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2018 Georgia Code 53-12-25 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 53-12-25 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 53-12-25

TITLE 53 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES

Section 12. (Revised Trust Code of 2010) Trusts, 53-12-1 through 53-12-506.

ARTICLE 2 CREATION AND VALIDITY OF EXPRESS TRUSTS

53-12-25. Transfer of property in trust.

  1. Transfer of property in trust shall require a transfer of legal title to the trustee. In any transfer of property or any interest in property, if a trust is named as a grantee, whether such trust is held under the laws of this state or of any other jurisdiction, then such transfer is deemed to have been made to the trustee of such trust as though the trustee of such trust had been named as grantee instead of the trust.
  2. For any interest in real property to become trust property in a trust of which any transferor is a trustee, the instrument of conveyance shall additionally be recorded in the appropriate real property records.

(Code 1981, §53-12-25, enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 579, § 1/SB 131; Ga. L. 2018, p. 262, § 6/HB 121.)

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in subsection (a), substituted "property in trust" for "property to a trust" in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 295 (2013).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Wrongful death claim did not comprise the res of a technical trust.

- Creditors' 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) claim against a Chapter 13 debtor, their attorney, was dismissed because although the attorney failed to file a wrongful death complaint on the creditors' behalf and represented to the creditors that the attorney had, the creditors failed to allege a contract or other agreement establishing a technical trust. The creditors' wrongful death cause of action did not comprise the res of a technical trust because under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-25 only property subject to transfer by the settler could become the subject matter of a trust, and under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 the creditors' wrongful death action was non-transferable. Crisler v. Farr (In re Farr), Bankr. (Bankr. M.D. Ga. May 18, 2011).

Retroactive application of statute prohibited.

- Rights of the decedent's surviving spouse were already vested when the Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010 (Revised Code), O.C.G.A. § 53-12-1 et seq., was enacted because under the terms of the amended trust agreement, the surviving spouse's rights to the trust assets took effect upon the decedent's death before the Revised Code took effect. Accordingly, any new obligation imposed by the Revised Code that would have impaired the surviving spouse's right to possession could not be applied retroactively, and O.C.G.A. § 53-12-25 would have had no application to the trust if it, in fact, created such a new obligation. Rose v. Waldrip, 316 Ga. App. 812, 730 S.E.2d 529 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1888, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 981 (Ga. 2012).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 53-12-25

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Gibson v. Gibson, 301 Ga. 622 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 5, 2017 | 801 S.E.2d 40

