Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1910, § 3900, former Code 1933, § 113-806, and former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Rules of construction generally.

- Rules applicable in the construction of a will are those established by the laws of Georgia and the decisions of the court, viz.: (a) every will is sui generis; (b) the first object is to find the intent of the testator; (c) such intent is to be derived from a consideration of the will as a whole and read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the will's execution; and (d) it is to be presumed that the testator intended to dispose of the testator's entire estate and not to die intestate as to any part of the testator's estate. Cumming v. Cumming, 219 Ga. 655, 135 S.E.2d 402 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Every will is a thing to itself. It is emphatically not only sui juris but sui generis. Its terms are its own law, and the application of that law by construction of itself - of the statute which the testator personally enacted, to the contestants for its bounty, is the plain duty of the court. Stringfellow v. Harman, 207 Ga. 62, 60 S.E.2d 139 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

All wills differ; each is a law unto itself, and must be construed according to the will's own terms. Bratton v. Trust Co., 191 Ga. 49, 11 S.E.2d 204 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Construction of will on ad hoc basis.

- Precedents, or adjudged cases, are of but little authority, and of dangerous application, in deciding upon the intention of a testator; the construction depends so much on each case, upon the character of the testator, the terms the testator employs, and all the surrounding circumstances. Sproull v. Graves, 194 Ga. 66, 20 S.E.2d 613 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806); Whitney v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 214 Ga. 674, 107 S.E.2d 191 (1959);(decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Presumption is that the testator intends by the testator's will to dispose of the testator's entire estate. Stephens v. Stephens, 218 Ga. 671, 130 S.E.2d 208 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Construction which results in partial intestacy is not preferred. Trust Co. Bank v. Heyward, 240 Ga. 557, 242 S.E.2d 257 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Cited in Coleman v. Harrison, 168 Ga. 859, 149 S.E. 141 (1929); Greene v. Foster, 178 Ga. 319, 173 S.E. 91 (1934); Refinance Corp. v. Wilson, 183 Ga. 336, 188 S.E. 707 (1936); Jefferson v. Bright, 189 Ga. 866, 8 S.E.2d 21 (1940); Perkins v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 190 Ga. 29, 8 S.E.2d 28 (1940); Mills v. Tyus, 195 Ga. 119, 23 S.E.2d 259 (1942); Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942); Veach v. Veach, 205 Ga. 185, 53 S.E.2d 98 (1949); Stahl v. Russell, 206 Ga. 699, 58 S.E.2d 135 (1950); First Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 209 Ga. 582, 74 S.E.2d 875 (1953); McClelland v. Johnson, 211 Ga. 348, 86 S.E.2d 97 (1955); Marsh v. Anderson, 214 Ga. 667, 107 S.E.2d 188 (1959); Dillard v. Dillard, 217 Ga. 176, 121 S.E.2d 766 (1961); Bedgood v. Thomas, 220 Ga. 262, 138 S.E.2d 313 (1964); McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 144 S.E.2d 741 (1965); Springer v. Cox, 221 Ga. 673, 146 S.E.2d 753 (1966); Pleasants v. First Nat'l Bank, 222 Ga. 316, 149 S.E.2d 696 (1966); Freedman v. Scheer, 223 Ga. 705, 157 S.E.2d 875 (1967); Williams v. Cowan, 226 Ga. 319, 174 S.E.2d 789 (1970); Ruth v. First Nat'l Bank, 230 Ga. 490, 197 S.E.2d 699 (1973); Boston v. Boston, 231 Ga. 801, 204 S.E.2d 102 (1974); Ammons v. Williams, 233 Ga. 534, 212 S.E.2d 769 (1975); Vickers v. Vickers, 234 Ga. 849, 218 S.E.2d 565 (1975); Stokes v. Trust Co., 507 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Williams, 236 Ga. 133, 223 S.E.2d 109 (1976); Grant v. Bell, 150 Ga. App. 141, 257 S.E.2d 12 (1979); Walker v. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439, 260 S.E.2d 338 (1979); Bailey v. Johnson, 245 Ga. 823, 268 S.E.2d 147 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 634 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1981); Carswell v. Waters, 254 Ga. 431, 330 S.E.2d 590 (1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins, 256 Ga. 223, 345 S.E.2d 829 (1986); Powell v. Vann, 257 Ga. 353, 359 S.E.2d 673 (1987); Cole v. Robertson, 263 Ga. 149, 429 S.E.2d 678 (1993); Dickinson v. Fueller, 265 Ga. 861, 463 S.E.2d 127 (1995); Lemmons v. Lawson, 266 Ga. 571, 468 S.E.2d 749 (1996); Bennett v. Young, 270 Ga. 422, 510 S.E.2d 521 (1999); Folsom v. Rowell, 281 Ga. 494, 640 S.E.2d 5 (2007); Wilkes v. Fraser, 324 Ga. App. 642, 751 S.E.2d 455 (2013).

