O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 53-3-13 (2019)

Sale or conveyance of property by personal representative or temporary administrator prior to award

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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The right of a surviving spouse or minor child to year’s support from the estate of a decedent shall be barred by a sale or conveyance made prior to the award of year’s support by the personal representative or temporary administrator of the estate under authority of a court of competent jurisdiction or under power in a will; provided, however, that the sale or conveyance shall bar year’s support and rights to year’s support only as to the property sold or conveyed.

History

Code 1981, § 53-3-13, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 10; Ga. L. 2020, p. 377, § 1-11/HB 865.

The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, inserted ‘‘or temporary administrator’’ in this Code section.

Annotations

COMMENT This section carries forward former OCGA Sec. 53-5-14.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1972, p. 731, § 1, and former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-14 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Property of a decedent may be sold free from a year’s support only under the provisions of this statute by a sale or conveyance made under court order or under power contained in a will by the representative prior to the setting apart of such year’s support. Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga. App. 642, 188 S.E.2d 800 (1972) (decided under Ga. L. 1972, p. 731, § 1). Widow’s application for year’s support is not barred by executor’s deed of assent as to the property conveyed therein by operation of this statute. Anderson v. Groover, 242 Ga. 50, 247 S.E.2d 851 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1972, p. 731, § 1). An executor’s assent to devise does

not come within the meaning of this statute, which was intended to offer protection to third-party purchasers of property in an estate against claims for year’s support, and was not intended to exempt devises and legacies from year’s support. Anderson v. Groover, 242 Ga. 50, 247 S.E.2d 851 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1972, p. 731, § 1). Widow of the decedent was entitled to a year’s support since the estate still contained over $45,000.00 and no action had been taken by the executor to obtain the court’s permission to distribute those funds to the minor child of the decedent; the executor’s attempt to designate the funds for the minor by purchasing a cashier’s check after the application was filed by the widow was of no avail. Evans v. Evans, 236 Ga. App. 896, 514 S.E.2d 74 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-14).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Executors and Administrators, §§ 324, 326, 327.

C.J.S. - 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators, §§ 453, 456, 459, 465.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases, 1984–2012 · leading case: Garner v. Harrison, 400 S.E.2d 925 (Ga. 1991).

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Garner v. Harrison, 400 S.E.2d 925 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 6× “Boggs we held that former OCGA § 53-3-13 was unconstitutional because it did not require notice to propounders and beneficiaries of another will previously filed for probate in the same county.”

McKnight v. Boggs, 322 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 6× “This is an appeal from an order of the Glynn County Superior Court declaring unconstitutional OCGA § 53-3-13, which requires that notice to probate a will in solemn form be given only to heirs-at- *538 law.”

Ray v. Stewart, 700 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, we hold that constructive notice by publication as encompassed in OCGA §§ 29-5-80 (a) and 29-5-81 (b) does not deny one in Ray’s position due process of law under the federal or Georgia Constitutions.”

Dismuke v. Dismuke, 394 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “Although appellant also contends this lack of notice would extend even to the probating of the will, the notice provisions of OCGA §§ 53-3-13 and -14 provide to the contrary.”

Mason v. Phillips, 722 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 53-3-13 (a) (1997) (current version at OCGA § 53-5-21 (2011)).”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.