Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 113-210, and former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Application only to mistake arising from mere ignorance.

- There is a difference between a "mistake" arising from mere ignorance and one which results from an error of judgment after investigation or from negligent or willful failure to make a proper investigation by means of which the truth could be readily and surely ascertained. It is to such a mistake as that first indicated that the statute applied; it could not have been intended to operate in instances of the latter character. Thornton v. Hulme, 218 Ga. 480, 128 S.E.2d 744 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-210); Herrin v. Herrin, 224 Ga. 579, 163 S.E.2d 713 (1968); Yancey v. Hall, 265 Ga. 466, 458 S.E.2d 121 (1995) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-210); Joseph v. Grisham, 267 Ga. 677, 482 S.E.2d 251 (1997);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8).

Will can be set aside for mistake of fact arising from ignorance, but not from an error in judgment after an investigation or after willful failure to investigate. Hammett v. Reynolds, 243 Ga. 669, 256 S.E.2d 354 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-210).

Error in judgment does not constitute mistake of fact.

- Mere fact that a testator bequeathed to the testator's daughter a note in the testator's possession, executed by her to the testator, which had been paid, did not show such a mistake of fact as to the conduct of an heir at law as is contemplated by law, so as to justify a finding that the testator should be deemed to have died intestate as to such heir at law. Watkins v. Jones, 184 Ga. 831, 193 S.E. 889 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-210).

When caveator insists that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for propounder because the evidence shows that the will was executed under a mistake of fact as to the conduct of caveator, the heir at law of testator, viz: that caveator was continuing to assert a right to one-half of the property whereas caveator was not continuing to assert such a right, caveator's evidence shows no more than an erroneous deduction or conclusion by testator that because caveator once asserted a right to one-half of the property, caveator was continuing to do so. This is not ignorance of the basic facts. It is at most an error of judgment resulting from a failure to make an investigation of the matter, which does not constitute a mistake of fact. Thornton v. Hulme, 218 Ga. 480, 128 S.E.2d 744 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-210).

Caveat to a will filed by the testator's wife on the ground that the testator mistakenly believed the wife had signed an enforceable antenuptial agreement did not allege a mistake of fact, but a mistake of judgment; the testator knew as a fact that she signed the agreement; whether the testator believed it was enforceable was a matter of judgment. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 266 Ga. 612, 469 S.E.2d 198 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8).

Purported mistake of the testator relating to her belief that she owned certain property which was claimed to be owned by son was not a mistake of fact as to the existence or conduct of an heir. Shore v. Malloy, 267 Ga. 44, 472 S.E.2d 303 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8).

Mistake of fact as to conduct of heir as to such heir.

- When court submitted to the jury the issue of whether the will was executed by the testator under a mistake of fact as to the conduct of the caveatrices, and properly instructed the jury that if the jury found the will to have been so executed it would be inoperative as to such heir or heirs, it was error to instruct the jury that, if the jury found the will to have been so executed, the jury should return a verdict finding against the will as a whole. Moreland v. Word, 209 Ga. 463, 74 S.E.2d 82 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-210).

Law does not require that a father provide for the support of his children after his death; public policy, of course, favors the support of minor children by the father's estate after death. Russell v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 247 Ga. 556, 276 S.E.2d 641, overruled on other grounds, Dolvin v. Dolvin, 248 Ga. 439, 284 S.E.2d 254 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8).

Prejudiced attitude toward own children insufficient to raise issue of incompetence.

- Law does not say, because a man is narrowminded, prejudiced, unforgiving, or even mean in his relations to some of his children, that he is incompetent to make a will, and the testimony of witnesses that he is incapable or incompetent because of such an attitude toward a child cannot make an issue for the jury to pass upon. Watkins v. Jones, 184 Ga. 831, 193 S.E. 889 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-210).

Despite testator's erroneous belief that the testator's son had stolen money, caveator could still not recover, as the only mistake affecting a will is the testator's erroneous belief that a child is dead. Harper v. Harper, 274 Ga. 542, 554 S.E.2d 454 (2001).

Cited in Scott v. Wimberly, 188 Ga. 148, 3 S.E.2d 71 (1939); Davis v. Aultman, 199 Ga. 129, 33 S.E.2d 317 (1945); Lee v. Boyer, 217 Ga. 27, 120 S.E.2d 757 (1961); Clavin v. Clavin, 238 Ga. 421, 233 S.E.2d 151 (1977); Russell v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 248 Ga. 421, 283 S.E.2d 879 (1981).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills, § 399 et seq.

8B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Descent and Distribution, § 1.

C.J.S.

- 95 C.J.S., Wills, § 344.

ALR.

- Mistake as to one's interest in land under law of descent as subject of relief, 39 A.L.R. 194.

Pretermitted heir statutes: what constitutes sufficient testamentary reference to, or evidence of contemplation of, heir to render statute inapplicable, 83 A.L.R.4th 779.