Intention of testator is primary consideration.

- In the construction of wills, the intention of the testator should be the first and great object of inquiry. And this is to be sought for by looking to the whole will, and not to detached parts of the will. Sproull v. Graves, 194 Ga. 66, 20 S.E.2d 613 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806); Whitney v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 214 Ga. 674, 107 S.E.2d 191 (1959); Wolfe v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 221 Ga. 412, 144 S.E.2d 735 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806);(decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

In finding testator's intent, the court is not limited to construing only the residuary clause in question, but may look to "the four corners" of the will to discover the testator's total testamentary disposition. Kirby v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 235 Ga. 205, 219 S.E.2d 112 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Intention of the testator is not generally to be derived from mere consideration of fragmentary excerpts from the will, but from examination and consideration of every word which the testator included within the "four corners." Baker v. Citizens' & S. Nat'l Bank, 175 Ga. 161, 165 S.E. 21 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 3900).

Intentions of a testator are to be derived from a consideration of the testator's will as a whole, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and are not to be determined by arbitrary conjecture as to what the testator meant nor by consideration of detached portions of the will. Aiken v. Aiken, 209 Ga. 819, 76 S.E.2d 481 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Intent of testator is to control.

- It is axiomatic in the construction of wills that the intent of the testator as gathered from the entire instrument is to control. If two clauses of a will are so inconsistent that both cannot stand, the latter will prevail; but the whole will is to be taken together, and operation is to be given every part of it, if this can be done without violating its terms or the intention of the testator. And the intention of the testator is to be sought by looking to the whole will rather than to detached parts of the will. Watts v. Finley, 187 Ga. 629, 1 S.E.2d 723 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Intention of the testator is to absolutely control. Not only may the rules of grammar be entirely disregarded in order to carry into effect the manifest intention of the testator, but even well-defined technical terms of the law will be given an unusual meaning, or will be held to be meaningless, when it is clear from the provisions in the will that the testator did not use them in their technical sense, or when, to carry out the testator's intention, it is necessary to entirely disregard such technical terms. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 192 Ga. 754, 16 S.E.2d 743 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

In construing a will the court is required to examine the will as a whole and to search diligently for the intention of the testator as the same may be revealed therein. This search for the intention of the testator should be made by two methods: (1) by looking to the will as a whole; and (2) by scrutinizing every phrase that the will contains. Patterson v. Patterson, 208 Ga. 17, 64 S.E.2d 585 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

In searching for the testator's intent, the court must look diligently to the entire will and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of the will's execution. Wolfe v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 221 Ga. 412, 144 S.E.2d 735 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

In the construction of a will, as in the construction of other legal documents, the cardinal rule is to ascertain the intention of the maker. Hines v. Village of St. Joseph, Inc., 227 Ga. 431, 181 S.E.2d 54 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Examination of four corners of will.

- Court's primary guide in construing a will is the testator's intention as it may be gathered from the four corners of the document. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 192 Ga. 754, 16 S.E.2d 743 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806); Worley v. Smith, 236 Ga. 888, 225 S.E.2d 911 (1976);(decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

When the language of a will is clear and can be given legal effect as it stands, the courts will not, by construction, give the will a different effect. Crow v. Lewis, 223 Ga. 872, 159 S.E.2d 77 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Intention of testator.

