rollins v. Rollins, 766 S.E.2d 162 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “The Supreme Court found that its holding that the Appellees may act in a dual role as entity managers and as trustees was “buttressed by the legislature’s 2010 amendment to the Trust Code,” and cited OCGA § 53-12-246 (b). Rollins II, supra at 716 (1).”
Rollins v. Rollins, 755 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 2014). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 53-12-246 (b). Decided March 3, 2014.”
Glen W. Rollins v. Gary W. Rollins (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “The Supreme Court found that its holding that the Appellees may act in a dual role as entity managers and as trustees was “buttressed by the legislature’s 2010 amendment to the Trust Code,” and cited OCGA § 53-12-246 (b). Rollins II, supra at 716 (1).”
Leigh Keng v. Susie Chang Keng (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2× ““Georgia trust law requires trustees to ‘administer the trusts solely in the interests of the beneficiaries,’ OCGA § 53-12-246 (a), and imposes upon them a duty of impartiality[.”
James Farmer v. Christie Lynn Mitchell (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2× “9 OCGA § 53-12-241 (a); a duty to “administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries,” OCGA § 53-12-246 (a); and, unless the trust instrument “clearly manifests an intention that the trustee shall or may favor” certain beneficiaries, a duty to “administer a trust…”
Charles Alexander Peterson v. Cleveland Calhoun Peterson (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “See also, OCGA § 53-12-246. As such, “[t]rustees . .”
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