O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 53-4-21 (2019)

Knowledge of contents of will by testator

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Knowledge of the contents of a will by the testator is necessary to the validity of a will. If the testator can read, the testator’s signature or acknowledgment of that signature is presumed to show such knowledge.

History

Code 1981, § 53-4-21, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 10.

Annotations

COMMENT This section carries forward the first two sentences of OCGA Sec. 53-2-42. Former OCGA Sec. 53-2-42 also stated that greater proof will be necessary to show that the testator knew the will’s contents if the scrivener or the scrivener’s immediate family receive substantial amounts under the will. The reference is repealed as unnecessary in that suspicious circumstances such as those described will result in closer scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the will execution under the theories of duress and undue influence. Likewise, former OCGA Sec. 53-2-46, dealing with the competency required of an interpreter who is used to convey the wishes of the testator to the scrivener or the witnesses, is repealed as unnecessary. JUDICIAL DECISIONS Presumption testator knew contents of will. - Trial court did not err in granting a propounder’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether a testator’s will was properly executed because pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-4-21, the testator’s signature on the will gave rise to a presumption that she knew the contents of the will; the mere fact that only portions of the will were read aloud to the testator was of no consequence. Strong v. Holden, 287 Ga. 482, 697 S.E.2d 189 (2010).

Because a parent’s will was plain and unambiguous and did not contain a residue clause, the lapsed gift of the residue passed to the parent’s three daughters by intestacy according to O.C.G.A. § 53-465(b); although the parent expressed disappointment with two daughters and left them specific bequests of $10.00 each, the parent did not express an intent to disinherit the daughters. Banner v. Vandeford, 293 Ga. 654, 748 S.E.2d 927 (2013). Cited in Cames v. Joiner (In re Joiner), 319 B.R. 903 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 3 cases, 2004–2013 · leading case: Holland v. Holland, 596 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 2004).

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Holland v. Holland, 596 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 53-4-21 requires such an awareness: “Knowledge of the contents of a will by the testator is necessary to the validity of the will.”

Strong v. Holden, 697 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 2× “Reeves’ intent to authenticate the will cannot be questioned simply because she needed physical assistance to mark the instrument. (b) The mere fact that only portions of the will were read aloud to Reeves is of no consequence.”

Banner v. Vandeford, 748 S.E.2d 927 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 53-4-21 (if testator can read, his signature is presumed to show knowledge of contents of the will).”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.