- Cardinal principle in the interpretation of a will is to give effect to the testator's intention, when it can be ascertained from the will, and when such intention is not incompatible with established rules of law and equity. Bratton v. Trust Co., 191 Ga. 49, 11 S.E.2d 204 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Intention of the testator is imperative on the courts, unless it is in conflict with some established rule of law. If it is, the law is more imperious than the intention, and the latter will yield to the former. The law, though, in order to defeat the intention, must be clearly and decidedly in conflict with it. Lane v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 195 Ga. 828, 25 S.E.2d 800 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Every court must determine for itself what the intention of the testator is in the particular case before the court, and that intention should be carried into effect, provided the intention be not unlawful. Whitney v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 214 Ga. 674, 107 S.E.2d 191 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

When the language of a will is clear, and can be given legal effect as the will stands, the court will not, by construction, give the will a different effect. Seymour v. Presley, 239 Ga. 572, 238 S.E.2d 347 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Courts are without authority to rewrite by construction an unambiguous will; for to do that would be to substitute the will of the court for that of the testator. Hungerford v. Trust Co., 190 Ga. 387, 9 S.E.2d 630 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

In order to construe item 14 of the will as the petitioners contend it should be, it would be necessary to make deletions and substitutions in the language of the testator, and this court is not authorized to do this, since the item as written has a logical meaning, consistent with the rules of law, which can be given effect. When the language of a will is clear and can be given legal effect as the will stands, the courts will not, by construction, give the will a different effect. Veal v. King, 216 Ga. 298, 116 S.E.2d 223 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Duly executed written will, with unambiguous terms, cannot be reformed by adding a provision to the will. Lining v. Jackson, 203 Ga. 22, 45 S.E.2d 410 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Court should construe to give effect to testator's intent.

- If the intention of the testator is clear as it stands, it is the duty of the court to so construe it, regardless of any opinion the court may have as to a different testamentary intention. Davant v. Shaw, 206 Ga. 843, 59 S.E.2d 500 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Terms of an unambiguous will may not be changed by extrinsic evidence; if a clause in a will as the will stands may have effect, it shall be so construed, however well satisfied the court may be of a different testamentary intention. Butler v. Prudden, 182 Ga. 189, 185 S.E. 102 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

An estate clearly fixed and devised in one item will not be diminished or enlarged by a subsequent item, unless the language and general context clearly and unmistakably discloses such to be the testator's purpose and intent. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 192 Ga. 754, 16 S.E.2d 743 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

If two clauses of a will are so inconsistent that both cannot stand, the later will prevail, but the whole will is to be taken together, and operation is to be given to every part of the will, if this can be done without violating the will's terms or the intention of the testator. Barker v. Haunson, 174 Ga. 492, 163 S.E. 163 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 3900).

When, the devise apparently passes a fee-simple estate and does so merely because of the absence of an expressed intent as to what character of estate was actually intended to be devised, and in a subsequent provision the property is devised to others at the death of the first devisee, such provisions should be held to grant a life-estate with remainder over, else such subsequent provision must be held to have no meaning. Watts v. Finley, 187 Ga. 629, 1 S.E.2d 723 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Clear, definite will prevails over uncertain codicil.

- Provisions of a will are not revoked by a codicil, the language of which is capable of any other reasonable construction, or is less clear and certain than that used in the will. Barker v. Haunson, 174 Ga. 492, 163 S.E. 163 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 3900).

When a provision in a will is clear, certain, and definite in regard to a bequest, a codicil which is not certain and definite, its language being capable of some other reasonable construction, and which makes nonmandatory the terms of the original bequest only as to the specific form of fulfillment, and does not alter the mandatory character of the original bequest as to the will's general purpose, will not work a revocation. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 192 Ga. 754, 16 S.E.2d 743 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Intent of in terrorem clause.

- Given a widow's commission of undue influence in procuring a conveyance of beach property to herself and her son, it was not the decedent's intent in including an in terrorem clause to wholly immunize her from the entire amount of attorney's fees incurred by the estate in the undue influence litigation. Her share of the estate, like all the bequests, would be reduced in value after payment of the fees under O.C.G.A. § 53-7-6(4). Pate v. Wilson, 286 Ga. 133, 686 S.E.2d 88 (2009).

Will is to be construed by the law as the will existed at the death of the testator, and the testator's intention will yield to the law only when it clearly and decidedly conflicts therewith. Bailes v. Halsey, 179 Ga. 182, 175 S.E. 472 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

While the intention of a testator cannot be given effect if contrary to express enactments of the legislature or positive rules of property, in the construction of a will the cardinal rule is that the intention of the testator should be the first and great object of inquiry, and this is to be sought for by looking to the whole will, and not to detached parts of the will, and when so ascertained, shall be given effect as far as may be consistent with the rules of law. Love v. McManus, 208 Ga. 447, 67 S.E.2d 218 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Will is to be construed under the law in effect at the testator's death. But this is only one of the rules of construction and is applicable only when no expression on the subject was made by the testator. Carnegie v. First Nat'l Bank, 218 Ga. 585, 129 S.E.2d 780 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Rights of adopted child a question of testator's intent.