...rial court’s rejection of Wife’s fraudulent transfer claim. Wife’s other claims are unavailing, as well, with one exception: we agree with her that transfers of the contents of two brokerage accounts into the trusts were ineffective under OCGA § 53-12-25 (a) because the *623accounts erroneously listed Husband as trustee....
...funding of the Trusts was not fraudulent. 3. Wife’s arguments that the transfers to the Trusts were invalid are unavailing, with the exception of her argument that transfers of assets held in the Charles Schwab accounts were incomplete under OCGA § 53-12-25 (a). Wife also raises various other arguments that the transfers to the trust were not legally effectuated. (a) First, Wife argues that the trial court erred in validating Husband’s purported transfer of an insurance policy and an interest in S....
...tions into the Trusts. (c) Finally, Wife argues that the trial court erred by finding that Husband’s intent to transfer $1.3 million held in accounts titled in Husband’s name as trustee of the Trusts sufficed to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 53-12-25 (a), which provides that“[t]ransfer of property to a trust shall require a transfer of legal title to the trustee.” We agree with Wife on this point. Two Charles Schwab accounts purportedly held in the Trusts bore the name of Husband as trustee.9 Rejecting Wife’s argument that this fact rendered the purported transfer of the contents of the accounts to the Trusts ineffective under OCGA § 53-12-25 (a), the trial court found it sufficient that Husband intended to title these funds in the trustee’s name....
...ver, that legal title must be transferred to the trustee. Our Trust Code does not define precisely what it means to “transfer” “legal title” to a brokerage account or its contents. But Husband does not dispute that, as a general matter, OCGA § 53-12-25 (a) means thatabrokerage account should bear the name of the trustee in order to be held in trust....
...“[I]f the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Id. at 173 (1) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted). Husband points to a Georgia trusts treatise as support for his argument that OCGA § 53-12-25 (a) does not render irrelevant evidence of a settlor’s intent. According to the treatise, the intent of the committee that drafted OCGA § 53-12-25 (a) was to avoid confusion following a settlor’s death as to which property was held by the settlor as an individual and which property was held by the settlor as trustee of a self-settled trust. See Mary F. Radford, Georgia Trusts and, Trustees § 2:4 (Dec. 2016 update). Because there need not be any confusion regarding a living settlor’s intent to gift property to a trust, Husband argues, OCGA § 53-12-25 (a) does not render a living settlor’s intent irrelevant. Husband also cites the same treatise for the notion that the committee that drafted OCGA § 53-12-25 (a) found relevant that other Georgia statutes require actual delivery of property to effectuate a gift, as proof of the donor’s intent....
...14, 26 n.17 (714 SE2d 693) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).10 Husband also argues that evidence of his intent to transfer to the Trusts title to the assets in the brokerage accounts distinguishes his situation from a Court of Appeals of Georgia decision that relied on OCGA § 53-12-25 (a) to conclude that in order for a deed to convey real property to a trust, the trustee must be designated as the grantee of legal title....
...the final verdict of the jury in the case ...Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to include the assets placed in the Schwab accounts in 2012 in its equitable division of property between the parties. The trial court ruled that even if OCGA § 53-12-25 “applie[d]” to the transfers into the Trusts generally, it did not apply to a May 2010 purported transfer, because that occurred prior to the July 1, 2010 effective date of the statute. The court relied on Rose v. Waldrip, 316 Ga. App. 812 (730 SE2d 529) (2012) (the only other Georgia appellate decision construing OCGA § 53-12-25 (a)), which held that the statute did not invalidate certain after-acquired property clauses in a trust that was executed more than eight years before the statute became effective, where the settlor died before the statute became effective, as well. That decision is distinguishable, however, because it involved a self-settled trust and relied on authority to the effect that, before enactment of OCGA § 53-12-25, “a settlor who declared a trust naming himself as trustee was not required to separately and formally transfer the designated property into the trust.” Id....
...Frankel, for appellant. We conclude that it did, at least in the case of a settlor, like Husband, who did not name himself as trustee. The Trust Code in May 2010 defined a “trustee” as “the person holding legal title to the property in trust.”11 As with the new OCGA § 53-12-25 (a), this provides that the trustee must hold legal title to the assets in question for them to be considered in trust....
...lly transfer it, because the settlor and the trustee are the same person. See Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 817-819 (1) (b) (i). And such prior authority about the lack of a requirement of formal transfer in the case of self-settled trusts explains why OCGA § 53-12-25, which does impose such a formal transfer requirement even for self-settled trusts, is not redundant of OCGA § 53-12-2’s definition of trustee....
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Forsyth Cnty. v. White, 532 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 12, 2000 | 272 Ga. 619, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2222

...In this case, the burden is upon the appellees to show that the County was under legal compulsion to approve the expansion of the Dick Creek facility. Id. Because the trust deed gives the County the authority to approve any expansion, the appellees cannot shoulder that burden. See generally OCGA § 53-12-25 ("Property may be added to an existing trust from any source in any manner if the addition is permitted by the trust instrument and the property is acceptable to the trustee.")....
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Speed v. Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 7, 1993 | 263 Ga. 166, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 2110

...For the reasons stated above, the decision of the trial court is reversed. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] Initially, the wife contends that because the husband is not a minor, incompetent, or spendthrift, a trust created for his benefit is invalid in its entirety under former OCGA § 53-12-25, see Stephens v. Stephens, 218 Ga. 671, 675 (130 SE2d 208) (1963), which was in effect at the time the trust was created. The wife argues that the 1988 repeal of OCGA § 53-12-25 (Ga....
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Rector of Christ Church v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc., 718 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2011 | 290 Ga. 95, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3631

...The National Church has not produced a valid deed that would be effective to pass *269 title in the subject property from CCS to the National Church in order to create a trust, though under Georgia law, no trust exists absent a valid deed being recorded. See OCGA § 53-12-25(b)....
...." • OCGA § 53-12-23—"A person has capacity to create an inter vivos trust to the extent that such person has legal capacity to transfer title to property inter vivos. A person has capacity to create a testamentary trust to the extent that such person has legal capacity to devise or bequeath property by will." • OCGA § 53-12-25—"(a) Transfer of property to a trust shall require a transfer of legal title to the trustee....
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Odum v. Henry, 334 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 26, 1985 | 254 Ga. 739

...or her incapable of managing his or her own property, the trust may be executed as to such person, and, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, the title and control of the trust remains in the trustee until the disability is removed. OCGA § 53-12-25; Stringfellow v....
...530, § 199 (4th ed.). The distinction between Bedgood, 220 Ga. 262, supra, and the case sub judice is the trustee scheme as originally devised. Here, Mr. Ansley created a trust for a granddaughter who labored under a disability, and pursuant to OCGA § 53-12-25, this trusteeship survives until the granddaughter's disability is removed....