- In construing the rights of an adopted child to take under a will, it is not a question of the right of the adopted child to inherit but simply a question of the testator's intent with respect to those who are to share in the estate. Thomas v. Trust Co. Bank, 247 Ga. 693, 279 S.E.2d 440 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

When a testator used the phrase "children of his body" evidencing an intent to include only natural children of her grandsons, and used the term "children, or descendants thereof" in describing the remaindermen in the testator's codicil, the testator's will was properly construed as excluding the adopted great-grandchildren. Epstein v. First Nat'l Bank, 260 Ga. 217, 391 S.E.2d 924 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91).

Grandchildren take nothing in a will when children take bequests in their own stead.

- Motion for summary judgment of the testator's grandchildren in an action against their three uncles alleging that the grandchildren had an interest in the property that comprised the testator's estate was properly denied because the plain language of the will indicated that the testator did not intend that the bequests follow the law of intestacy, and the presumption in favor of a per stirpes distribution in the anti-lapse statute was overcome; the use of the phrase "per capita" in the will imposed a requirement that the individuals named, the testator's children, take the bequests in the children's own stead, and that the children had to survive the testator; and the grandchildren's mother, the testator's daughter, did not survive the testator. Piccione v. Arp, 302 Ga. 270, 806 S.E.2d 589 (2017).

Inconsistent subprovision.

- In the construction of a will, it is a cardinal rule, imposed by former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91, that the court shall strive diligently to ascertain the intent of the testator and give effect to it so far as consistent with the law. Therefore, inasmuch as subprovision of will did not plainly manifest an intent of the testator contrary to the legal presumption that distribution should be per stirpes, the trial court did not err in attempting to construe the apparently inconsistent language of the subprovision in the context of the entire will. In re Last Will of Lewis, 263 Ga. 349, 434 S.E.2d 472 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91).

Testator's intent on appointment of executor.

- When a will named the testator's mother as executor, with the testator's daughter as executor "in the event that my mother should predecease me," and the mother was living but incompetent when the testator died, the will was properly construed as not naming a successor executor. Robbins v. Vanbrackle, 267 Ga. 871, 485 S.E.2d 468 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91).

"Heirs" and "children" have same meaning.

- Weight of authority is to the effect that generally the terms "heirs" and "children" in popular sense have the same significance. Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 24 S.E.2d 381 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

In order to prevent the phrase "or their bodily heirs" from becoming meaningless, it is logical to assume that the testator intended that, after the testator's residuary estate had vested in the testator's children who were in life at the testator's death, if any of these children should die before a complete determination and distribution of the residuary estate, their heirs would stand in the place of the deceased children. Veal v. King, 216 Ga. 298, 116 S.E.2d 223 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Only logical construction of "my surviving children or their bodily heirs" is that the words "their bodily heirs" mean children of the testator's children who survive the testator's death. Veal v. King, 216 Ga. 298, 116 S.E.2d 223 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

"Bodily heirs" mean children. Veal v. King, 216 Ga. 198, 116 S.E.2d 223 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Ordinary meaning of the words "my surviving children" is the children of the testator surviving the testator at the testator's death. Veal v. King, 216 Ga. 298, 116 S.E.2d 223 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Testamentary provision to the effect that "whatever amount may be over when the donations are all made is to be equally divided among my sisters and brothers" constitutes a gift to a class consisting of testator's sisters and brothers living at the time of testator's death, to the exclusion of descendants of a sister and brother predeceasing testator. Johns v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 206 Ga. 313, 57 S.E.2d 182 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Word "or" is frequently used to connect two others expressing the same idea. When so used, the word "or," in a grammatical sense, is equivalent to "being" and may be so construed in a will. Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 24 S.E.2d 381 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

"Need" defined.

- Term "need" refers to the beneficiary's health, maintenance, and support consistent with the beneficiary's accustomed manner of living, but may include other areas if specific provision is made therefor in the will. Wright v. Trust Co. Bank, 260 Ga. 414, 396 S.E.2d 213 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91).

Use of parol evidence.

- While parol evidence in some instances is authorized to explain an ambiguity in a will, oral testimony would be inadmissible for the purpose of inserting an entirely new clause in a will to dispose of an interest in property which the testator failed to devise. Lining v. Jackson, 203 Ga. 22, 45 S.E.2d 410 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

When there is no ambiguity in the instrument, parol evidence is inadmissible to add to, to modify, vary, or change the will. Hines v. Village of St. Joseph, Inc., 227 Ga. 431, 181 S.E.2d 54 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Declarations of testator admissible on issue of undue influence.

- Declarations of a testator freely and voluntarily made prior to the execution of the testator's will manifesting a long-continued purpose to dispose of the testator's property in a particular manner would be admissible on the issue as to whether undue influences had been exercised or not. Clements v. Clements, 247 Ga. 787, 279 S.E.2d 698 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Charge on inadmissibility of parol evidence applies to will construction cases, not will validity cases. Clements v. Clements, 247 Ga. 787, 279 S.E.2d 698 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Estates devised absolutely in fee simple.

- Courts will not by construction reduce an estate once devised absolutely in fee, by limitations contained in subsequent parts of the will, unless the intention to limit the devise is clearly and unmistakably manifest. Barker v. Haunson, 174 Ga. 492, 163 S.E. 163 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 3900).

When, in a will, property is devised in language sufficient to pass a fee-simple estate, the will should not be held to convey a lesser estate unless it is clear from a subsequent provision of the will that such was the intention of the testator. Watts v. Finley, 187 Ga. 629, 1 S.E.2d 723 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

When under the terms of the will, bequest in controversy was to vest unconditionally and in fee simple in a named brother of the testator upon his claiming such bequest within a stated period (otherwise to go to a designated legatee), and the brother claimed the bequest within the time limited, the title became vested unconditionally in the brother, and the bequest did not pass to the alternative legatee. Lassiter v. Bank of Dawson, 191 Ga. 208, 11 S.E.2d 910 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Language conditioning bequests to sons-in-law, "provided they are living with their present wives at the time of my death," has but one meaning and is unambiguous and legatee's contention that the son was prevented from meeting the condition by his wife's death, and that it was therefore ineffective, was without merit. Hungerford v. Trust Co., 190 Ga. 387, 9 S.E.2d 630 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

When a will is susceptible of such interpretation, a provision creating a remainder shall be construed "so as to vest the estate indefeasibly at the earliest possible period of time." Buchanan v. Nicholson, 192 Ga. 754, 16 S.E.2d 743 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

When will devised all the property to the wife in fee simple, "to be used and disposed of in anywise as she may deem fit and proper for the exclusive benefit of herself and/or" their minor children and in the next paragraph disclosed that it was the testator's intention to leave the testator's estate in fee simple to the testator's spouse and their minor children with the testator's grown children receiving no share or claim upon the property, the property was devised to the wife absolutely and in fee simple. Aiken v. Aiken, 209 Ga. 819, 76 S.E.2d 481 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Court will not by construction reduce an estate devised absolutely in fee simple because of limitations in subsequent parts of the will unless the intent to limit the devise is clearly and unmistakably manifested, all doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the absolute estate. Aiken v. Aiken, 209 Ga. 819, 76 S.E.2d 481 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Will bequeathing entire estate to testator's wife and further stating desire that upon wife's death, estate would pass to their son, gave wife fee simple rather than life estate. Chandler v. Chandler, 249 Ga. 575, 292 S.E.2d 685 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91).

Precatory words following gift of fee will not "cut down" interest devised. Chandler v. Chandler, 249 Ga. 575, 292 S.E.2d 685 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-91).

When testator intent unclear.

- In cases of real doubt as to the nature of the bequest, whether general or special, if the intention of the testator in respect thereto cannot be clearly ascertained from the will, the law will declare it general and not special. Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 Ga. 175, 5 S.E.2d 636 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

In determining whether a particular bequest is general or special, resort must be had not alone to the particular item creating it, but to the will as a whole, in order to ascertain the intention of the testator which if it may be there discovered must control. Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 Ga. 175, 5 S.E.2d 636 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Motive in making a bequest is a legitimate field for judicial inquiry only to the extent that the motive may illuminate the vital question of intent, when, due to the uncertain and ambiguous language of the will, the testator's intent is doubtful. Hungerford v. Trust Co., 190 Ga. 387, 9 S.E.2d 630 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Language requiring distribution per capita versus per stirpes.

- In the absence of anything in the will to the contrary, the presumption is that an ancestor intends that the ancestor's property should go where the law carries the property, which is supposed to be the channel of natural descent; and that the use of such terms as "in equal shares," or "share and share alike," or "equally divided," would not alone be sufficient to overcome this presumption and require a distribution per capita when the statute would require a distribution per stirpes. Harrison v. Odom, 241 Ga. 284, 244 S.E.2d 874 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Grandchildren take nothing in a will under a bequest to children as a class, unless there be something to indicate and effectuate an intention that the grandchildren should take the interest of their parent who dies before the testator. Veal v. King, 216 Ga. 298, 116 S.E.2d 223 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-806).

Testator's ignorance of all of personal property.

- When the right of the testator to receive the moneys in question constituted personal property, and was included within the description "all my personal property," the mere fact that the testator was ignorant of the existence of such right is insufficient to show that the testator did not intend that all of the testator's personal property, whether known or unknown, should go to the testator's wife and daughter as stated in the testator's will. Evans v. Pennington, 177 Ga. 56, 169 S.E. 349 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 3900).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 80 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills, § 1008 et seq., 1024, 1025.

C.J.S.

- 96 C.J.S., Wills, §§ 819, 847, 849, 857, 858.

ALR.

- Direction in will that legacies be paid out of the personal estate as affecting right to charge real estate therewith, 26 A.L.R. 648.

What is included in terms "notes," "securities," etc., in a bequest, 52 A.L.R. 1097.

Practical construction placed on will by parties interested, 67 A.L.R. 1272.

Term "heirs" in will as including legatees or devisees, 70 A.L.R. 581.

Content and effect of symbol or abbreviation "&c." or "etc.,", 77 A.L.R. 879.

Devise or bequest to country or political division without specification of particular purpose as a charitable devise or bequest, 82 A.L.R. 476.

Intention of testator as defeating operation of statute to prevent lapses, 92 A.L.R. 846; 63 A.L.R.2d 1172.

What is included in term "money" in will, 93 A.L.R. 514; 173 A.L.R. 656.

Phrase "from and after" death of life beneficiary as affecting character of remainder as vested or contingent, 103 A.L.R. 598.

Disinheritance provision of will as affecting construction of will as regards children or descendants of person disinherited, 112 A.L.R. 284.

Construction and application of provision of will expressly giving executor or trustee power to mortgage realty, 115 A.L.R. 1417.

Meaning of term "issue" when used as a word of purchase, 117 A.L.R. 691.

Doctrine of equitable conversion as affected by discretion as to time, manner or other circumstances of sale, where the duty to sell is mandatory, 124 A.L.R. 1448.

Word "now" or other word of time in will as relating to date of execution of will or date of death of testator, 125 A.L.R. 790.

Possibility of avoiding or limiting effect of clause in later will purporting to revoke all former wills, 125 A.L.R. 936.

Execution, by donee of power, of deed, mortgage, or will not referring to the power as exercise thereof, 127 A.L.R. 248.

Time as of which members of class described as testator's "heirs," "next of kin," "relations," etc., to whom a future gift is made are to be ascertained, 127 A.L.R. 602; 169 A.L.R. 207.

Provision in trust instrument making solvency of beneficiary, or discharge of his debts, a condition precedent to his receipt of trust property, 138 A.L.R. 1336.

Vested or contingent character of remainder as affected by fact that, if vested, certain person or persons will share in the property who were excluded by express terms of the will, 138 A.L.R. 1435.

Disposition of share of one of two or more life tenants or beneficiaries of income accruing between his death and the death of the last survivor of the beneficiaries under a will or other instrument which postpones the remainder until the latter event, without providing for such disposition, 140 A.L.R. 841; 71 A.L.R.2d 1332.

Incorporation of extrinsic writings in will by reference, 144 A.L.R. 714; 173 A.L.R. 568.

Equitable conversion by will as affected by total or partial failure of testator's purpose, 144 A.L.R. 1236.

Validity, construction, and effect of provision in will regarding amount payable for attorneys' services, 148 A.L.R. 362.

Education of beneficiary, or children of beneficiary, as within contemplation of provision of will or trust instrument permitting encroachment upon principal, 148 A.L.R. 1039.

Wills: significance and effect of statement of value or par value in specific legacy of bonds or stock, 151 A.L.R. 969.

When existence of institution named as beneficiary deemed to have ended, within contemplation of provision of will in that regard, 152 A.L.R. 1303.

Designation of legatee or devisee by abbreviation, 153 A.L.R. 486.

When bequest deemed to cover or include accounts receivable or other money obligations owned by testator, 154 A.L.R. 973.

Who included in term "family" in bequest or devise, 154 A.L.R. 1411.

Construction and application of phrase "understanding age" or similar obscure phrase, fixing the time when beneficiaries of trust or will shall receive principal or income, 157 A.L.R. 139.

Time as of which "heirs" or "next of kin" descriptive of beneficiaries of a devise or bequest are to be determined where ancestor predeceases the testator, 162 A.L.R. 716.

Prior estate as affected by remainder void for remoteness, 168 A.L.R. 321.

Respective rights and obligations of testamentary trustee and one whom will permits to occupy property, 172 A.L.R. 1283.

Effect of error in mentioning the number who are to take under a devise or legacy to persons described as a class, 173 A.L.R. 1012.

Construction and effect of general legacy conditional upon ademption of specific legacy or devise to legatee, 2 A.L.R.2d 819.

Phrase in will, "subject to payment of debts," and the like, as charging particular devise or bequest with debts, in exoneration of property otherwise subject thereto, 2 A.L.R.2d 1310.

What constitutes oil or gas "royalty," or "royalties," within language of conveyance, exception, reservation, devise, or assignment, 4 A.L.R.2d 492.

Enlarged interest acquired by testator after execution of will as passing by devise or bequest, 18 A.L.R.2d 519.

Nature of remainders created by will giving life estate to spouse of testator, with remainder to be divided equally between testator's heirs and spouse's heirs, 19 A.L.R.2d 371.

Who is "child," "issue," "descendant," "relation," "heir," etc., within antilapse statute describing the person taking through or from the legatee or devisee, 19 A.L.R.2d 1159.

Words of survivorship in will disposing of estate in remainder as referable to death of testator or to termination of intervening estate, 20 A.L.R.2d 830.

Nontrust life estate expressly given for support and maintenance, as limited thereto, 26 A.L.R.2d 1207.

Term "next of kin" used in will, as referring to those who would take in cases of intestacy under distribution statutes, or to nearest blood relatives of designated person or persons, 32 A.L.R.2d 296.

Validity and effect of provision in will regulating or controlling beneficiary's residence, 35 A.L.R.2d 387.

Purview of gift, charge, or like, for "college education,", 36 A.L.R.2d 1323.

What passes under, and is included in, devise of "home" or "home place,", 38 A.L.R.2d 840.

What passes under term "things" or "personal things" in will, 41 A.L.R.2d 946.

Provision of will that children, etc., of remainderman who dies before expiration of precedent estate or time fixed for distribution to remaindermen, shall take the share to which he would have been entitled, as affecting the character of remainder as vested or contingent, 47 A.L.R.2d 900.

What constitutes contest or attempt to defeat will within provision thereof forfeiting share of contesting beneficiary, 49 A.L.R.2d 198.

Testamentary gift to class or group of specified relationship as including those of half blood, 49 A.L.R.2d 1362.

Construction and effect of proviso of will that "in case of the death" of a devisee or legatee, or "if he die" (or equivalent expression), the property shall go to another, 51 A.L.R.2d 205.

Admissibility of subsequent declarations of settlor to aid interpretation of trust, 51 A.L.R.2d 820.

Spouse's right to take under other spouse's will as affected by antenuptial or postnuptial agreement or property settlement, 53 A.L.R.2d 475.

Applicability of antilapse statutes to class gifts, 56 A.L.R.2d 948.

Determination as to whether testator intended to dispose of property belonging to devisee or legatee so as to put latter to election, 60 A.L.R.2d 736.

Construction of devise to persons as joint tenants and expressly to the survivor of them or to them, "with the right of survivorship,", 69 A.L.R.2d 1058.

Changing, deleting, or adding punctuation in construing will, 70 A.L.R.2d 215.

Person entitled to devise or bequest to "husband," "wife," or "widow,", 75 A.L.R.2d 1413.

Wills: "stocks" as including bonds or other securities, 76 A.L.R.2d 243.

Construction and effect of will provision releasing or forgiving debt due testator, 76 A.L.R.2d 1020.

Husband or wife as heir within provision of will or trust, 79 A.L.R.2d 1438.

Effect of mistake of draftsman (other than testator) in drawing will, 90 A.L.R.2d 924.

Effect of will provision cutting off heir or next of kin, or restricting him to provision made, to exclude him from distribution of intestate property, 100 A.L.R.2d 325.

Bequest of stated amount to several legatees as entitling each to full amount or proportionate share thereof, 1 A.L.R.3d 479.

What passes under legacy or bequest of things found or contained in particular place or container, 5 A.L.R.3d 466.

Revocation of will as affecting codicil and vice versa, 7 A.L.R.3d 1143.

Validity, construction, and effect of bequest or devise to a person's estate, or to the person or his estate, 10 A.L.R.3d 483.

Disposition of all or residue of testator's property, without referring to power of appointment, as constituting sufficient manifestation of intention to exercise power, in absence of statute, 15 A.L.R.3d 346.

Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to clarify location of real property devised in a will, 16 A.L.R.3d 386.

Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to identify stocks, bonds, and other securities disposed of by will, 16 A.L.R.3d 432.

Wills: validity and construction of gift to A or B, or to A or B or survivor, 19 A.L.R.3d 1213.

Wills: admissibility of extrinsic evidence to determine whether fee or absolute interest, or only estate for life or years, was given, 21 A.L.R.3d 778.

Wills: bequest or devise referring to services to be rendered by donee to testator during latter's lifetime as absolute or conditioned gift, 22 A.L.R.3d 771.

Testamentary devise or bequest conditioned upon beneficiary's supporting or rendering services to named person as providing for condition subsequent or precedent, 25 A.L.R.3d 762.

What passes under term "securities" in will, 27 A.L.R.3d 1386.

What passes under terms "cash," "cash on hand," or "cash assets" in will, 27 A.L.R.3d 1406.

What passes under term "business" or "business enterprise" in will, 28 A.L.R.3d 1169.

Testamentary gift to children as including stepchild, 28 A.L.R.3d 1307.

What passes under, and is included in, devise of "building," "house," or "dwelling house,", 29 A.L.R.3d 574.

What passes under terms "personal belongings," "belongings," "personal effects," or "effects" in will, 30 A.L.R.3d 797.

Disposition of property of inter vivos trust falling in after death of settlor, who left will making no express disposition of the trust property, 30 A.L.R.3d 1318.

Wills: term "heirs" as restricted to meaning "children,", 37 A.L.R.3d 9.

Change in stock or corporate structure, or split or substitution of stock of corporation as affecting bequest of stock, 46 A.L.R.3d 7.

Wills: gift over to "survivors" of class or group of designated beneficiaries as restricted to surviving members of class or group, or as passing to heirs or representatives of deceased beneficiary, 54 A.L.R.3d 280.

Validity and construction of bequest with limitation over to another in event that original beneficiary dies before distribution, payment, or receipt thereof, 59 A.L.R.3d 1043.

Construction of reference in will to statute where pertinent provisions of statute are subsequently changed by amendment or repeal, 63 A.L.R.3d 603.

Wills: separate gifts to same person in same or substantially same amounts made in separate wills or codicils, as cumulative or substitutionary, 65 A.L.R.3d 1325.

Construction and effect of will provisions expressly relating to the burden of estate or inheritance taxes, 69 A.L.R.3d 122.

Construction and effect of will provisions not expressly mentioning payment of death taxes but relied on as affecting the burden of estate or inheritance taxes, 70 A.L.R.3d 630.

Construction and effect of will provisions relied on as affecting payment of real or personal property taxes or income taxes, 70 A.L.R.3d 726.

Term "money" or "moneys" in will as including real property, 76 A.L.R.3d 1254.

Time in which option created by will to purchase real estate is to be exercised, 82 A.L.R.3d 790.

Wills: effect of gift to be disposed of "As Already Agreed" upon or the like, 85 A.L.R.3d 1181.

Base for determining amount of bequest of a specific percent or proportion of estate or property, 87 A.L.R.3d 605.

Validity and enforceability of provision of will or trust instrument for forfeiture or reduction of share of contesting beneficiary, 23 A.L.R.4th 369.

Word "child" or "children" in will as including grandchild or grandchildren, 30 A.L.R.4th 319.

Wills: what constitutes "bank," "checking," or "savings" account, within meaning of bequest, 31 A.L.R.4th 688.

Adoption as precluding testamentary gift under natural relative's will, 71 A.L.R.4th 374.

What constitutes contest or attempt to defeat will within provision thereof forfeiting share of contesting beneficiary, 3 A.L.R.5th 590.

What passes under term "personal property" in will, 31 A.L.R.5th 499.

Adopted child as within class named in deed or inter vivos trust instrument, 37 A.L.R.5th 237.